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Abstract 
The concept of autonomy has acquired paramount status in English medical law, medical 
ethics and philosophy. Using the methodology of grounded theory, and three iterative 
cycles of enquiry of the medical law reports and the literature, this thesis investigates 
how and why judges use and interpret autonomy in ethically-contentious medical law 
cases. Each cycle of enquiry reveals its internal limitations, prompting further 
engagement with the data in order to overcome those limitations and deepen the level of 
understanding and explanation.  
 
The first cycle of empirical enquiry describes variation in judicial usage of the autonomy 
concept in the law reports but gives way to a second  cycle of hermeneutical enquiry in 
order to advance understanding of what judges mean in their use of it. Concurrent 
analysis of the literature on autonomy reveals a progressive development from a partial 
view of autonomy as body and mind towards an emerging holistic concept as the identity 
and capability of the person. The failure of hermeneutical enquiry to explain judicial 
variations in meaning and interpretation leads to a third cycle of enquiry based on critical 
realist analysis, examining the underlying social structures and traditions that may 
influence judicial variations in usage. Using MacIntyre’s concept of tradition, and 
Brandom’s tools of inferential analysis, the thesis explores whether the law reports 
reveal the influence on judicial usage of traditions of legal rationality – common law, 
statute law, and European human rights law – and whether these legal traditions are 
influenced by wider traditions of moral and political order.  
 
The emergent theory of the research, developed through the iterative cycles of enquiry of 
the data is that judges have developed a community of practice which has over time 
elaborated a sophisticated ethical language of autonomy to mediate the influence of 
different legal traditions and, in so doing, has constituted a new practice of medical 
jurisprudence.  
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Prologue 
 
The genesis of this research 
The idea for this thesis initially emerged from a sense of unease which I began to 
experience as a practising barrister in the mid-80s, specialising in medical and 
personal injury law. It has continued throughout my academic career as a sessional 
teacher of medical ethics and law at a British university, and as an Anglican parish 
priest with responsibilities involving pastoral care of the sick and dying. In the 
1980s, I had the sense that autonomy was being oversold as a principle in medical 
ethics  and that its supremacy was being achieved at the expense of other important 
ethical principles, in particular the effect that an unqualified right to autonomy gave 
the individual to make decisions which might have profoundly negative 
consequences for others.  
 
This impression was reinforced in the course of preparing a co-authored article for 
publication on the ethics of separation surgery on conjoined twins following the 
celebrated legal case of Maltese conjoined twins, known for legal purposes as ‘Jodie’ 
and ‘Mary’(Bratton & Chetwynd, 2004). The suggestion of the third Court of Appeal 
judge, Lord Justice Robert Walker, that fatal surgery for the weaker of the twins, 
‘Mary’, would be in her best interests because it would restore to her that bodily 
integrity and autonomy than nature had denied her was startling. It seemed to 
exemplify the insight of the philosopher and psychiatrist George Canguilhem that 
“the abnormal, while logically second, is existentially first” (Bratton & Chetwynd, 
2004: 284). It seemed that in the face of the spectre of the entangled flesh of two 
would-be singletons, the medical profession and the courts were driven to define 
xxi 
 
autonomy as physical circumscription and bodily integrity as the norm all the more 
strongly. 
 
Another stimulus was the sheer intellectual delight of trying to make explicit what 
judges implicitly mean when they use words like ‘autonomy’. Because of the 
pressure under which they work, judges have neither the leisure, nor usually the 
inclination, to articulate the concepts they use with theoretical rigour, though they 
tend to be men and women of great practical intelligence in terms of their legal craft. 
Judicial decisions are therefore potentially a fertile source of ‘implicit philosophy’, 
of evidence from which the deeper meanings of the words they used might be 
inferred and structure of thought unearthed. This possibility is premised on the view 
that law and the legal system are a part of, rather than apart from, the society that 
brings them into being. The law is a social artefact, “a lens to reveal the dominant 
cultural values and interests of a society and observe how these are preserved, 
challenged and changed” (Laster, 200: 1).  
 
A third motivation for this thesis is the desire to demystify the law. The language of 
law is not ‘autonomous’ in the sense that it operates according to its own standard 
norms apart from ordinary language. One of the distinctive features of judicial 
discourse, captured in the law reports, is its roots in the facts and circumstances of 
human experience. For that reason, perhaps, many of them, especially in the context 
of medical jurisprudence, are interesting and readable. Judges draft them partly with 
an eye to their public reception, analogous to the way that barristers draft their legal 
opinions, so that their non-lawyer clients can make sense of what they are advising.  
 
xxii 
 
It has been a startling discovery that qualitative methods of documentary analysis 
have hardly, if ever, been applied to the law reports, when they seem so eminently 
suitable to such methods of analysis. It is my conjecture that academic lawyers in 
English law schools are still so concerned with the requirements of legal practice, 
and the traditional doctrinal approaches to the law, that they are still unfamiliar with, 
or bewildered by, the techniques that social research methods of the kind employed 
in this thesis have to offer. Non-lawyers, too, still tend to regard legal material as the 
monopoly of the specialists, a province restricted to those who have been inducted 
into the allegedly esoteric practices of the law. Yet, as was said above, the common 
law has from time immemorial been rooted in the reality of people’s everyday lives 
and the law reports have unusual intelligibility for those willing to familiarise 
themselves with their style of thinking. The law reports are, after all, meant to be 
matters of ‘public record’. 
 
The rationale for the structure of this thesis 
This thesis has been, as all intellectual enterprises on this scale tend to be:  personally 
and intellectually transformative. At journey’s end, the thesis has settled on a 
structure which has departed from the shape of the conventional research template. 
Nevertheless it is proposed that there is a strong rationale for the shape it has 
ultimately taken. Instead of the usual pattern (introduction, literature review, 
methodology, findings (including analysis and discussion) and conclusion, the thesis 
is organised according it its three cycles of enquiry: empirical; hermeneutic and 
structural. This organisational decision was not made a priori but rather in response 
to the logic of the experience of the research process driven by the processual, 
iterative dynamic of grounded theory. The account of the methodology, the strategy 
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of investigation and analysis of the findings are not treated in discrete sections in the 
traditional fashion but in complementary fashion within the particular cycle of 
enquiry to which the particular processes of investigation and findings relate. It is 
suggested that this strategy of exhibiting the research through the different stages of 
enquiry, while following a chronological structure, is nevertheless analytical 
methodologically and as a result renders the thesis more intelligible.  
 
The possibility of restructuring the thesis in this way began to suggest itself after a 
personal and fundamental watershed in the research process. Several years in, it 
became apparent that an exclusively empirical approach to the database of law 
reports and its intellectual hinterland in the literature would result in a thesis that was 
trivially descriptive. This impasse was largely self-inflicted, the outcome of the 
descriptive research questions which the thesis initially set out to address. The 
impasse was finally and timeously broken only when wider background reading and 
conversations with colleagues suggested that there were different, explanatory, 
research questions with which I needed to engage. As a result the nature of the 
enquiry was rethought and the initial focus on how judges were using and varying in 
their use of the concept of autonomy shifted to concern with the question of why the 
judiciary were using and interpreting autonomy as they were. This led to deepening 
of the cycles of research enquiry around the proximate and underlying influences 
affecting judicial meanings in practice of use of autonomy.  
 
The third justification for adopting a structure based on layers of intellectual and 
methodological enquiry is that it has enabled the disclosure of the emerging findings 
and the theory of the study. It is contended that on this structure ‘the right notes are 
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played in the right order’. On the conventional structure, the rights notes seemed to 
be being played in the ‘wrong’ order’ leaving it with an unsatisfactorily hybrid 
quality, rendering the research process less transparent.  It is contended that the 
structure adopted for this thesis is truer to the practice and experience of the research. 
 
Some preliminary matters   
There are three preliminary matters which are best dealt with at this stage concerning 
the research sample of law reports; the question of jurisdiction; and some 
terminological matters. 
 
1. The law reports 
Case summaries of the research sample of law reports are set out at Appendix 1. 
These set out the facts and decisions of the cases as well as indicating their legal 
significance. Although the salient features of the cases are briefly indicated in the 
course of analysis in the main text of the thesis, they should be read cognisant of the 
fuller exposition in the Appendix.  
 
2. Jurisdiction 
The research sample is restricted to English law reports, although these cases are 
often deeply influenced by cases decided in other jurisdictions, e.g. decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  It should be noted that the UK has three legal 
systems: English law which applies to England and Wales; Northern Irish law which 
applies in Northern Ireland; and Scots law which applies in Scotland. For the 
purposes of this thesis, therefore, Northern Irish and Scots cases are regarded as 
‘non-domestic’.  
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3. Terminology 
‘Medical law’ is sometimes distinguished from ‘medical jurisprudence’. Medical 
jurisprudence refers to judicial decisions in (medical) law reports, whereas medical 
law is an umbrella term embracing jurisprudence, other sources of medical law, and 
academic medico-legal literature.  ‘Medical ethics’ and ‘bioethics’ are used as 
synonyms. While there is no single definition of these terms, they are sometimes 
used interchangeably in the literature (Levinson & Reiss, 2003) and this thesis does 
not require terminological distinction. The difference between legal and bioethical 
literature is made by looking at content and the principal intellectual formation of the 
author. Distinguishing bioethical from philosophical literature is complicated by the 
fact that most bioethicists tend to have studied philosophy. I have chosen to take a 
pragmatic approach and refer to bioethics and philosophy conjointly. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE TRANSFORMED FRAMEWORK AND 
CONTEXT OF MEDICAL LAW 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Over the last thirty years, ‘medical law’ has emerged as a distinct legal topic 
interacting with healthcare in diverse ways (Grubb, 1987; Rothstein, 2004; Laurie, 
2006a). Veitch (2007) has referred to “medical law’s inexorable expansion” likening 
it to the painting of the Forth Bridge: 
 
…no sooner has the ink dried on the latest textbooks 
than the pace of events, and the arrival of new topics, 
compel their authors to embark anew on the next 
invariably longer editions (Veitch, 2007: 1). 
 
Grubb and Kennedy (2000) have made similar observations. There are now a large 
number of textbooks specifically devoted to the subject which have not only grown 
in size but also in complexity (e.g. Herring, 2010; Jackson, 2010; Pattinson, 2011). 
Hope (1991) has explored medical law’s parentage: “After an extensive and 
somewhat uncertain gestation period, a new subject has been born; its name is 
Medical Law and its birth weight is well above average” (1991: 247). However, 
while medical law’s parentage is fairly easily traced, its legitimacy should not 
perhaps be too quickly assumed, as we shall explore later in this chapter.  
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Over recent decades, the courts have been increasingly called upon to respond to 
new moral and ethical dilemmas raised by advances in modern science, medicine, 
and technology. There has been a range of contentious cases arising out of healthcare 
practice which have provoked intense public debate about matters of human concern, 
including the nature of human mortality (Miola, 2007). Novel, ethically 
controversial, medico-legal cases have compelled reflection on the nature and goals 
of medicine. Lee & Morgan (2001) have designated some of these ‘stigmata cases’ 
because they enable “the marks of a deeper system of values to be seen on the 
surface of a specific dispute” (Montgomery 2006b: 190). They are “talismatic of 
broader debates in society” (Montgomery 2006a: 8) and have challenged the courts 
“to develop a social, even a moral, vision with which to respond to the dilemmas 
created by the social and cultural revolution of contemporary medicine” (Lee & 
Morgan, 2001: 298).  
 
In addition to this growing jurisprudence, complex legislation governing various 
aspects of clinical practice and research has brought the field of medical law within 
the province of democratic vote (Smith, 1997). This has partly taken form in recent 
statutes governing the storage and use of human tissue and organs (Human Tissue 
Act 2004); determinations of capacity in vulnerable adults (Mental Capacity Act 
2005); and  assisted reproduction and the storage, use and disposal of human 
gametes and embryos (Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 2008). The 
increasing variety of domestic medico-legal provisions has been matched by a range 
of international legal and quasi-legal measures, e.g. the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1950); the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966); the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); and the 
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United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). A 
central argument of this thesis is that the incorporation of the ECHR into UK 
jurisprudence through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) is of special significance 
for the changing legal, moral and political ecology of English medical law.  
 
To date, the moral and ethical implications of these advances have attracted the 
attention of a number of scholars (Dworkin, 1993; Fukuyama, 2002; O’Neill, 2002; 
Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2007) who have singled out for specific consideration 
issues such as abortion, euthanasia, assisted reproduction and genetic engineering 
thus putting the nature and scope of ethics in issue. These advances are challenging 
the limits of established moral and ethical theories because they concern not simply 
how to make the world a better place, but what kind of world in the first place is to 
be brought into being: Heyd (1994) has distinguished ‘world-creation’ from ‘world-
amelioration’. These thinkers argue that such developments are not only having an 
impact on the way people live but also on the ethical self-understanding of the 
human race. Mason et al. (2006) state that: 
 
…the importance and intensity of the public moral 
conversation about bioethics and medical law are 
explained in part by the very nature of their subject 
matter. This is an area of concern that touches upon 
people’s most intimate interests.  
 
Law, morality and the ‘public interest’ are intertwined in the healthcare context; a 
scenario which was inconceivable until more recently. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, English medical jurisprudence reflects the centrality of autonomy as a 
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legal, moral and political principle and has a bearing on the origins of the research 
interest.  
 
1.1.1 Autonomy and the origins of the research interest 
Questions of autonomy have typically been at the centre of judging ethically 
contentious medical law cases. The concept of autonomy, and the principle of 
respect for personal autonomy, is a legal and ethical value of paramount importance 
in the West.  McLean (2010) observes that: 
 
… the emergence of autonomy as the guiding concept 
in biomedical ethics has occurred relatively recently 
and co-exists with the growth in the importance of the 
language of human rights. Autonomy rules, then, but 
… its precise meaning is far from agreed and some 
commentary seems unclear about whether the mere 
existence of (legal) decision-making capacity – which 
is a pre-existing condition of autonomy, is sufficient to 
demand respect for a decision made by the competent 
person.  
 
 
There is paucity of research investigating how judges use, and understand, the 
concept of autonomy and what factors have shaped it. Indeed, it is this very issue 
that forms the central thread of the present thesis, that is:  to enquire into judicial 
interpretations of the concept of autonomy in ethically-contentious medical cases.   
 
My early professional practice as a barrister, and general reading around the 
literature in medical law and ethics suggested that judges’ understanding and use of 
autonomy was varied. In addition to the fact of usage, the initial stage of enquiry 
would need to examine the variety of usage and what factors influenced diversity of 
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legal judgments on autonomy. My initial conjecture, derived from background 
reading of the literature over 25 years (i.e. since 1985),  proposed that law and ethics 
were closely related, that medical law as a distinct legal topic was bound to  ethics; 
and that there had been a legalistic influence on medical ethics since its inception (cf. 
Rothstein, 2004). The rise of legalism, the assimilation of morality to law and the 
legalisation of morality in medical ethics has been well-documented from the 
inception of medical ethics (Ladd, 1979; Faden et al., 1986; Jonsen, 1998). The fact 
that medical law and ethics are in relationship is not universally commended. Miola 
(2007) has recently argued that medical law and ethics are in a symbiotic, but 
mutually detrimental, relationship.   
 
Thus, it is my contention that the influence of academic developments on the 
judiciary needs to be more closely examined: are judges’ conceptions of autonomy 
similar to uses in the literature? These, such as they are, will be explored in chapter 
2. Moreover, enquiry into judicial uses of the concept of autonomy needs to develop 
a broader assessment of judges’ decisions, and not just to analyse the scale and limits 
of influence. The significance of prominent cases needs to be examined, and, as does 
the implications of the changes taking place in public and European law for the 
traditions of English law.  
 
 This thesis uses, as its investigative basis, a set of medical law reports applying 
qualitative documentary analysis rather than conventional legal commentary. 
Traditional legal commentators analyse law reports to explain the doctrinal 
implications of judicial decisions and the ways they might be improved (Jacobson et 
al., 2001). In terms of its overall methodology, the research takes a grounded theory 
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approach with its emphasis on explanatory theories of a study emerging from the 
constant interaction of the researcher with the data that includes significant literature 
on changes in public and European law, as well as the discourses on autonomy. To 
this end, the thesis is an interdisciplinary study combining medical law, applied and 
political philosophy, and social science.  
 
1.1.2 The chapter plan 
The introductory chapter examines the background of change that has faced judges 
in their decision-making about autonomy. First, it considers the expansion of 
medical law. Second, it considers the relationship between this expansion and the 
rise of the assertive citizen. Third, it uncovers the changes that have taken place in 
the framework of law and their significance, especially the creation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), for the tradition of English common law. 
The chapter concludes by describing the problematic of the thesis: its purpose, focus 
and organisation. 
 
1.2 THE EMERGENCE OF MEDICAL LAW AND THE PRIMACY OF 
ETHICAL QUESTIONS 
 
The complex origins of medical law are widely agreed. As an outgrowth of different 
branches of traditional private law, e.g. contract, family, property, tort and public 
law, medical law has been referred to as “an academic version of the cuckoo” 
(Wicks, 2007: 1). Originally focussed on the doctor-patient relationship, medical law 
has acquired broader, “public law” dimensions, embracing the  institutional context 
of healthcare, e.g. the legal and ethical complexities of assisted reproduction, the 
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structure and responsibilities of the National Health Service (NHS) and issues of 
resource allocation (Pattinson, 2009). Accordingly, for some medical lawyers, 
“healthcare law” is the preferred nomenclature (Montgomery, 2003). Some have 
wanted to expand the discipline beyond the structured healthcare provided within the 
healthcare system calling it “health law” (Hervey & McHale, 2005), and “public 
health law” (Gostin, 2012). Brazier & Glover (2000: 372) have distinguished 
‘medical’ and ‘health care’ or ‘health law’ thus: 
 
Medical law which focusses on a relationship between 
doctors and patients remains in essence a creature of 
private law….Health care law is located more firmly in 
public law. Doctors are shifted to the margins of 
debate. The needs, and even rights, of individual 
patients must be viewed within a wider context of 
protecting health and promoting public goods.  
 
There has been a blurring in the medical, or healthcare, or health, law context, of the 
formerly fundamental distinction between private law (which governs relationships 
between individuals) and public law (which concerns the regulation of State and its 
relationship between individuals). The function of public law is to protect the rights 
of citizens and to vindicate them against those in positions of power who threaten to 
infringe them (Poole, 2005).  
 
1.2.1 The rise of the ‘intervener’ and courts as sites of civic debate 
The ‘intervener’ is a conspicuous feature of recent cases and a sign that the ethical 
issues raised in them are attracting broader public interest. Pattinson (2009) has 
argued that this is partly the consequence of pressure groups being denied support by 
the major political parties in spite of lobbying which has, in turn, led them to look to 
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the judicial process instead. This is conspicuously evident in three cases which (as it 
turns out) form part of the research sample (see Appendix 1).  In Re A (2001), the 
Court of Appeal, quite unusually, accepted written submissions from the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Westminster and the Pro-Life Alliance. The former 
specifically stated in his written submission that his views were “based on Roman 
Catholic faith and morality” (Skene, 2006). The Court of Appeal in Burke (2006) 
allowed seven interveners. The case of Re F (1990) is an early example of third-
party intervention. Although such interventions are rare in the law, it is proposed that 
there is a link between their putative increase and the constitutively ethical-
contentiousness of medical law. Pattinson identifies another trend – for such groups 
or individuals to bring cases themselves. For example, the applicant in Gillick (1986) 
did not have a direct personal interest in the lawfulness of a Department of Health 
circular on contraception policy. Whether or not these interveners succeed in their 
appeals to the judicial process, they invariably attract publicity for their points-of -
view.  
 
Although the status of ‘public standing’ to intervene is contentious where disputed 
ethical questions are involved (Pattinson, 2009; Wicks, 2009), medical law has 
nevertheless become a site for civic ethical debate. The case of Re A (2001) 
mentioned above, involving the lawfulness of separation surgery on infant conjoined 
twins, involved complex legal and ethical analysis. For Lee (2003), the decision not 
to appeal the case to the House of Lords was a lost opportunity to continue moral 
reflection on ethical issues of the profoundest importance and at the highest judicial 
level. James (2008), who also refers to the case, points to a growing expectation that 
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judges adjudicating ethically-contentious cases will ‘do the right thing’, as well as 
decide them in the technically correct way.   
 
1.2.2 The ‘legitimacy’ of medical law and its relationship with ethics 
The judiciary in a culture of moral pluralism are hard-pushed to appeal to any one 
moral position without questions arising regarding their legitimacy as arbiters of 
‘public morals’ (Montgomery, 2006a). In controversial areas such as assisted suicide 
and euthanasia what legitimacy has the courtroom, or law-makers in Parliament, to 
dictate a restrictive moral and legal position? In ethically-contentious cases, the 
judiciary is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Judges’ are required to resolve them in 
the absence of any universally-agreed moral vision. Veitch (2007) has argued that 
this pressure has led to a disjunction in judicial discourse between judges’ stated 
reasons for their decisions and ‘actual’ reasons which can be discerned in the reports. 
Although judicial rhetoric has emphasised a view of autonomy consistent with an 
‘individualistic’ model, judges are in fact taking into account factors which they do 
not make explicit and are more consistent with a model of  ‘principled autonomy’ 
(cf. O’Neill, 2002). 
 
While judges resort to the rhetoric of individualistic autonomy in their judicial 
reasoning in order to entrench their liberal credentials, the outcome of these cases is 
determined by their responses to the ethical and human dilemmas which the cases 
present, leading to a disconnection between judicial ‘rhetoric’ and judicial ‘reality’ 
(Munby, 1998). Montgomery contends that the:  
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…key to the legitimacy problem in the modern context 
is to see medical law as a tool to ensure the recognition 
that its subject matter is morally charged and to protect 
the ability of individuals to grapple with the ethical 
issues that arise. It maintains the pre-conditions for 
moral agency (2006a: 14).  
 
In the absence of a clear normative moral framework, the role of the courts is to keep 
the parties, and the public, attuned to the ethical dimensions of the case. 
 
The uncertain relationship between law and ethics in medical jurisprudence can 
perhaps be accounted for within the recent history of legal philosophy. The tradition 
of positivism associated with Hart (1961) which dominated in the second half-of the 
twentieth-century, maintained a strict separation between law and morality. James 
(2008) states that the: 
 
…long-term impact of legal positivism, in the view of 
at least some scholars, has been gradually to remove 
substantive moral debate from the decision of 
controversial cases. Yet, ‘medical treatment has 
become possibly the most fertile source of ethical 
conundrums (2008: 67).  
 
 
This separatist tradition is perhaps reflected in judicial statements which attempt to 
restrict the courts’ concerns in cases which raise profoundly difficult moral issues, to 
technical ones of identifying and applying the relevant legal principles to the facts of 
the case before the court. In the conjoined twins’ case above-mentioned, the Court of 
Appeal insisted that it was a “court of law, not an arbiter of morals” (Re A (2001) at 
p. 155D-E).  In other cases, the courts have recognised the fundamental intertwining 
of law and ethics. In a case involving the ethical and legal issue of whether it was 
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right to withdraw life-sustaining sustenance from a permanently insensate patient, 
the Court of Appeal stated (Bland (1993), p. 825F-G): 
 
This is not an area in which any difference can be 
allowed to exist between what is legal and what is 
morally right. The decision of the court should be able 
to carry conviction with the ordinary person as being 
based not merely on legal precedent but also upon 
acceptable ethical values.   
 
A moral dimension of English law is assumed in Lord Coleridge’s oft-cited 
statement that, while every moral obligation is not necessarily translated into a legal 
duty, “every legal duty has a moral foundation” (R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450). The 
separatist approach to law is being challenged in the transformed social context 
where, as alluded to above, the judiciary are increasingly being expected to offer 
ethically satisfactory answers to complex medico-legal questions in a morally-
diverse culture. This raises questions as to where the judiciary is to look for sources 
of law and ethical guidance.  
 
The growth of medical law from its seedbed in a variety of traditional legal topics, its 
transition from private to public law, and the intimate interplay of medical law and 
ethics have led to debate about medical law’s coherence as a distinct legal discipline 
(Grubb, 1987; Brazier et al., 2000; Grubb & Kennedy, 2000; Lee & Morgan, 2001; 
Montgomery, 2006a; Miola, 2007). This debate has focused on the role of patient 
autonomy in the healthcare context. The traditional approach, which ties medical law 
to its common law roots, views patient autonomy as a function of the law of consent.  
On the traditional version, the role of consent is to turn otherwise unlawful behaviour 
(non-consensual touching) into lawful, ethical and professionally responsible 
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behaviour. This contrasts with an approach tied to ‘human rights’. Kennedy (1988) 
has long argued that the theoretic underpinnings of medical law should be located in 
human rights, rather than traditional common law reasoning, contending that it 
provides medical law with its rationale, and has, at its core, the principle of respect 
for patient autonomy.  
 
Other medical lawyers have subsequently sought to reconfigure medical law around 
the concept of human rights (e.g. Wicks, 2007).  On different lines, Morgan (2001) 
has argued that the crucial question is not what medical law is, but rather what 
medical law is for: “medical law indeed is not just a subject; it is also a 
responsibility.” In attempting to delineate the boundaries of medical law academic 
medical lawyers have tended to overlook the unique way in which medical law 
attempts to address the intersection of medical ethics and law  within the context of  
advancing technology, social change, and developments in philosophical medical 
ethics.   
 
1.2.3 Autonomy, rights and the rise of the assertive citizen  
The rise of medical law as a distinct discipline and constituted as such by its 
inherently ethical content is closely associated with the phenomenal rise of the 
assertive citizen in Western culture. This phenomenon began to emerge from the late 
1960s onwards. In the early 1960s, Devlin (1962) commented: 
 
Is it not a pleasant tribute to the medical profession 
that by and large it has been able to manage its 
relations with its patients ... without the aid of lawyers 
and law makers? (Devlin, 1962: 103). 
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By the beginning of the 1970s, however, the shape of the relationship between the 
medical and legal professions had changed dramatically. Medical advances had 
begun to pose ethical dilemmas of unprecedented complexity (Dworkin, 1996a). 
This coincided with the rise of consumerism and consumer rights. Medical decisions 
which were once widely accepted as falling exclusively within the discretion of 
professionals had been brought firmly within the scope of legal redress.  
 
The growth of the consumer-inspired doctrine of ‘informed consent’ represents an 
important stage in the recalibration of the relationship between doctor and patient 
away from medical paternalism (Kennedy, 1981; O’Neill, 2002). The growth of 
consumerism is closely related to the post-industrial emergence of individualism or 
‘individualization’. This is linked to the loosening of ties to tradition and the advance 
of individual autonomy. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have charted the 
emergence of the assertive citizen from the constraints of “normal biography” into 
relative freedom of “the do-it -yourself biography”.  Beck has observed the rise of a 
new “institutionalised individualism” in which people are “invited to constitute 
themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals” 
(Giddens, 1998: 36).  
 
Another linked development has been the growth of moral pluralism made possible 
by an important shift in cultural mood in the latter part of the 20
th
 century, 
‘postmodernism’. The traditional presumption that people share a concrete morality, 
whether through religious observance or rational reflection, has given way to the felt 
importance of pursuing individually chosen goals and achieving personal freedom 
(Church of England Doctrine Commission, 1997). The lack of a shared moral 
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framework within which to make medical decisions has led to increasing emphasis 
on allowing people to live according to their personal values and to pursue their 
individual life-plans (Harris, 1985; Spriggs, 2005). Technological advance, the 
economics of consumerism, the rise of individualism, the growth of moral pluralism 
and the increasing importance of individual autonomy have all contributed to the 
emergence of the assertive citizen in the healthcare context.  
 
The culture of moral pluralism and lack of shared ethical foundations has had 
implications for the role of law. If ethically-contentious cases arising in healthcare 
cannot be resolved by medical ethics because of the variety of ethical viewpoints 
which exist, then problems that arise in practice need another forum for their 
resolution. Miola (2007) argues that “the law cannot help but be involved in this 
area, as many of the medico-legal cases that come before the courts have inherently 
ethical content” (2007: 8). Medical law is a function of the demand by an assertive 
citizenry for a relevant effective outlet for the difficulties that arises for it in the 
medical context.  
 
A central finding of this thesis is that the courts have responded to the demands of 
the assertive citizen by developing an ethical discourse to inform the difficult 
practice of judicial decision-making in medical law contexts. The courts have 
developed this language in stages and the concept of autonomy has been central to 
this development. It is proposed that the medical law reports chosen for analysis  
provide snapshots of this development and, in the process, this thesis makes  a 
contribution to the  “as-yet largely unexplored historical jurisprudence in various 
quarters of the medico-legal world” (Laurie, 2006b: 131).  In short, this work goes at 
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least some way to demonstrating that medical law is a practice which has 
dynamically developed in response to social change.  
 
1.2.4 From ‘civil liberties’ to ‘human rights’: the legal ‘positivisation’ of rights 
Coincident with these developments has been the rise of ‘rights talk’ (Glendon, 
1991). It is widely stated that rights discourse has become a lingua franca of modern 
politics and law and has led several to designate the current era as ‘the age of rights’ 
(Henkin 1990; Bobbio, 1996). Epp (1998) and Ignatieff (2000) have referred to ‘a 
rights revolution’ which has fundamentally altered the way in which the relation 
between citizen and state is understood. The nature of rights is highly contestable. 
The existence of rights has, amongst other things, been related to human need, 
responsibility or interests (Weinreb, 1994; Fukuyama, 2003). For some, the 
existence of rights can be affirmed notwithstanding the lack of establishment of firm 
normative foundations (Hart, 1979; Thomson, 1990).  
 
Whatever rights consist in, Loughlin (2003) argues that rights discourse has changed 
over history and in the contemporary West has had expressed a transformed 
relationship between law and government, the citizen and the State. He has pointed 
to a ‘blurring’ in the post-Enlightenment period of the formerly clear distinction 
between ‘positive law’, expressed in the body of rules, and politics, the language in 
which concepts of the right and the good are engaged with. This elision of the 
discourses of law and politics has accompanied the transmutation of ‘natural rights’ 
into ‘human rights’ and fuelled “a tremendous expansion in the creativity of legal 
argument, as basic values of dignity, autonomy, and equality are explicated into ever 
more ingenious forms of rights claims” (Loughlin, 2003: 127).  
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Natural rights were, especially within the Hobbesian conception, regarded as 
political claims which, within the British political tradition, sought to protect the 
subject from the restrictive effects of law. These have, accordingly, “generally taken 
the form of negative liberties, serving mainly to define a zone of individual 
autonomy which government must not invade” (Loughlin, 2003: 127). However, 
rights (and human rights) discourse has shifted from an exclusive political domain 
and become a fundamental feature of the legal order. This has led to an expansion in 
‘law’s empire’ in which liberty “is no longer the sphere of individual autonomy 
beyond the constraints of the law [but] must now be defined by the operations of the 
law” (Loughlin, 2003: 128). “Law, once a form of coercive order, now presents itself 
as a means of maintaining freedom.” (Loughlin, 2003: 128). 
 
This development has had a number of potentially revolutionary implications for the 
relationship between law, morals and politics. Firstly, it has meant that rights have 
become institutionalised and ‘positivised’. In other words, rights have become items 
of legal, rather than simply political, order. Secondly, it has made the judiciary the 
ultimate arbiters of competing rights claims, which might properly have been taken 
to be political matters to be determined by a democratic state’s elected 
representatives. Thirdly, and relatedly, it has introduced ethical considerations into 
matters of judicial deliberation making it more difficult to separate law and morals in 
the tradition of legal positivism. Fourthly, the moralisation of the law has meant that 
political critique can no longer appeal to a non-judicial standard, but must come from 
within the law.  
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1.3 THE CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In the previous section, I have argued that medical law is not a static discipline but 
one that has been characterised by dynamic change. Its existence as a discrete legal 
topic is inseparable from the development of an ethically-loaded medical 
jurisprudence. Since the 1980s these changes have occurred in the context of 
important institutional developments in the framework of the law, in particular the 
development of common law, the influence of statute, and the incorporation of the 
provisions of the ECHR. It is proposed that these legal regimes each represent 
specific forms of rationality, that is, particular methods of normative legal reasoning 
mediated through specific institutional operations, informed by distinctive traditions 
of moral and political order.  It is further proposed that what distinguishes these 
specific rationalities can partly be captured in terms of the kinds of constraint on the 
otherwise whimsical judicial decision-making they represent, respectively, common 
law precedent, the democratic will expressed in statute, and fundamental ethical 
values embedded in human rights law. These legal regimes need to be discussed in 
turn.  
 
1.3.1 Common law and the doctrine of precedent 
The common law represents a distinct form of legal rationality characterised by its 
inductive commitment to the authority of precedent, its attention to facts and human 
experience, and its remedial character. It is a complex historical product of English 
parentage but whose offspring constitute a distinctive legal family throughout the 
world, e.g. Australia, Canada, India, Israel, New Zealand and the United States 
(Goff, 1987). It contrasts with the systems of law typical of the European continent 
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in its largely uncodified make-up and the centrality of judges, as opposed to jurists, 
or law professors, in the formulation of law. Within England’s (UK) unwritten 
constitutional settlement, English judges have power to make law without statutory 
authority; the notion that the judiciary merely ‘declares’ the law is widely-regarded 
as an outmoded constitutional fiction (Dworkin, 1986).  
 
The common law has emerged out of judicial resolutions of countless concrete cases. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that it has acquired an intelligible relationship to ‘real-
life’ and thus public support. Unlike the appeal to abstract principles typical of 
codified systems on the continent, common law is steeped in the facts and 
circumstances of particular cases off the back of which legal propositions are 
enunciated (i.e. inductively). Common law is argued law, and therefore ‘tough law’, 
in which judicial ideas are formed through “the purifying ordeal of skilled argument 
on the specific facts of contested cases” (Lord Justice Megarry in Cordell v Second 
Clanfield Properties Ltd [1968] 3 WLR 864 at 872). Foster (2009) has contended 
that practising lawyers: 
 
…tend to think that if a solution has been shown for 
quite a long time to work, that is a fairly good reason 
to adopt it, unless a compelling case is made for an 
alternative (2009: 4) 
 
Glenn (2007) has characterised the rationality of common law as ‘interstitial’, 
“rooted in a contextual tradition’ moving ‘within existing principles and categories 
without imposing conclusions broader than those already and explicitly authorised” 
(2007: 38).  
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At common law, judges’ decisions are preserved as records (in law reports) and it is 
the established rule to work with these when the same points arise in litigation. This 
forms the basis of the distinctly English common law doctrine of stare decisis (‘let 
the decision stand’). According to this, judges are ‘bound’ by previous decisions of a 
higher court if its rationale (ratio decidendi) is applicable in the instant cases (i.e. 
binding precedent). Where in the course of a decision a judge enunciates a 
proposition of law which is not directly relevant to the final outcome, it is considered 
ancillary. Such obiter dicta have ‘persuasive’ rather than ‘binding’ authority. 
Distinguishing the ratio from obiter statements is an interpretative rather than 
algorithmic process and raises profound questions relating to the nature of common 
law and the common law process. 
 
There is a large literature attempting to conceptualise the process of common law 
and the nature of its authority (e.g. Holmes, 1881; Weinreb, 2005; Duxbury, 2008). 
Brandom has made a lucid philosopher’s contribution. He has argued that an 
“essential feature of the common law model is the symmetry between retrospective 
and prospective perspectives” (Pritzlaff, 2008: 368; cf. Brandom, 2002). Rather, 
Brandom states that the judge must: 
 
retrospectively rationally reconstruct the tradition as 
progressive, so as to reveal within a trajectory that he 
can construe as the gradual revelation, the gradual 
unfolding into explicitness, of principles that can be 
seen retrospectively to have been implicit all along 
(Pritzlaff, 2008: 368). 
 
Brandom identifies a “complex diachronic recognitive structure” in the common law 
model: 
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…where a judge makes himself responsible to 
previous judges and to future judges, but also exercises 
a kind of authority over both the past judges whom he 
interprets and the future judges who are bound by the 
precedent that his decision establishes … (Pritzlaff, 
2008: 369). 
 
It is widely accepted amongst practising lawyers that the case law does not supply an 
algorithm which the judge applies mechanically to the cases before him but rather 
seeks a post-hoc legal and ethical justification for the decision he has made (cf. 
Foster, 2009).  
 
Another distinguishing feature of the English common law system in contrast to civil 
law systems is its ‘remedial character’. Citizen freedoms exist ‘negatively’ and only 
come to light when infringed and judicially remedied, or abridged by statute. They 
are residual, rather than ‘positive’ entitlements, which are allowed to exist unless 
prohibited. Klug (2000) has written that not: 
 
Even many lawyers tend to appreciate the crucial 
distinction between our [English] legal system 
characterized by unwritten liberties and others based 
on written rights. The terms ‘human rights’ and ‘civil 
liberties’ have been used interchangeably over the 
years. There has been little awareness of the increasing 
weight given to the values of dignity, community and 
equality in post-war human rights thinking, for 
example (2000: 6). 
 
The common law judiciary have made a fundamental contribution to the common 
law constitutional tradition of negative civil liberties. The constitutional historian 
Dicey (1902) has argued that: 
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…the general principles of the constitution (as for 
example the right to personal liberty, or the right of 
public meeting) are with us as a result of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons in 
particular cases brought before the courts (1985: 188).  
 
 
Thus, the common law tradition of legal rationality is distinguished by its largely 
inductive, interstitial, and negative character. It is ‘mosaic’ rather than 
‘architectonic’, focussing on particulars until patterns (i.e. legal rules and principles) 
emerge which give shape to the law.  
 
1.3.2 Statute law and the sovereignty of Parliament 
Apart from European Union law, legislation is the highest source of English law and 
overrides the authority of case law where it overlaps. Legislation (or statute law) 
derives from the legislature which in the UK is the Queen in Council in Parliament. 
Its legitimacy emanates from parliamentary sovereignty and popular mandate, 
arising out of the political process, as opposed to rules and principles mined from 
myriad ‘real-life’ cases. The Victorian constitutional historian Dicey (1902) 
observed that, with English lawyers, it was a fundamental principle that Parliament 
could do everything except change human nature. The quote is apt to convey the 
force of the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, but sounds somewhat 
ironic with the benefit of hindsight. In the case of Goodwin v. UK ([2002] IRLR 
664), the ECtHR held that in denying legal recognition to the applicant's  transgender 
status the UK had breaching her rights under Articles 8 (right to privacy) and 12 
(right to marry) of the ECHR. In response, the UK Parliament passed the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 which enables transsexuals to apply to a Gender Recognition 
Panel for a certificate recognising their change of gender. 
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 Under the doctrine of the separation of powers and legislative supremacy, 
Parliament has authority to infringe even the most basic of human rights (Slapper 
and Kelly, 2006). Van Caenegem (1987) has stated:  
 
The theory of parliamentary sovereignty, i.e. that 
Parliament is an absolutely sovereign legislature, is 
built on two pillars. The first is that no parliament can 
bind a future parliament or be bound by a previous 
one. There are no laws that parliament cannot make or 
unmake and no consideration of morality or natural 
law can prevail against a clear statute emanating from 
Westminster. The second is that no judge can condemn 
a law and refuse to apply it on the ground that it is 
incompatible with the constitution or the fundamental 
principles of the common law; that would be a 
usurpation of the legislative function by the judiciary 
(1987: 21-22). 
 
Statutes have become the most prolific source of English law, with approximately 
seventy-five per cent of judicial business taken up with matters of statutory 
interpretation. Zander (2004) has observed that while the number of statutes enacted 
in any parliamentary session has not greatly increased in the last hundred years, their 
length has done so, e.g. in 1901, 40 statutes totalling 247 pages, in 1991, 69 statutes 
totalling 2,222 pages.  
 
The role of the judge is to interpret statute in order to give expression to the will of 
Parliament. How the will of Parliament is discerned is a debatable point of 
constitutional significance. Over the last hundred years or so, the judiciary have 
developed principles of statutory interpretation.  Broadly speaking, in interpreting 
statutes, English judges have either looked for the surface meaning of the words (the 
literal approach), or, if ambiguous, beyond the literal meaning for Parliament’s true 
intent (the purposive approach). Barak (2008) has argued that the interpretation of 
23 
 
statutes is more than an exercise in textual analysis.  He contends that when the 
judiciary interpret a statute they seek to balance what the authors of the statute 
intended with the fundamental values embedded in the legal system.  In his view, the 
will of Parliament is a judicial-constitutional construct which requires of judges 
learned conjecture as to what a democratic parliament intended to achieve through 
the enactment of the statute.  
 
Barak (2008) distinguishes between the ‘letter’ and the ‘spirit’ of a statute. The 
interpreter’s aim is to give ‘life’ or ‘spirit’ to legislative provisions so as to achieve 
the statute’s social objectives. Where a statute is new, narrow and domain-specific, 
(e.g. licensing statutes) greater weight is normally given to the original intentions of 
the legislators (the statute’s subjective purposes). Where, however, a statute is older, 
wider and more comprehensive, greater emphasis is usually placed on giving the 
statute a ‘reasonable’ interpretation which takes into account the values of the legal 
system (its objective purpose).  Accordingly, when judges interpret statutes, they are 
required to strike a balance between the statute’s subjective and objective purposes.  
A useful (and relevant) example of this process is the MCA 2005.  
 
1.3.2.1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is a good illustration of a statute which, in 
Barak’s terms, calls for balance between subjective and objective interpretation. The 
MCA is one of the most important medical law statute enacted in recent times.  As a 
statute, it is the product of parliamentary process and rationale. Although it is new, it 
is wide-ranging and has something of the character of a ‘code’. The Act is the 
product of extensive research, reflection and public consultation, including a Law 
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Commission Report (Law Commission, 1995), a Government Policy Statement 
(Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999), and extensive pre-legislative scrutiny. It 
provides a framework of protection and support for those who are unable to make 
decisions for themselves for reasons of impaired capacity and a structure for those 
who are required to make and implement decisions in relation to them.  
 
The ‘spirit’ of the Act is evident in a list of governing principles set out in section 1, 
inviting a broad purposive approach to its interpretation. In particular, section 1(3) 
stipulates that ‘a person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all 
practicable steps to help him have been taken without success’ and section 1(6) that:  
 
Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard 
must be had to whether the purpose for which it is 
needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is 
less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom of 
action. 
 
The principles of support and enablement have a practical impact on the 
determination of a person’s capacity. In section 3 (2), the MCA provides that:  
 
…a person is not to be regarded as unable to 
understand the information relevant to the decision if 
he is able to understand an explanation of it given to 
him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances 
(using simple language, visual aids, or any other 
means).  
 
The practical spirit of support and enablement applies also to the assessment of a 
patient’s best interests (section 4). Section 4 (3), (4) states: 
 
[The decision-maker] must consider …whether it is 
likely that the person will at some time have capacity 
in relation to the matter in question, and … if it 
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appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be…  
[The decision-maker] must, so far as reasonably 
practicable, permit and encourage the person to 
participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as 
fully as possible in any act done for him and any 
decision affecting him. 
 
The Act invites a broad, purposive approach to its interpretation and a flexible 
judicial construction of parliamentary intent based on the fundamental values 
embedded in the legal system. What those fundamental values are is debatable, but it 
is noteworthy that the MCA, which, amongst other things, enshrines common law 
principles relating to mental capacity and best interests, albeit with important updates 
and modifications, is drafted to meet the UK’s positive obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, interference with the patient’s 
Article 8 (right to privacy) rights in pursuit, of the principles under section 1, the 
incapacity criteria (section 2 and 3), and the best interests ‘checklist’ (section 4) is 
legitimate under that Act provided it is proportionate.  
 
The distinctive form of legal rationality embodied in legislation is principally 
characterised by its commitment to the authority of Parliament and giving 
authoritative expression to the sovereign parliamentary will through processes of 
statutory interpretation. Tuori (2011) states that: 
 
…the legislator is guided by a specific rationality: 
instrumental rationality, which conceives of the law as 
a means to achieve the legislator’s political goals. 
What constitutes the problem with such a view of 
legislative voluntas is not a lack of rationality but 
rather its truncated nature… Here, democracy alters 
the situation, at least potentially, by sensitising the 
lawmaking procedure to such discourses within civil 
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society where even the ethical and moral aspects of 
legislative issues are addressed (2011: xii). 
 
Thus, the Act is the confluence of three legal ‘rationalities’: the common law 
background of legal capacity; the European Convention and the fundamental ethical 
values of privacy, dignity and autonomy; and statute law, and the intentions of 
Parliament. The European Convention on Human Rights – the third legal regime – is 
where we now turn. 
 
1.3.3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was signed in 1950, entered 
into force in 1953, and, by Article 1, enjoins that ratifying national governments 
“shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” described 
by the Convention (Tompkins, 1997). The ratification of the ECHR by the UK 
government did not have the effect of making it part of UK domestic law, even 
though it could be seen as indicating what the law of the country should be, or 
interpreted as being (Gearty, 1997). It came fully into force in English (UK) law in 
October 2000 through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Consequently, England’s 
public law obligations under the Convention can now be directly considered by 
English judges in cases where the Articles of the Convention are engaged. It means 
that litigants can obtain remedies for breaches of their human rights in the English 
courts without the need for a lengthy journey to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. It also signifies that English judges can now directly 
contribute to the growing jurisprudence of the ECtHR and thus its ‘authority’.  
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By having ratified and incorporated the ECHR, England (UK) has, in addition to 
European Community Law and the European Court of Justice, opened up another 
avenue for civil law influence on the common law tradition. Burton & Carlen (1979) 
have drawn a distinction between the rational, theoretic traditions of the continental 
civil law tradition and the distinct customary origins and rationale of English 
common law. Civil law is based on codes, rather than cases, and the authority of 
jurists (i.e. law professors) rather than judges. It  represents a different method of 
legal thinking based on the development of abstract principles which are applied to 
cases by a process of ‘subsuming’, i.e. the cases are incorporated under a more 
general principle. The approach is logical rather than historical. It seeks to anticipate 
and solve problems in advance rather than addressing them as and when they arise. 
According to Glenn (2007) law, on this model, is ‘reason’s instrument’ in which 
deductive thought follows syllogistic logic. Doctrine, and its associated dogmatic 
conceptual constructs, has priority over jurisprudence, rather than the contrary as 
with common law.  
 
A significant consequence of the incorporation of the Convention into English law is 
its impact on the doctrine of precedent. When considering the meaning of the 
Articles of the Convention, the English courts are not bound by previously binding 
authorities in the area of overlap. Instead, the courts have a duty to consider the 
decisions of the ECtHR (section 2 of the HRA), although, as with domestic case law, 
they are not bound by them. Moreover, it is unlawful for the courts which are ‘public 
authorities’ for the purposes of the Act (section 6) to act in way incompatible with 
the Convention. Previously binding domestic case law and the case law of the 
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ECtHR may, nevertheless, have ‘persuasive’ authority when the courts are 
interpreting the provisions of the Convention.  
 
Another consequence of the development is its impact on the ‘negative’ character of 
the common law. The common law constitutional tradition of ‘negative’ liberty 
understands law in basically permissive terms: ‘liberties’ are expressed as ‘negative 
rights’, what is left over after all prohibitions are accounted for’ (Dicey, 1902). On 
this version, the function of the law was essentially remedial:  to restore a person to 
the position he would have been in but for the unlawful infringement of his negative 
freedom. This largely unwritten constitutional tradition is, some argue, giving way to  
‘a new British constitution’ (Bogdanor, 2009) in which citizens have positive 
entitlements, enshrined in writing in the European Convention, which are matters of 
direct judicial interpretation, regardless of parliamentary evaluation. The English 
legal system is now, on this view, subject to a ‘higher law’ (European human rights 
enshrined in the Convention), which affects all other laws by subjecting them to a set 
of basic values.  
 
Another significant consequence of incorporation is its effect on the interpretations 
of legislation and, more broadly, its implications for the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and judicial review. The courts are now obliged “in so far as is possible” 
to interpret statutes in a manner compatible with the ECHR, regardless of the 
intention of Parliament (section 3 of the HRA). Where the provisions of the ECHR 
and statute cannot be reconciled, the courts are empowered to issue a “declaration of 
incompatibility” which Parliament has discretion to remedy (although it is not 
obliged to do so) through an expedited parliamentary procedure (section 4). The 
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English courts do not have (or have not yet arrogated to themselves) the powers of 
‘constitutional’ courts (e.g. the American Supreme Court) with power to ‘strike 
down’ legislation deemed incompatible with the written tenets of the relevant 
Constitution.  
 
Thus, the Human Rights Act 1998, through its incorporation of the Convention, has 
modified the traditional approach to common law precedent and legislation in 
significant ways, engendering change in the legal and, it is proposed (see below), 
moral and political ecology of the UK. The Act enjoins that case law and statute 
must be decided, enacted and interpreted in a manner consistent with individuals’ 
human rights under the Convention.  
 
1.4 TENSIONS BETWEEN BODIES OF LAW? 
 
The incorporation of the Convention by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
has extended to English judges authority to determine cases arising under the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  English judges can now supposedly 
protect, promote and uphold fundamental human rights directly, rather than waiting 
for the Strasbourg court to make a decision under the Convention which the English 
Courts are then bound to follow. The impact that the ECHR is making, or should 
make, to traditional judicial reasoning is a matter of debate amongst the most senior 
members of the judiciary.  
 
Sumption (2011)  is sceptical about the notion of universal human values that can be 
applied uniformly throughout the forty-seven states that have ratified the European 
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Convention. Rights, he argues, find their grip in the context of the values of the 
particular communities in which they are claimed and “depend for their legitimacy 
on a measure of recognition by that community.” He states that: 
 
…collective values are the product of their particular 
culture and history…The Strasbourg Court has treated 
the Convention not just as a safeguard against arbitrary 
and despotic exercises of state power but as a template 
for most aspects of human life. The problem about this 
is that the application of a common legal standard 
breaks down when it is sought to apply it to all 
collective activity or political and administrative 
decision-making. The consensus necessary to support 
it at this level of detail simply does not exist (2011: 13-
14). 
 
In the context of his ‘communitarian’ construction of human rights, Sumption is 
determined to uphold the sovereignty of Parliament and to restrict judicial review to 
proper scrutiny of executive action rather than contentious review of the merits of 
legislation or executive policy. He contends that in a number of cases “the 
presumption that Parliament cannot have intended to authorise the decision in 
question is distinctly artificial.” Part of the problem, he argues: 
 
…has been that the judiciary and the executive are 
looking at the issue from different ends of the 
telescope. The judiciary’s instincts are moulded by 
their experiences of individual cases, many of which 
have involved profound human tragedies to which no 
judge could be indifferent. By comparison, politicians, 
policy-makers and electors are primarily concerned by 
the problem viewed impersonally and en masse.  
 
Sumption’s conservative approach to the relationship between the courts, legislation 
and European Convention contrasts with the views of some of his colleagues on the 
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Supreme Court. Lord Hope contends that human rights have now become matters of 
judicial, rather than parliamentary evaluation, stating that it was: 
…now plain that the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into our domestic law 
will subject the entire legal system to a fundamental 
process of review and, where necessary, reform by the 
judiciary (R v. DPP ex p. Kebeline 3 WLR [1999] 972 
at 988). 
 
The advent of the ECHR has raised the prospect of a potential clash or tension within 
the highest ranks of the judiciary over the nature of the judicial role at the 
intersection of law, morality and politics.  
 
The impact of the ECHR on English law is also a matter of debate amongst academic 
lawyers and political scientists. Loughlin (2003) has argued that the legal 
institutionalisation of (human) rights has led to a shift in the function of the law from 
defining negative constraints on liberty, beyond which the citizen is free to do as he 
pleases, into means of maintaining freedom, in which large tracts of the lives of 
rights-bearing citizens are brought within the bounds of  ‘law’s empire’: “Liberty is 
no longer the sphere of individual autonomy beyond the constraints of the law; 
liberty must now be defined by the operations of the law” (2003: 128).  
 
Campbell (1999) contends that judicial interpretation of the HRA may well involve 
more than resolving ambiguities in the Articles of the Convention through traditional 
methods of statutory interpretation. Rather, it “may involve creative concretizations 
of vague statements in order to give justiciable meaning to those statements, a 
process with goes far beyond resolving ambiguities” (1999: 23). Indeed, the 
judiciary may need to determine whether there are ambiguities to be resolved in the 
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first place. They may be required to consider the intentions of those who sought to 
give meaning to the form of words contained in the Convention, and this may have 
an impact on how the judiciary read and interpret domestic statutes which might 
otherwise appear, on the face of them, quite clear. Judges may be constrained to 
interpret them in accordance with the ethical and democratic values lying at the heart 
of the Convention. This might in turn encourage judicial activism of a kind that 
would push the development of the common law into areas of public policy 
development that would formerly have been regarded as a matter for Parliament 
alone.  
 
Bogdanor (2009) maintains that one consequence of the Human Rights Act is that 
individual rights will be derived from the “principles of the Constitution”, rather than 
the decisions of the courts. He states that:  
 
Following the passage of the Human Rights Act, 
judges are now entrusted with interpreting legislation 
in the light of a higher law, the provisions enshrined in 
the European Convention of Human Rights (2009: 63).  
 
This ‘new Constitution’ represents an important qualification of the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. This is so even though the British courts, unlike their 
American counterparts, lack constitutional authority to strike down legislation. 
Under section 4 of the Human Rights Act, they can only make declarations of 
incompatibility. The former Law Lord, Lord Steyn, speaking extra-judicially, has 
stated (Bogdanor, 2009: 64): 
 
In the development of our country towards becoming a 
true constitutional state, the coming into force of the 
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Human Rights Act 1998 …was a landmark….By the 
Human Rights Act Parliament transformed our country 
into a rights-based democracy. By the 1998 Act 
Parliament made the judiciary the guardians of the 
ethical values of our bill of rights. 
 
Loughlin (2003) has observed that the incorporation of the ECHR has given the 
English judiciary a direct means of turning basic ethical and political values into 
rights-claims. Klug (2000) contends that the ECHR has introduced “a set of ethical 
standards essential to creating a decent society, to providing people with the contours 
of a value system by which to lead their lives” (Klug, 2000: 6). Bogdanor (2009) 
argues that under the HRA, the judiciary are bound to become more political because 
it “now has responsibility of interpreting legislation to determine whether it is in 
accordance with the rights outlined in the Act”  (2009: 65). The judicial, rather than 
the political, sphere has become the preferred context for the advancement of human 
rights claims.  
 
This, according to Veitch (2007), is having a paradoxical result. While giving legal 
effect to Convention rights has supposedly politicised the law, it has, in reality, 
depoliticised it, because human rights no longer represent an external moral and 
political standard against which the law itself can be judged. Rather, the rights 
outlined in the HRA have been ‘positivised’ and ‘institutionalised’; they encapsulate 
rules and principles which have become subject to “familiar methods of legal 
reasoning” (Veitch, 2007: 112). He contends that: 
 
Confronted with the task of assessing the compatibility 
of both statutes and common law with human rights 
provisions, the judiciary has overwhelmingly sought to 
delimit the ‘political’ nature of their new function by 
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deploying traditional techniques of legal reasoning – 
for example a concern to respect legal precedent – to 
resolve cases, and by stressing the need for a restrained 
judicial role (2007: 114). 
 
This, for Veitch, would not be a problem if the fundamental moral values enshrined 
in human rights were transparent to the judiciary, obviating the need for public 
discussion of those norms. However, the existence of shared epistemological 
foundations is too highly contested to justify the restriction of judgements about 
fundamental human values to the courts.. 
 
In the new legal ecology brought about by the direct introduction of human rights 
law into England, judges can move in one of two directions: either towards judicial 
activism, with a more pronounced ethical and political role; or judicial conservatism 
which favours traditional techniques of judicial reasoning and seeks to apply those to 
the European Convention 
 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS  
 
This investigation was initially led by the proposition that the judiciary was using, 
understanding and interpreting the concept of autonomy in various ways in complex 
medical law cases. This initial interest in the variations of judicial decision-making 
on autonomy led to the preliminary conjecture that these variations reflected the 
influence of the academy. Further examination of the concepts used in the 
jurisprudence and the academic literature disclosed regularities of particular usage 
leading to the provisional conclusion that the influence of the academy was the 
appropriate object of study.  
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However, as a result of wider reading in medical and public law, bioethics and 
political philosophy a level of uncertainty has emerged as to how interpretation of 
the initial object of enquiry was to be developed. The implication of legal 
transformations in the bodies of law has invited a reassessment of the principal 
influences on judicial decision-making on autonomy. The proposition that the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law has 
introduced fundamental tensions between bodies, or traditions, of law has suggested 
a broader canvas of study, encompassing the academy as well as traditions of law.  
This is illustrated in certain quarters of the judiciary through the promotion of, and 
resistance to, human rights-based constructions of autonomy.  
 
An interactive relationship with the data bases of the study which this introduction 
implies led to recognition of the value of a grounded theory approach to the 
methodology of this thesis. The salient order in the presentation of this thesis is 
methodological, rather than conceptual. This research has been a study, in three 
stages, of the emerging formation of the ethical language of autonomy in judicial 
decision-making in ethically-contentious medical cases. The justification for this 
methodological account of the research process is the relative economy with which 
the main components of the thesis can be assembled and exhibited and the avoidance 
of untidy duplication of content and argument. Moreover, this organising principle 
allows for a thesis structure which incorporates analysis of the jurisprudence and the 
literature in a way that reflects the iterative character of the research. As the object of 
study changes, the use of the law reports changes from an internal unit of analysis 
(vocabulary) to an external contextualizing of a case in time in a legal context. 
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Chapter 1 has set out the contemporary context within which medical jurisprudence 
has been constituted and developed. It has drawn attention to the transformed legal, 
social context and political context within which medical law and jurisprudence has 
emerged. In particular, it has differentiated the roles and processes of three distinct 
bodies of law and highlighted the complexity of their interaction. These 
developments supply the indispensable framework within which questions of 
autonomy are being addressed by judges in the medical law context.  
 
 
Stages of enquiry 
 
Research questions 
 
Method and data bases 
 
Mode of Analysis 
                Object 1 
PROBLEMATIC 
MEANINGS  
 
Judges use and 
interpretation of 
autonomy 
 
 
(RQ1) Do judges use the 
concept of autonomy?  
(RQ2) Do judges express 
a variety of uses of 
autonomy?  
[Judges are intuitive in 
their use] 
 
Content analysis of Law 
reports 
 
[The unit of analysis is the 
vocabulary/language of 
the reports) 
 
Semantic analysis of 
(elemental) meanings in 
judges decisions  
                Object 2 
PROXIMATE 
INFLUENCES 
 
Dimensions of         
analysis 
 
 
(RQ4) Is there evidence 
of an influence of the 
Academy in judicial 
decision-making? 
 
[The Academy is 
influential} 
 
 
(RQ3) Analysing patterns 
of variation 
 
Literature review  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping cases in time 
 
Hermeneutic analysis 
of continuity of 
meanings and 
interpretations of 
autonomy in legal and 
academic literature 
 
 
Diachronic and 
synchronic analysis 
 
                Object 3 
UNDERLYING 
INFLUENCES 
 
The role of traditions 
 
(RQ5) Are judges’ 
decisions influenced by 
traditions (legal, and 
socio-political)? 
 
[There is likely to be a 
clash of traditions]  
 
Literature review of 
background changes in 
jurisprudence; 
Literature review of 
autonomy 
 
Juxtaposing sample cases 
The unit of analysis is the 
report as a case in time in 
legal context 
 
Examination of 
inferential relations 
between use of 
autonomy and (a) 
traditions of law, and 
(b) moral and political 
traditions  
Critical realism 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Summary of the plan of research investigation 
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Chapter 2 grounds the research enquiry and design setting out the principles and 
practice of grounded theory in this research  
 
In Chapter 3, the first stage of the enquiry (Cycle 1) is addressed to the initial 
problematic of the thesis, namely what uses of autonomy, and variety of use, judges 
express in the research sample medical law reports. In Chapter 3, a semantic content 
analysis of elemental uses is undertaken, setting out to establishing what concepts 
are used and what relations they have with usage in the academic literature. At this 
stage, the ‘surface’ vocabulary and language of the reports is the main unit of 
empirical analysis.  
 
In Chapter 4, the second stage (Cycle 2) develops the initial object of enquiry 
through an investigation into the meanings and interpretations judges give to their 
uses of autonomy, which semantic analysis alone is unable to disclose.  Through 
hermeneutical enquiry, the thesis sets out to analyse how the judiciary use the 
concept of autonomy and to trace the continuity of meanings and interpretations of 
autonomy in both the law reports and the literature.  
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the third stage of critical realist research enquiry sets out in 
search for an explanation why judges use the concept of autonomy as they do. 
Through inferential analysis, it examines the relationship between judicial uses of 
autonomy and underlying legal moral and political traditions. The existence of a 
structural relationship between the law reports and  the role of traditions is pointed to 
by the  literature reviews of background changes in jurisprudence (Chapter 1) and 
literature reviews of autonomy (Chapters 3 and 4).  
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In Chapter 7, the outcomes of the research are discussed and the emergent theory (to 
be tested in further research) is discussed. It is contended that the emergent theory 
which has developed through iterative cycles of enquiry of the data is that the judges 
have been developing a community of practice which over time has elaborated a 
sophisticated ethical language of autonomy. In this connection judges have been 
mediating the influence of different legal traditions, informed by wider traditions of 
moral and political order, and, in doing so, constituted a new practice of medical 
jurisprudence.  
 
This thesis hopes to make a contribution to public philosophy, medical jurisprudence 
and social science.  
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PART 1 
GROUNDING THE RESEARCH ENQUIRY AND 
DESIGN 
 
CHAPTER 2 
GROUNDING THE ENQUIRY 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 1, the emergence of medical law from its heterogeneous origins in various 
branches of private law into the realm of public law was considered in the context of 
background changes in public law and jurisprudence, in particular the incorporation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its implications for 
English common law based on precedent. These developments provide the legal 
setting within which the investigation into judicial uses and interpretations of 
autonomy is to be undertaken. In this chapter, the principles on which the empirical 
enquiry into the law reports will be undertaken – the principles of grounded theory - 
are expounded – leading in Chapter 3 to the explication of the application of these 
principles to the law reports as part of a first cycle of empirical enquiry.  
 
There has been a dearth of qualitative investigation of legal material and little has 
been written about the reasons for this. In spite of early advocacy of empirical legal 
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research by the Americans, Pound (1910) and Holmes (1920) there has been little of 
this undertaken on judicial decision-making and existing research generally consists 
of quantitative analyses involving the application of statistics to large bodies of law. 
A famous example is Landes & Posner’s (1987) classic study of the economic 
structure of the law of tort.  Hall & Wright (2008) identified only one example of a 
qualitative study (Fradella et al,  2002) based on case analysis. They suggest that the 
main reason for this lack of qualitative and quantitative research is the legal 
professions’ often dilettante approach to inter-disciplinary enquiry and consequent 
failure to find its “own unique empirical method” (2008: 63). The only qualitative 
content analysis of English law reports of which I am aware is an unpublished PhD 
thesis by Nicole Westmarland (2005).
1
  
 
Traditional legal analysis often employs comparatively unsystematic forms of case 
analysis. Academic lawyers tend to draw on cases that suit their academic purposes. 
Hall &Wright (2008) observe: 
 
Interpretive legal scholars present the cases that 
interest them, often with no discussion at all about 
where they found the cases or why they selected them 
over other candidates for discussion. The reader 
depends on the author’s judgment about which cases 
are worth reading, which are the “leading cases” that 
best illustrate the historical moment in question. In 
contrast, a purposive selection of law reports, and the 
application of procedures of qualitative analysis, 
promises more systematic methods of ascertaining 
documentary themes (2008: 79). 
                                                                                       
 
1 Dr Westmarland informed me privately that her research also revealed a dearth of empirical analysis 
of law reports. 
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This work seeks to contribute to the development of rigorous investigation of law 
reports by applying to them for the first time the methodology of grounded theory. 
The task of this chapter is to describe the principles of the methodology grounding 
the enquiry and the method that will guide the research investigation.  
 
2.2 THE PRINCIPLES OF GROUNDED THEORY  
 
The ‘discovery’ of grounded theory (GT) by Glaser & Strauss (1967) and its 
subsequent development (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), offers a powerful theory-
generating qualitative research methodology, and method of collecting and analysing 
data (Corbin & Holt, 2005; Allan, 2003). GT was first formulated as a reaction 
against detached, positivist, approaches to the investigation of the social world, 
promoting fieldwork and viewing theory as a property of the data gathered. Perhaps 
GT’s most distinctive feature is its rejection of pre-defined theoretical formulations 
in favour of methods of data comparison. This involves procedures of theoretical 
sampling with a view to generating and developing, as opposed to testing, theory. 
Accordingly, it falls within a broader family of theorising known as ‘analytic 
induction’ which is designed to be more reflective of practical situations than 
speculatively derived theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Pole & Lampard, 2002; 
Corbin & Holt, 2005).  The constant interaction between data and ideas works to 
develop two layers of theory: first, as explanation and interpretation of the data field 
and second, as clarifying any underlying presuppositions about the objects of 
enquiry (ontology) and how they are to be known (epistemology). These will be 
discussed in turn.  
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2.2.1 Grounding theory, interpretation and explanation 
Bryman (1988) develops a processual account of the practice of grounding 
theoretical analysis and explanation. The practice works in two cycles: Cycle 1 deals 
with posing preliminary research questions and Cycle 2 with their further 
development.  Cycle 1 involves acquiring knowledge of the context of the question, 
through theoretical sampling; getting to know the data through collection; and 
grounding concepts in the data. This entails interaction between ideas and data, using 
coding procedures, developing concepts and categories, submitting them to constant 
comparison, and exploring relationships between categories. These procedures 
reflect the distinctively iterative approach of GT in which data collection and data 
analysis occur in tandem constantly referring to each other (Bryman, 2004). This 
feature, along with data-derived theory, distinguishes GT from other research 
methods.  
 
Cycle 1 begins with a basic orientation towards the field of investigation in the form 
of a general question (See Figure 2.1). This preliminary orientation provides the 
impetus for collecting data that will help to develop understanding of how the 
research question is to be interpreted and explained, that is theorised. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), cited by Bryman (2004), defines this practice as theoretical sampling:  
 
…the process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and 
analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next 
and where to find them, in order to develop his theory 
as it emerges. The process of data collection is 
controlled by the emerging theory, whether substantive 
or formal. (Bryman, 2004: 305). 
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Figure 2.1 Processes and outcomes in grounded theory (taken from Bryman, 2004: 
404 (Figure 19.2)) 
Process  Outcomes 
   
Research question   
   
   
Theoretical sampling   
   
   
Collect data   
   
   
Coding  4a Concepts 
   
   
Constant comparison  5a Categories 
   
   
Saturate categories   
   
   
Explore relationships  
between categories 
 7a Hypotheses 
 
   
   
Theoretical sampling   
   
   
Collect data   
   
   
Saturate categories   
   
   
Test hypotheses  11a Substantive theory 
   
   
Collection and analysis of 
data and sampling 
 12aFormal theory 
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The aim of this stage is to identify the concepts, and to hypothesise relationships 
between them, in order to generate theory. This should be understood not as a 
theoretical formulation to be applied to an investigation, but the interrelated set of 
ideas and propositions which emerge from the investigation to provide a unique 
explanation of the object of enquiry.  
 
Knowing the context of the research is the first stage of Cycle 1. The next stage, 
according to Bryman, is to obtain knowledge of data, which can only emerge 
through its analysis as part of an iterative process. GT offers a number of practical 
strategies enabling the researcher to become familiar with his otherwise intractable 
data.  These initial ideas can be drawn from a multiplicity of sources, e.g. data bases, 
literature, media, public discourses, reflection on public cases, preliminary 
interviews and discussions. 
 
 
The concurrent processes of data collection, analysis and coding are designed to 
obviate the contentious and unrealistic procedures of, on the one hand, merely 
displaying the data, devoid of intellectual engagement, and, on the other, identifying 
a hypothesis at the outset of the research, testing it through the collection of data, and 
then transmuting the hypothesis into theory if the data confirms it. Rather, the 
processes of GT (coding, conceptualisation, categorisation etc.) are designed, 
through engagement with the data, to initiate reasoned movement through levels of 
abstraction in the direction of theory-development.  
 
This recursive relationship between the research question, and the processes of data 
collection, coding and conceptualisation, provides the dynamic for the process of 
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constant comparison, a key feature of GT method (e.g. Strauss and Corbin, 1998; 
Bowling and Ebrahim, 2005; Corbin and Holt 2005). According to Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) this feature of the research process is the principal means of 
maintaining intimacy between researcher, data, and the process of conceptualisation. 
Bryman describes this part of the process as: 
 
…constant movement backwards and forwards 
between [the research question, theoretical sampling, 
data collection and coding] so that early coding 
suggests the need for new data, which results in the 
need to theoretically sample, and so on.  (Bryman, 
2004: 404) 
 
It is this idea of honing by constant comparison, continuing until the level of ‘data 
saturation’ is reached, i.e. repetitions of theoretical relationships already discovered, 
leading to intensified ‘theoretical sensitivity’ of researcher to data, which 
distinguishes GT (Glaser, 1978; Bowling and Ebrahim, 2005).   
 
Coding plays a crucial role in the process of data analysis. According to Bryman 
(2004) coding in qualitative research is a method of breaking up data into 
components which are then given names. Strauss and Corbin (1990) identify three 
different kinds of codes that can be used in the early stages of data analysis: 
respectively, open, axial, and selective coding. These three steps in the coding 
process broadly correspond to Pole and Lampard’s (2002) descriptive, interpretative 
and explanatory coding stages. 
 
 Open coding is the initial stage in data acquisition, 
so-called because it aspires to be an ‘open-minded’ procedure for developing 
categories of information. Strauss and Corbin 1990 describe it as “the process of 
breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data” 
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(1990: 61). Axial coding is the next stage and is a means of interconnecting the 
codes and the categories obtained,  “a set of procedures whereby data are put back 
together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories” 
(1990: 96). Selective coding is the final stage in the sequential series and is a 
procedure for selecting the particular codes and categories, including the core 
category or categories,  as a way of identifying what is central to the explanatory 
framework being developed. 
 
 Bryman (2004) similarly uses ‘categories’ to represent the more general and 
selective way of understanding the phenomenon of interest.   Categories are 
elaborated concepts, or subsumptions of two or more concepts, which constitute 
representations of real-world phenomena. Categories represent a third level of 
abstraction, higher than concepts. A category may become a core category, around 
which other categories can gather, and to which they are related. A core category has 
been called the ‘storyline’ that frames the research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 
Bryman, 2005). The identification of a core category is the result of an exploration of 
relationships between categories, leading to a hypothesis, a hunch about relationships 
between concepts.   
 
The completion of this stage leads to Cycle 2 in which the processes of Cycle 1 are 
repeated, leading to the testing of hypotheses, and the generation, or development of 
theory. This may involve further research, e.g. re-reading documentary material, to 
refine categories. Bryman distinguishes substantive from formal theories; the former 
applying to substantive areas or empirical instances; the latter applying at a higher 
level of abstraction embracing a range of substantive areas.   
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Thus, GT’s distinction as a research methodology, and set of procedures, is its 
capacity to distil the object of research and to generate, iteratively, the specific 
theoretical propositions with their higher and lower levels of conceptual abstraction, 
which serve to provide the necessary interpretation and explanation. 
 
2.2.2 Principles of reliability, replicability and validity 
It is important for consumers of research to have confidence that a study has been 
undertaken with rigour and that the finding that can withstand public scrutiny. Yet 
researchers differ about which procedures are appropriate for studies of the social 
world. Bryman (2004) sets out three criteria for assessing the quality of research: 
reliability; replicability; and validity. Reliability is concerned with whether the 
results of a study are repeatable, stable and consistent. Two forms are identified: 
internal reliability and external reliability. Internal reliability refers to inter-observer 
agreement about what is seen and heard; external reliability refers to the degree to 
which others can repeat these observations. Replicability refers to the reproducibility 
of the results of research. Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions. 
Two forms of validity are identified. Internal validity inquires whether conclusions 
follow from the research, independent variables explain variation, and the theoretical 
ideas developed follow from the researchers’ observations.  
 
2.2.2.1 Alternative criteria for evaluating qualitative research 
Some researchers (e.g. Silverman, 2000) argue that it is not possible to follow the 
procedures used in the natural sciences and call for criteria that are appropriate for 
qualitative studies of the social world. These have been developed by Lincoln & 
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Guba (1985) and Guba & Lincoln (1994) who propose two principle criteria of 
trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness includes: 
 
2.2.2.1.1 Credibility (parallels internal validity): Where multiple accounts lead to 
the same account, research is credible (inter-observer consistency), where those who 
have contributed to research (respondents) receive a report and validate the findings 
(respondent validation, or member validation). Another technique is triangulation: 
using more than one method, or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon 
to check the data and the findings.   
 
2.2.2.1.2 Transferability (parallels external validity): Researchers are encouraged to 
produce what Geertz (1973) , cited in Bryman and Bell (2007) terms “thick 
description”: that is “rich accounts of the details of a culture’  or practice which 
provide others with a data base for making judgments about the possible 
transferability of findings to other milieux” (2007: 413). 
 
2.2.2.1.3 Dependability (parallels reliability): Guba & Lincoln (1994) encourage 
researchers to adopt an ‘auditing’ approach. “This entails ensuring that complete 
records are kept of all phases of the research process – problem formulation, 
selection of research participants, fieldwork notes, interview transcripts, data 
analysis decisions etc. in an accessible manner” (Bryman & Bell, 2007: 414).  
 
2.2.2.1.4 Confirmability (parallels objectivity): A researcher should have acted in 
good faith in not allowing personal values or theoretical inclinations to sway the 
conduct of the research. This should be one of the objectives of the auditors of a 
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research project. Authenticity is the second criterion developed by Guba and Lincoln 
and is used to assess the wider political impact of research. This criterion includes: 
Fairness: does the research fairly represent different viewpoints among members of a 
social setting? Ontological authenticity: Does the research help members to arrive at 
a better understanding of their social milieu? Educative authenticity: does the 
research help members to appreciate better the perspective of other members of their 
social setting? Catalytic authenticity: has the research acted as an impetus to engage 
in action to change their circumstances? Tactical authenticity: has the research 
empowered members to take the steps necessary for engaging in action? 
 
2.2.2.2 An intermediary position  
Hammersley (1992), cited by Bryman (2004), presents a third, intermediary position, 
lying between the quantitatively oriented validity and reliability perspective and the 
qualitatively oriented trustworthiness and authenticity perspective. For Hammersley, 
validity means that an empirical account must be plausible and credible and should 
take into account the amount and kind of evidence used in relation to it. In this, 
Hammersley shares with realists the notion that there is an external reality 
independent of the researcher. Yet he also shares with critics of the empirical realist 
position that the researcher is a direct and neutral mirror of the social world, and the 
researcher is always engaged in representations and constructions of that world.   
 
The intermediary position is the one preferred for its suitability for the investigation 
of law reports. The differences between the three positions, Bryman argues, reflect 
divergences in the degree to which a realist position is broadly accepted or rejected: 
“Most qualitative researchers operate at the mid-point of the realist-constructivist 
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axis” (2004: 277). The framework of critical realism, adopted in this thesis, construct 
the structures that underlie social reality and the practices of empirical enquiry that 
allow them to be investigated. This study believes that it is reasonable to apply the 
tests of reliability and validity but with practices that are appropriate to the study of 
the social world. Thus the investigation will seek to introduce the tests of (1) Inter-
observer reliability; and (2) Testing the thesis against the work of leading academics 
in the field. 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Inter-observer reliability: A qualitative assessment using three researchers 
(two colleagues and my supervisor) was used to ensure the reliability of my coding 
manual. The early version of my manual was the product of my initial iterative 
investigation of the law reports and the academic literature. This had resulted in a list 
of descriptors of autonomy each of which I had elaborated with a brief paraphrase 
and exemplar quotation drawn from the academic literature. Each researcher was 
given clear and concise instructions about how to use the coding grid and then given 
two law reports (Re T (1993) and Re B (2002)) for examination and asked to pull out 
concepts of autonomy from them.  
 
There was a much greater degree of consistency between my and my supervisor’s 
results than those of my colleagues (a lawyer and philosopher). While the latter 
tended to treat the various descriptors of autonomy as synonyms, my supervisor was 
more prepared to distinguish them. Upon further reflection (including with my 
supervisor), a number of conceptual distinctions were sharpened and the coding grid 
accordingly revised.  
 
51 
 
There now seemed to be four possible relationships between conceptions: (1) clearly 
distinct conceptions, e.g. ‘subjective character of experience’; (2) distinct 
conceptions which nevertheless presuppose others, e.g. ‘self-determination’ 
presupposes ‘freedom of choice’; (3) narrower conceptions which specify broader 
conceptions with greater concreteness, e.g. ‘bodily inviolability’ is a bodily form of 
privacy (which can include psychological privacy), and freedom from unwanted 
interference (which can include both psychological and political) interference;
2
 and 
(4) conceptions which are synonymous with others. , e.g.’ self-possession’ can mean 
the same thing as ‘self-ownership’ (although it is noted could mean something very 
different e.g. ‘composure’). 
 
Although my two colleagues and supervisor were given the same instructions, the 
inconsistency between them, and between my friends and me, can plausibly be 
accounted for. My supervisor had initially coded the two cases before she had 
discussed the coding framework with me. The principal reason why her results were 
more consistent than my colleagues was because she was more familiar with the 
theoretical framework of the conceptions of autonomy, and their nuances, that I had 
developed from the literature. Thus, when coding the empirical data, she would have 
had a better understanding of the coding framework.  In future, it would help inter-
observer reliability to provide researchers with a more careful and thorough 
introduction to the theoretical framework within which the coding manual had been 
drawn up.  
                                                                                       
 
2 In this thesis, ‘bodily integrity’ is taken to embrace both ‘bodily inviolability’ and ‘physical 
sovereignty’ 
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2.2.2.2.2 Wider background reading: The investigation of the medical law reports 
was carried out in tandem with a rich account of academic data which both 
influenced the course of research and provided a basis for a description of the 
process. For example, the process of abstraction, prompted by the need to explain the 
role of the literature as an explanatory factor in the judicial interpretation of 
autonomy in ethically-contentious medical law cases, led to the discovery of 
‘tradition’ as a theme of central importance. The work of the medical lawyer Veitch 
(2007), public lawyer Loughlin (2003), and political scientist Bogdanor (2009) were 
important contributors to my awareness that different bodies of law existed informed 
by traditions of moral and political order. The well-documented, serial, character of 
the research, enabled by the use GT  has provided a rich data base allowing 
researchers to check and explore validity, maintaining a tight connection between the 
findings and the process of investigation, and providing a clear and accessible audit 
trail.  
 
2.3 THE PRACTICE OF GROUNDED THEORY IN THIS RESEARCH 
 
As stated in the Prologue, the idea for this thesis emerged from a sense of unease 
which I began to experience as a practising barrister in mid-80s specialising in 
medical and personal injury law and which has continued throughout my academic 
career as a teacher of medical ethics and law at a University, and as an Anglican 
clergyman with pastoral responsibilities. This unease was related to my perception 
that the principle of respect for personal autonomy was receiving apparently 
uncritical acclaim as a cultural value of first-order amongst colleagues at the Bar, in 
the academy and in society-at-large. This feeling of personal, and philosophical, 
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discomfort has been exacerbated as a result of an accompanying perception of the 
way the language of autonomy, individual rights and choice, has dominated the 
public moral conversation. Substantively moral issues, whether in the context of 
abortion, assisted reproduction and assisted-suicide, seem to have been reduced to 
the utilitarian proportions of ‘best interests’ and ‘harm to others’, rather than forming 
part a more robust moral conversation about whether these are the ‘right-thing-to-
do’.  
 
The thesis has developed through a number of cycles of interaction between 
researcher and data that have clarified and developed the objects, purposes and 
questions of study. This cyclical approach has helped to elicit and elucidate the 
object(s) of study through the various stages of field work investigation, and 
engagement with the data field (law reports, bodies of law, academic and public 
discourse). The interaction of background reading and scrutiny of the law reports has 
revealed the multiple layers of the object of inquiry. For Bourdieu & Wacquant 
(1992), this stage - the construction of the object – is the most crucial operation.  
 
To develop and deepen investigation of the objects of investigation three cycles of 
enquiry unfolded. These were: 
 
(i) Empirical enquiry (cycle one): to study the judges uses of autonomy and 
what associations and influences could be discovered in associations of use 
with the Academy; 
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(ii) Hermeneutic enquiry (cycle two), to study the continuity of meanings and 
interpretations of autonomy in the law reports and in the legal and academic 
literature; 
 
(iii) Critical realist enquiry (cycle three), to study the extent of patterns of 
variation between judges use of autonomy and the structural contexts of the 
reports (location in court hierarchy, the nature of the cases etc.), and the role 
of legal traditions in influencing the judges decisions.  
 
The unfolding of the first cycle of enquiry is discussed below following Bryman’s 
scheme above in Figure 2.1. The application of this scheme to cycle two and three 
will be developed in Chapters 4 and 5.   
 
 2.3.1 The nature, development and purpose of the object of study: Cycle 1 
Cycle 1 consisted of: an explication of the nature of the law reports; a consideration 
of the purpose of the research question; theoretical sampling; data collection; coding 
and concept formation; and constant comparison, saturation and relationships. 
 
2.3.1.1 Purpose and research question: The question of what autonomy meant in the 
judicial context was one that seemed to cry out for clarification and the answer to 
which would have had major implications in the healthcare context. If healthcare 
practitioners are required by law, ethics and professional guidance, to uphold and 
promote patient autonomy, then it would be a good idea if they knew what it meant. 
Thus the purpose of the research in this first cycle of enquiry was to describe the 
variety of judges’ use of autonomy. The research questions at this stage were: do 
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judges use the concept of autonomy? Do judges express a variety of uses of 
autonomy? And, is there evidence of an association between judges’ use of 
autonomy and concepts developed in the academy?    
 
2.3.1.2 Theoretical sampling: My initial conjecture, derived from background 
reading of the literature around autonomy over 20 years, proposed that medical law 
and ethics were closely related, that medical law as a distinct legal topic was 
inextricably bound up with ethics, and that there had been a legalistic influence on 
medical ethics since its inception. The rise of legalism, the assimilation of morality 
to law and the legalisation of morality, in medical ethics has been well-documented 
from the inception of medical ethics and bioethics (Ladd, 1979; Faden and 
Beauchamp, 1986; Jonsen, 1992). Thus, whether the judiciary were at some level 
being influenced by developments in the academy, in particular medical ethics and 
bioethics, needed to be examined: were judges conceptions of autonomy similar to 
uses in the ethico-medical and bioethical literature?   It was clear from my 
background reading that medical law and ethics were frequently referred to in 
conjunction, including standard medical law textbooks, e.g. the highly-praised 
Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics. 
 
2.3.1.3 Data collection: The period of study began with a programme of activities 
and enquiry designed to develop understanding of the field of study. These included: 
(1) Review of the appropriate literatures on the uses and understandings of autonomy 
in the bioethical and academic medico-legal literatures, in philosophy and political 
thought; (2) Background reading on changes taking place in public law and 
jurisprudence, in particular the significance of the rise of medical law as a distinctive 
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legal topic, the introduction of the European Convention on Human Rights (2000) 
and the Mental Capacity Act (2005). The literature included Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009) in bioethics; Veitch (2007) in medical law; Bingham (2000) in 
judicial thought; Loughlin (2003) in public law; Raz (1986) in philosophy; and 
Bogdanor (2009) in political thought (3) The search for, selection, and early reading, 
of medical law cases which were to become the focus of the study. 
 
2.3.1.4 Coding and concept formation: The identification of the primary data base 
was inevitably influenced by background reading in medical and public, including 
constitutional, law, and academic discourse (the secondary data base). The initial 
reading focussed on academic medico-legal and bioethical debates concerning the 
concept of autonomy and shaped by awareness that autonomy had been a matter of 
intense concern and contestation within the legal and bioethical community since the 
late 1960’s. The early work was marked by an exclusive focus on the range of 
elemental conceptions of autonomy in use by the judiciary and academics.  
 
2.3.1.5 Constant comparison, saturation and relationships: Reading of the literature 
developed my understanding that lawyers and ethicists tend to use the concept of 
autonomy without conceptual precision. They seem intuitively to assign to the 
concept a range of elemental uses of autonomy, without making it clear whether 
autonomy has a unitary meaning, or whether it is a more complex concept encoding 
values. It seemed difficult to form categories of autonomy from the diversity of 
usage, though it appeared that there was evidence suggesting an association between 
judicial and academic understandings of conceptions of autonomy that invited 
further investigation.  
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The principles and practices of grounded theory provide a powerful intellectual and 
practical scheme for engaging with, and working out, from the primary database of 
law reports in iterative interaction with the broader secondary database of academic 
literature. It has proved true to the practice and experience of research which was 
initially concerned with the language and vocabulary of the law reports (semantic 
use) but was driven, through continued iteration between law and literature, to 
question the descriptive limitations of empirical enquiry and to deepen analysis of 
judges’ uses of autonomy. A second cycle sought to deepen textual analysis of the 
meanings implicit in judicial use and then a further cycle of enquiry developed 
critical realist analysis of underlying structures of meaning in the practice of use. 
Coding of the uses of autonomy developed with greater sophistication through these 
three cycles of enquiry as summarised in Figure 2. 2  
 
The law reports selected for analysis were coded at three levels and in each of the 
three stages. In the first cycle of enquiry, the law reports were read through and 
coded for ‘elemental uses’ of autonomy.3 In the cycle, the reports were iteratively re-
coded for the concepts of ‘self’ or person entailed in the elemental uses of autonomy. 
In the third cycle of enquiry, the law reports were again recoded for ‘traditions’ of 
freedom entailed in both the elemental uses and concepts of person identified as a 
                                                                                       
 
3
 In this thesis, a terminological distinction is drawn between the concept of autonomy, and its various 
conceptions, i.e. the various different ways in which autonomy is presented in the literature, e.g. 
bodily inviolability, freedom of choice etc. 
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result of the first two levels of enquiry. The description of this practice of coding will 
be developed in detail in the appropriate chapters to follow.  
 
Cycles of Enquiry Levels of Coding 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Particulars Concept Category 
I. Elemental Uses Implicit and explicit 
uses 
e.g. bodily 
inviolability 
The self/person 
II. Concepts of Person e.g. bodily integrity, 
capacity, dignity 
Body, mind and 
identity 
Capability 
III. Categorisation of 
traditions 
e.g. freedom from 
interference, privacy,  
self-realisation 
Negative and 
positive liberty 
Freedom-from 
(liberty), freedom-
to (freedom) 
 
Figure 2.2 Cycles of enquiry and levels of coding 
 
As a result, grounded theory as a powerful processual research methodology has 
enabled findings which were not anticipated and a theory of medical jurisprudence as 
potentially a tradition-constituted complex practice which simply could not 
otherwise have been hypothesised.  
 
In the next chapter, the first cycle of empirical enquiry into the law reports and the 
literature will be undertaken. The framework and basis of the semantic enquiry into 
judicial uses of autonomy will be set out including analysis of the elemental 
meanings which have been assigned to the concept in the literature.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FIRST CYCLE OF EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY: THE LAW 
REPORTS 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to justify and explain the strategy of enquiry and detail the 
first stage of field work investigation, entailing semantic content analysis of the 
research sample of law reports.  It articulates the precipitating research questions and 
provisional hypothesis and explains the procedure for the selection and sampling of 
the law reports. The chapter then goes on to describe the elemental uses of autonomy 
in the law reports, its relationship with the academy and the limitations of empirical 
analysis in this enquiry. The research design involved the construction of a unique 
data base of medical law reports, and a strategy of constant interaction with, and 
progressive focussing, of the cases. The strategy of investigation was constructed on 
the realist assumption that a qualitative methodology such as grounded theory was 
needed in order to collect evidence of the meanings (judicial constructions of 
autonomy) revealed in experience (judicial decision-making contained in law 
reports). This knowledge is not of the harder, observable, tangible and quantifiable 
kind requiring a quantitative methodology, such as Landes & Posner’s (1987) 
statistical study of the economic structure of the law of tort. 
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3.2. THE DATA BASE OF LAW REPORTS 
 
Law reports are documentary records of judicial decisions of legal interest decided in 
the superior courts. According to Lindley (1885) a case is of legal interest ‘if it 
promises to introduce a new legal principle or rule, or materially settle a question 
upon which the law is doubtful, or offer material which is, for any reason, 
particularly instructive’ (1885: 143).  The principle Lindley proposed has been 
adopted by the International council of Law Reporting (ICLA). Certain elements are 
common to all law reports. The figure below is drawn from Clinch & Hart (2001) 
and illustrated with reference to one of the cases in the sample selected for empirical 
analysis (Pretty (2002)). The catchwords indicate briefly what the case is about. The 
headnote is not part of the judgement but the law reporter’s summary of, or guide to, 
the judgement, and can occasionally be inaccurate (Williams, 1982). A law reporter 
must be either a barrister or solicitor (section 115 of the Court and Legal Services 
Act) and a report which has not been prepared by either will be rejected by the courts 
(Zander, 2004). 
 
The submissions of counsel do not form part of the judgement and appear only in 
some of the published series of law reports, e.g. The Law Reports. However, the 
relationship between the arguments of counsel and the content of judicial decisions is 
complex. On the basis of the contents of the précis of counsel’s arguments in the law 
reports, and the contents of the judgements, there is good prima facie evidence to 
suggest that the judiciary are significantly reliant on those submissions, although not 
all the cases cited by counsel in argument appear in the text of the judgement(s). 
Foster (2009) has colourfully characterised judgements as “cut and paste jobs from 
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barristers’ skeleton arguments” (2009: 4), alluding to the convention that judges are 
restricted to the authorities actually cited in court and from considering authorities 
not cited but of which they are aware. There is evidence in some of the more recent 
cases not only of increased acknowledgment of judicial indebtedness to the 
arguments of counsel (e.g. NHS Trust A (2001) (p. 351H; 359B-C)), but, in one case, 
an example of an extract from the skeleton argument of one barrister in another case; 
(Burke (2005) (p.457D-E)). The ‘veil’ between the primary data base (judicial 
decisions) and the secondary data-base (the arguments of counsel) can at times seem 
paper-thin.  
 
There is no set structure to a written legal judgement in a superior court (i.e. High 
Court, Court of Appeal, House of Lords (or Supreme Court). Traditionally, they 
have been marked by the intertwining of fact and law, with a special emphasis on the 
importance of facts. Munday (2002) states that the “common-law judge’s judgement 
is ground in and grows out of fact” (2002:  613). A distinctive feature of the common 
law tradition is the way it has firmly sought to ground enunciations of legal principle 
in a case’s factual context with an eye to the implications that those will have in 
practice, especially where ethical questions are concerned. The form of legal 
judgements may be evolving with signs of an increasing tendency on the part of the 
higher courts to deliver a single judgement written by a single judge with whom the 
others concur, or a composite judgement. Another recent development is the 
tendency to divide up the judgements into numbered paragraphs, with headed 
sections which may, under European legal influence, be leading to a subtle 
separation between a case’s factual and legal dimensions, with emphasis on issues of 
legal principle. The changing form of judgement may itself be a register of the 
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increasing influence of European legal traditions (with their associated dimensions of 
moral and political order) on the common law.  
 
The Australian judge Atkinson (2002) has identified four chief purposes, and four 
basic constituents of a judgement. The four chief purposes are: (1) to clarify thought; 
(2) to explain the decision to the parties; (3) to communicate the reasons for the 
decision to the public; and (4) to provide reasons for an appeal court to consider. 
Atkinson expresses the four basic constituents of a judgement using the acronym 
FLAC: F – for facts; L – for law; A – for application; and C – for conclusion. The 
recitation of the relevant facts is foundational to any common law judgement. This 
usually occurs at length in High Court judgements, but not necessarily in the higher 
courts (the Court of Appeal, House of Lords/Supreme Court) where the facts are 
usually only briefly reprised. This latter is more likely to be the case in the Court of 
Appeal which can entertain mixed fact-law appeals. The Supreme Court/House of 
Lords only deals with questions of law. The second aspect of FLAC is the law. In 
order to come to the right decision, the law needs to be stated clearly and 
persuasively, including the way in which counsel for the parties have stated it, so that 
the rationale for the overall decision is more transparent. Thirdly, the law needs to be 
applied to the facts. In the common law tradition, the enunciation of legal principle is 
grounded in the facts, and a clear demonstration of how the law applies to the facts is 
essential to the acceptance of the decision. This leads, fourthly, to the conclusion to 
the case, which should follow on logically, and practically, from the application of 
the law to the facts.  
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Figure 3.1 Sample structure of a law report (based on Clinch (2001: 108)) 
 
3.2.1 The doctrine of precedent 
The judgement is the only part of the law report which exerts legal authority. The 
catchwords, headnote, submissions of counsel (where they appear) and notes do not. 
The judgement alone contains the legal rules, and principles, which can ‘bind’, or 
otherwise legally influence, another superior court. The doctrine of stare decisis 
(literally ‘let the decision stand’) or binding precedent – is the distinctive feature of 
Common elements Case Illustration 
Names of the 
parties 
Regina (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the 
Home Department intervening) 
Name of the Court House of Lords 
Name of Judge(s) Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough and Lord Scott of Foscote 
Dates of hearing 
and judgement 
2001 Nov 14,15; 29 
Catchwords e.g. Aiding and abetting — Suicide — Terminally ill claimant seeking 
undertaking from Director of Public Prosecutions not to consent to prosecution 
of husband for assisting proposed suicide  
Headnote e.g. ‘In particular she claimed that article 2 protected a right to self-
determination, entitling her to commit suicide with assistance’ 
Commentary on 
notes 
There were no notes in this particular case 
List of cases cited 
in judgement 
 
e.g. Airedale Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; [1993] 2 WLR 316; [1993] 1 All 
ER 821, CA and HL(E) 
List of other cases 
cited in argument 
 
e.g. McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982.] QB 1166; [1982] 2 WLR 
890; [1982] 2A11ER77I,CA 
Details of 
proceedings 
APPEAL from the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division The 
claimant, Diane Pretty, appealed, with leave of an Appeal Committee of the 
House of Lords (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of 
Craighead) granted on 30 October 2001…’ 
Names of counsel 
 
Philip Havers QC and Fenella Morris for the claimant; Jonathan Crow for the 
Secretary of State ; David Perry and Robin McCoubrey for the Director 
Judgement 
 
e.g. ‘For these reasons, which are in all essentials those of the Divisional Court, 
and in agreement with my noble and learned friends, Lord Steyn and Lord 
Hope of Craighead, I would hold that Mrs Pretty cannot establish any breach of 
any Convention right.’(per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at para. 37) 
Formal order Appeal dismissed 
Names of solicitor Liberty; Treasury Solicitor. 
Name of law 
reporter 
DECP  
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the common law system. The English courts (Practice Statement (Judicial 
Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234) have described the use of precedent as: 
 
An indispensable foundation upon which to decide 
what is the law and its application to individual cases. 
It provides at least some degree of certainty upon 
which individuals can rely in the conduct of their 
affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of 
legal rules. 
 
Stare decisis is one of the normative premises of the common law, and the rational 
form of ordering of court decisions. It seeks to create stability, predictability and 
certainty in the law, however short it may fall of these aspirations in practice. The 
common law precedent-based approach is characterised principally by its method, a 
mode of example-based legal reasoning which accords prudential value to past 
decisions, in combination with a pragmatic approach to later cases. This distinctive 
method of common law reasoning is a form of ‘constraint’. Judges cannot adjudicate 
on an ad hominem basis but are required to justify their decisions on the basis of 
precedental reasoning.  
 
The governing rule, principle or rationale, of a court decision is known as the ratio 
decidendi. Lower courts are bound by the previous decisions of higher courts in 
analogous cases. The ratio of a case is distinguishable from ancillary judicial 
utterances know as obiter dicta (‘by the way’) which may exert ‘persuasive’ 
authority on any other court in the hierarchy, but which those courts are not bound to 
follow. Decisions in foreign jurisdictions may not bind English courts, although they 
may exert persuasive authority. This includes the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the opinions of the European Commission and 
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Council of Ministers, which English courts are obliged by virtue of section 2(1)(a) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 to ‘take into account’(Zander, 2004). 
 
Distinguishing the ratio of a case from obiter dicta is a matter of judgment based on 
legal practice and experience. Judicial decisions do not have special headings 
labelled ratio and obiter. Extracting either from a judgement is a matter of 
interpretation: law reporters in the formulation of a headnote, and legal 
commentators in the form of academic case-notes and articles, may experience 
considerable difficulty extracting the ratio of a case where several judgements are 
handed down. In Sidaway (1985), a case concerning the liability of a neurosurgeon 
for failure to disclose an inherent risk of an operation for spinal cord decompression, 
five Law Lords offered different justifications for a shared finding of negligent non-
disclosure. Judges in their construction of the ratio of an authority may well be in 
disagreement with the judge who decided that authority had the latter been asked at 
the time to make what he thought was the ratio of his decision explicit (Slapper and 
Kelly 2006). Laster (2001) has stated, “[w]hile easy in theory, the distinction 
between ratio and obiter is more difficult to put into practice” (2001: 111).  
 
3.2.2 The hierarchy of citation 
The doctrine of precedent depends on the existence of a clear hierarchy of courts and 
an efficient retrieval system in which the previous decisions of the courts can be 
made known (Wacks & Allan, 1993). The superior courts in England and Wales are 
the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords), the Court of Appeal, and the High 
Court. The Court of Appeal and High Court are divided into criminal and civil 
divisions, and, within the latter, the High Court into further specialist divisions, e.g. 
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Family Division and Court of Protection. The Supreme Court (formerly the House of 
Lords) is not bound by its previous decisions, although it will rarely depart from 
them. With its judicial elite, the Supreme Court may review existing, and make new, 
law. The Court of Appeal and High Court are bound by decisions in a higher court 
and, as a basic rule, bound by their own decisions. Higher courts may nevertheless 
adopt a rule or principle articulated in the lower courts, thus entrenching its 
authority.  
 
A classic example of such entrenchment can be found in the case of Bolam (1957) 
case which established the ‘prudential doctor’ standard of care in the law of 
negligence, has infiltrated a wide variety of areas of medical law at the very highest 
levels of the court hierarchy, e.g. the House of Lords in Re F (1990). The Bolam case 
is also notable for taking the form of a direction to the jury in the days when most 
civil trials were jury trials (Brazier and Miola, 2000). Another closely related 
premise of the common law is the greater prudential weight given to decisions of the 
higher courts, in part because there are more judges deciding a single case and more 
time for deliberation (Laster 2001). 
 
In England and Wales, modern law reports are ‘official’ publications only in a 
qualified sense. The most authoritative reports are those independently produced, or 
approved, by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting (ICLA), a charitable 
organisation founded in 1865 and dedicated to the expeditious professional 
production of cheap and accurate law reports (Slapper and Kelly 2006). Before 1865, 
law reports were produced privately (‘the nominate reports’) of which there were 
hundreds of different series, many short-lived and many of dubious accuracy and 
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authority. The electronic revolution, and the growing availability of computerised 
systems of data retrieval, has made legal resources speedily available and to an 
unprecedented degree. The growth of computerised systems of data retrieval has 
given unprecedented access to legal materials and means that virtually every case is 
reported in one form or another thus making the concept of an ‘unreported’ case 
problematic (Spencer et al., 2002).  
 
This measure of accessibility has put the concept of an ‘unreported’ case into issue. 
Munday (2004) goes further stating that “the demarcation line between reported and 
unreported case law has always been porous” (2004: 229). Even though case reports 
can be accessed directly from the courts, or online databases, or through the Internet, 
an unreported case can be classified as one which has not been considered 
sufficiently important to merit publication in one of the citable series of law reports. 
In addition, the growth of primary online legal resources by government publishers 
has lent ‘official’ status to such material even though it has not been subject to the 
scrutiny procedures which have traditionally characterised the most authoritative 
reports. The Internet publication of court decisions precipitated the introduction in 
2001 of a neutral citation system of identifying court decisions independently of 
traditional citation formats pertaining to printed law reports, and a system of 
paragraph, as opposed to page, numbering (Practice Direction (Judgments: Form 
and Citation), [2001] 1 WLR 194). 
 
Not all modern law reports are of exactly equivalent authority. The hierarchy of 
citation for the various series of law reports is laid down in a special protocol 
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relating to procedure in the civil courts (Practice Direction (Court of Appeal: 
Citation of Authority), [1995] 1 WLR 1096).The protocol stipulates that: 
 
When authority is cited, whether in written or oral 
submissions, the following practice should in general 
be followed. If a case is reported in the official Law 
Reports published by the Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting for England & Wales, that report should be 
cited…If a case is not (or not yet) reported in the 
official Law Reports, but is reported in the Weekly 
Law Reports or the All England Law Reports, that 
report should be cited. If a case is not reported in any 
of these series of reports, a report in any of the 
authoritative specialist series of reports may be cited. 
 
The trustworthiness ascribed to the official law reports, that is, the series called  The 
Law Reports, derives from the judicial endorsement and authentication procedures to 
which the case reports contained within them are subject. The Law Reports, which 
appear in four parts as Appeal Cases (AC), Chancery Division (Ch), Family Division 
(Fam) and King’s/Queen’s Bench Division (KB/QB), are written by professional 
lawyers (barristers and solicitors) who remain in court for the arguments of counsel 
and the handing down of judgement. These reports contain ‘headnotes’ (which distil 
the facts of the case and the applicable rule or principle of law), a skeleton summary 
of the arguments of counsel, as well as the judgement itself (see above). These are all 
subject to pre-publication judicial revision. Because, in England and Wales, 
headnotes, and arguments of counsel, are edited by lawyers and legal publishers, 
they do not constitute part of the judgment proper (i.e. the judicial stare) and 
therefore part of the case’s ‘authority’, unlike in other jurisdictions where the court 
itself supplies these and therefore form part of the judicial opinion and precedent.  
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Cases reported in The Weekly Law Reports, also a publication of the ICLA, do not 
contain précis of the arguments of counsel or benefit from pre-publication judicial 
revision. However, many of the cases reported there appear, after judicial revision, in 
The Law Reports. Cases in the All England Reports, a series published by noted legal 
publishers Butterworths/Lexis – do not (like the Weekly Law Reports) contain the 
arguments of counsel, but do (unlike the Weekly Law Reports) benefit from judicial 
revision. Another procedural protocol (Practice Statement [1998] 2 ALL ER 667 at 
para. 8) has added specialist or subject- based reports to the hierarchy of citation 
(e.g. Butterworth’s Medical Law Reports (BMLR)).Where a case is not reported in a 
series apparent in the hierarchy of citation, then less substantial reports may be cited, 
such as legal journals, such as the Criminal Law Review, or newspaper law reports, 
such as The Times Law Reports.  
 
3.3 STRATEGY OF INVESTIGATION 
 
The initial interest in this research project was borne of experience as a practising 
barrister working principally in the field of medical law and subsequent experience 
as a teacher of medical ethics and law at an English university (see Prologue). The 
perception that the concept of autonomy was being used imprecisely, and yet 
exalted, in legal and bioethical discourse was a matter of both concern and 
intellectual interest.  The variety of other terms that my legal colleagues and my 
early untutored background reading of the literature seemed to be using in close 
association with autonomy led to the suspicion that autonomy might be a complex, 
multifaceted concept.   
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3.3.1 Research questions and hypothesis 
These experiences guided the formulation of the initial research questions: 
 (1) Is there use of autonomy?  
(2) Do judges express a variety of uses of autonomy? 
 (3) Is there association between judges’ and academic usage? 
 
3.3.2 Sampling the Law Reports  
The law reports selected for analysis were drawn from full-text UK court judgments, 
freely available online. It was possible to search for judgements at all levels of the 
court hierarchy against terms of interest and relevance. Search terms “autonomy” 
and “medical treatment” were used. Lexis Library yielded 255 cases and Westlaw 
215 cases 
 
In Lexis Library, there were 166 ‘duplicate’ cases. A duplicate case is one published 
in more than one format or published series of law reports. These duplicates were 
removed. Of the 89 cases left over, a further three non-domestic cases were 
eliminated. For reasons difficult to ascertain, 2 decisions of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal and 1 decision of the Northern Irish Court of Appeal were thrown up by 
the search engine.  The search in Westlaw (see below) produced 76 of the 86 Lexis 
cases. Nine (out of 10) cases not produced by Westlaw were excluded either because 
they fell outside the medical treatment context, although they include references to 
patient autonomy. This meant that there was only one case produced by Lexis which 
remained potentially analysable.  
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 The Westlaw search yielded 215 cases. Of these 51 of were excluded because they 
were non-domestic cases. Westlaw (unlike Lexis Library) did not have a function to 
restrict the search to English decisions alone.  Of the 164 cases left over, 115 were 
excluded because the legal decision either did not contain the word autonomy, or did 
not directly concern medical treatment. It is a quirk of Westlaw, that even if the term 
‘autonomy’ does not appear in the law report or transcript, it can nevertheless appear 
in documents registered under ‘case analyses. Westlaw, unlike Lexis Library, did not 
have a function on allowing a search restricted to the law reports and transcripts 
alone. Even though the search terms were specific, it is nevertheless possible for 
non-medical treatment cases to appear in the search results if the judgements relied 
on medical treatment cases as legal authorities. This left 49 cases potentially suitable 
for analysis.  
 
This was considered too large a population of cases for proper scrutiny. Therefore, 
further cases were excluded from the research sample if they did not contain all of 
the following criteria: (1) the status of a ‘stigmata’ case; (2) significant judicial 
discussion of the concept of autonomy; (3) significant academic discussion of the 
concept of autonomy; and (4) elemental uses of the concept of autonomy. These 
cases are tabulated at Appendix 4.  
 
Firstly, cases were excluded which were not considered revelatory of broader 
concerns in society, i.e. ‘talismatic’ (Montgomery, 2006a: 8). Lee and Morgan 
(2001) have called these ‘stigmata’ cases (see Chapter 1). These cases have five 
features: (1) they are relatively recent and ethically-controversial; (2) raise the 
balance of personal and public interests; (3) compel consideration of the goals of 
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medical practice; (4) prompt reflection on the boundaries between the normal and 
anomalous; and (5) “require the courts to develop a social, even moral, vision to 
respond to the social and cultural revolution of contemporary medicine” 
(Montgomery, 2006b: 189).  
 
Secondly, cases were removed from the sample where judicial discussion of 
autonomy was either non-existent, or insufficiently substantial to merit further 
consideration. For example, in Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust v Wyatt 
4
 the Court 
of Appeal (at p. 4024F) makes a single reference to ‘parental’ as opposed to ‘patient’ 
autonomy. This takes the form of a quotation from the High Court judgement in the 
same case
5
 which involved the question whether further invasive treatment to 
prolong the life of a profoundly disabled baby was in her ‘best interests’. In R (on the 
application of B) v Haddock the Trust A and Trust B v H (an Adult Patient) there are 
two passing references to ‘autonomy’ in the form of quotations from other cases (cf. 
paras. 10 and 16). 
 
Thirdly, cases were removed from the research sample if they failed to generate a 
pool of academic commentary and reflection contributing to wider discourse on 
questions of autonomy. In order to guard against selection bias, cases were excluded 
if they failed to generate more than five academic articles according to the ‘Journal 
Articles’ function in the ‘Case Analysis’ section of the Westlaw search engine.  For 
                                                                                       
 
4
 [2005] 1 WLR 3995 
5Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] 2 F.L.R. 480.  
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example, the case of Chester v Afshar
6
 has generated nearly 90 academic articles, 
and Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment
7
) 31, while the case of NHS Trust v D
8
a mere 
4 articles.
9
  
 
It is proposed that this academic literature constitutes a public body of objective 
evidence as to the importance of the cases to which they refer to in relation to 
questions of autonomy. The cases were also apt for close scrutiny because they 
could, within the span of 21 years (1990-2011), be influenced by background 
changes in public law and jurisprudence which may influence the use and 
interpretation of autonomy. The 23 selected cases are distributed over a 21 year time 
line (1990-2011) into two periods: cases from 1990 – 1999 (T1); and cases from 
2000 – 2011 (T2). The second (T2) encompasses the period of important legislative 
change: the coming into force into domestic law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in 2000 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005.   
 
Fourthly, cases were removed from the sample if they failed to contain descriptors of 
autonomy, i.e. elemental uses or ‘conceptions’, e.g. bodily inviolability, self-
determination. These descriptors supply the empirical content of the various uses to 
which the concept of autonomy is being put in the law reports.  
                                                                                       
 
6 [2005] 1 AC 134 
7 [1993] Fam 95 
8 [2005] EWHC 2439 (Fam) 
9 It is notable that the cases which Lee and Morgan (2001) identify as ‘stigmata’ cases - the cases of 
Bland (1993), Blood (1997) and Re A (2001) – have generated great academic controversy, with the 
Medical Law Review – perhaps the leading British medical law journal – devoting a whole issue to the 
latter  case (Volume 9(3) 2001).  
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23 of the 49 cases (See Figure 3.2) satisfied all four criteria, i.e. ‘stigmata’, judicial 
discussion, academic discussion, and elemental uses of autonomy and these were 
chosen for focussed analysis. It should be noted that in Appendix 4, 19 cases are 
highlighted to this end. References of Re F, Bland, Burke, and Purdy each comprise 
2 cases at different levels of the court hierarchy, i.e. High Court, Court of Appeal 
and House of Lords (19+ 4 = 23). The cases more than adequately attained the 
threshold of ‘data saturation’ as regards identification of ‘elemental meanings’ of 
autonomy. The initial restriction of the empirical analysis to these terms was justified 
on two grounds. 
 
First, wider background reading had indicated that a search using these terms 
promised more effectively to locate the judiciary’s more discursive treatments of the 
concept of autonomy in the medical jurisprudence. Secondly, the justification for 
restricting the search to one for cases rather than legislation is of the dearth of 
philosophical discussion to be found in the latter. “Philosophically, [legislation] is 
something of a desert….The point of Acts is to act, not to discuss” (Foster, 2009: 
173). Most other domains of medical law are regulated by statute, e.g. abortion 
(Abortion Act 1967 (as amended)), human tissue and organ donation (Human Tissue 
Act 2004); assisted reproduction (Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 2008). 
Therefore, judicial discussion of legislation is philosophically-etiolated, being 
restricted to questions of statutory interpretation, rather than concepts. The word 
‘autonomy’ does not appear in any legislation. This is not to say that issues of 
autonomy do not arise for academic reflection out of the nature and purpose of 
legislation. The broader question whether, and to what extent, the relevant statutory 
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provisions as a whole reflect an ethical commitment to the value of autonomy is not 
strictly relevant to this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Table of selected law reports 
 
No.  Cases Hierarchy of  Court Law Report Series 
1, 2 Re F (Mental Health: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 
1 
Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords 
The Law Reports 
3 Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment [1993] Fam 
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Court of Appeal The Law Reports 
4 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 
95 
Court of Appeal The Law Reports 
5, 6 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords 
The Law Reports 
7 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 
1WLR 290 
High Court The Weekly Law 
Reports 
8 Re MB (Caesarean Section) [1997] 2 FLR 426 Court of Appeal Family Law Reports 
9 St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] 
Fam. 26 
Court of Appeal The Law Reports 
10 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation) [2001] Fam 147 
Court of Appeal The Law Reports 
11 Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 
F.L.R. 129 
High Court Family Law Reports 
12 NHS Trust ‘A’ v. M; NHS Trust ‘B’ v. H [2001] 
Fam 348 
High Court The Law Reports 
13 R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2002] 1 AC 800 
House of Lords The Law Reports 
14 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) 
[2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) 
High Court Official Transcript 
15 R (on the application of Burke) v General 
Medical Council [2005] QB 424 
High Court The Law Reports 
16 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 House of Lords The Law Reports 
17 R (on the application of Burke) v General 
Medical Council [2006] QB 273 
Court of Appeal The Law Reports 
18.  Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust 
[2010] QB  
Court of Appeal The Law Reports 
19, 
20 
R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2010] 1 AC 345 
Court of Appeal House 
of Lords 
The Law Reports 
21 D Borough Council v AB [2011] 3 W.L.R. 1257 High Court The Weekly Law 
Reports  
22 Re A (Capacity: Refusal of Contraception) 
[2010] EWHC1549 (Fam) 
High Court The Law Reports  
23 Re M (2011) High Court Official Transcript 
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3.3.3 Research methods: documentary analysis 
Jupp (2001: 103) has defined documentary analysis as ‘the detailed analysis of 
documents with a view to making assertions about some aspect of the social world.’ 
Bryman has provided a useful checklist for evaluating documents as sources of data 
for authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning (Scott, 1990; Bryman, 
2004). These are put in question form (2004: 392):  
 
Who produced the document? It was demonstrated in a previous section that law 
reports are quasi-official documents produced by judges and, in their most 
authoritative form, published under the auspices of the ICLA, or other specialised 
publishers, and endorsed by the judiciary through special judicial protocols, e.g. 
practice directions.  
 
Why was the document produced? Law reports are records of judicial decisions in 
legally, and perhaps morally and politically, significant cases which contribute to the 
body of judge-made law, known as ‘common law’. Judicial decisions are constrained 
by precedent, but may also involve the interpretation of statutes (parliament-made 
law) and the European Convention of Human Rights. Law reports contain reasons 
for the judicial decision and are available for public, as well as specialist, scrutiny. 
 
Was the person or group that produced the document in a position to write 
authoritatively about the subject or issue? Members of the judiciary are chosen from 
amongst the most eminent members of the legal profession, principally the English 
Bar, and are, accordingly, well-equipped to enunciate the legal principles which 
emerge from the factual contexts of the cases upon which they are called to 
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adjudicate. Judges have been immersed, first as practitioners, and then as members 
of the judiciary, in the complex practice of common law, and disciplined according 
to its customs, rules, canons and conventions.  
 
Is the material genuine? The issue of authenticity is dealt with by the strict protocols 
relating to the hierarchy of citation.  
 
Did the person or group have an axe to grind and if so can a particular slant be 
identified? The presence of ideological bias, where it exists, is constrained by the 
virtues judges are required to cultivate within the framework of the complex practice 
of judicial decision-making, including the prudential, pragmatic, precedent-based 
rationality of law making. 
 
 Is the document typical of its kind and if not is it possible to establish how untypical 
it is and in what ways? Although law reports are not perfectly uniform in 
organisation, and may be changing under the influence of the electronic revolution 
and European influence, they invariably share a number of common features which 
distinguish it from non-law reports (Clinch, 2001; Atkinson, 2002).  
 
Is the meaning of the document clear? Law reports may reflect certain standards of 
FLAC clarity (Atkinson, 2002). However, judicial decisions are also matters of 
interpretation especially with regard to the legal principles which the judges 
enunciate on the basis of the cases’ factual contexts, and other data within the law 
reports which may indicate implicit factors which have influence on judicial 
determinations.  
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Can the events or accounts presented in the document be corroborated? This is not 
normally a problem in the context of law reports. Issues of fact appear on the face of 
the pleadings (the documents which set out the factual and legal cases of the parties), 
which can either be agreed, or disputed. If the latter, then each set of legal 
representatives will set out vigorously to corroborate the events and accounts 
presented on which the outcome of the case may turn, and air them in court. The 
judiciary on the basis of the evidence it has heard will make the final determinations 
of fact. In the criminal courts, the Crown’s case must be established ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’, and in the civil courts, a party must establish his case ‘on the 
balance of probabilities’.  
 
Are there different interpretations of the document from the account offered and if so 
what are they and why have they been discounted? There are a number of different 
ways of interpreting law reports as sources of data.  
 
Law reports generally, and those selected for empirical analysis in particular, are 
high quality documents according to Scott’s (1990) criteria. They are authentic 
because they are genuine and of unquestionable origin. They are credible in that 
there is no basis for thinking that reports of judicial decisions have been, or are, 
distorted in some way.  They are representative insofar as the existence of 
sophisticated legal search engines (Westlaw/LexisLibrary) and a plethora of 
electronic retrieval systems have greatly facilitated access to a wide variety of law 
reports. As a result, it is relatively easy to acquire a representative sample of law 
reports by entering the appropriate search words. The method of interpreting law 
reports in order to make sense of their contents is the greatest challenge.  
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3.3.4 Qualitative content analysis: ethnographic content analysis  
There are a number of research methods for interpreting documents. Bryman (2004) 
identifies three qualitative research methods for interpreting documents: qualitative 
content analysis, semiotics and hermeneutics. Qualitative content analysis (QCA) is 
the most prevalent qualitative research method and the one best suited for scrutiny 
for law reports. It is an approach to documents which emphasises the role of the 
researcher in the construction of the meaning of, and in, texts, and of allowing 
concepts and categories to emerge out of the data.  
 
Altheide has formulated a form of QCA called ethnographic content analysis (ECA) 
which follows the processual and iterative movement between researcher and data 
redolent of GT. Altheide (1996) characterises the research methods as: 
 
… following a recursive and reflexive movement 
between concept and development-sampling-data, 
coding-data, and analysis-interpretation. The aim is to 
be systematic and analytic but not rigid. Categories 
and variables initially guide the study, but others are 
allowed and expected to emerge during the study, 
including an orientation to constant discovery and 
constant comparison of the relevant situations, 
settings, styles, images, meanings and nuances (1996: 
16). 
 
They are material objects, clearly sources of data, and properly take their place 
within that heterogeneous set of sources congenial to forms of documentary analysis. 
Law reports are not ‘official’ documents in the sense that they do not derive directly 
from the state, but they nevertheless form the basis for the common law legal system 
characterised by its adherence to the doctrine of precedent and access to authentic 
reports of legal cases. Law reports therefore contain a great deal of textual material 
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of potential interest. Judicial decisions are embodied in documentary form as law 
reports and therefore congenial to suitable forms of documentary analysis.  
 
The initial impulse to undertake a semantic content analysis of the medical law 
reports was prompted by the suspicion that judges were both intuitive in their use 
and interpretation of autonomy and that there was variation of such usage.  This 
suspicion was accompanied by a hunch that the potential use and variety of use of 
autonomy in decision-making was influenced at some level by developments in 
academic medical law, bioethics and philosophy. From an early stage in the research, 
therefore, the scrutiny of the law reports was accompanied by wider background 
reading in the literature in order to determine whether there existed similar use and 
variation of use. The findings of the initial analysis of the law reports and the review 
of the literature are considered next. 
 
3.4 THE CODING OF THE LAW REPORTS 
 
The first cycle of enquiry sought to identify and code elemental uses of autonomy in 
the law reports. At the first level stage (Coding Level 1), the law reports were 
scrutinised and coded for specific examples of judicial elemental uses of autonomy. 
The identification of these uses of autonomy was informed, but not determined, by a 
‘lexicon’ of such uses which was constructed for the purpose based on a systematic 
analysis of the academic legal and bioethical literature. Alphabetic codes were 
assigned to the elemental uses of autonomy identified in the law reports. The 
paraphrases of these particular uses in the reports, and their alphabetic codes, are 
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shown in Figure 3.3. The particulars of the case analysis were then grouped into 
similar, and more workable, concepts (Coding Level 2) and then formed into 
categories (Coding Level 3), which provided the basis for the emergent theory.  
 
For example, in the case of Re T (1993), the court declares that “the right to decide 
one’s own fate presupposes a capacity to do so” (p. 112G). The identification of this 
phrase as being entailed in the conception of self-determination is informed by its 
use in the academic literature. The academic lawyer Foster (2010) paraphrases his 
understanding of McLean’s (2010) use of self-determination as the ability to follow 
“a carefully-drafted life-plan” (2010: 178). The philosopher Frankfurt (1971) defines 
self-determination as the “ability to choose, revise and pursue one’s own particular 
life plan, or suitable aims and values” (1971: 6-7). It should be noted, however, that 
in many of the examples, the judiciary explicitly use conceptions of autonomy, thus 
eliding particular into concept and thereby conflating Stages 1 and 2, e.g. “to deny 
them assistance will thus interfere with their Article 8 right to personal autonomy 
and self-determination” (Purdy (2010) at p. 404B).   
 
3.5 DESCRIBING ELEMENTAL USES OF AUTONOMY 
 
The principal finding of the initial stages of analysis is that the judiciary assign a 
wide range of elemental meanings to the concept of autonomy as Table 3.3 shows 
and as the Tables in the Appendix demonstrate.  These conceptions include in no 
particular order: self-determination,; self-control; freedom of choice; freedom from  
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Particulars Code Paraphrase Concept  Code Category + 
Code 
NHS Trust A 
(2001) at p. 
357 F 
I (a) (i) Freedom from unwanted bodily 
interference 
Bodily 
inviolability  
I (a) (ii) Autonomy  
(I (iii))) 
Re A (2001) 
at p. 219C 
I (b) (i) Control of one’s body through time 
and space 
Physical 
sovereignty 
I (b) (ii) 
Bland (1993) 
at p. 884B 
I (c) (i) A composite of bodily inviolability 
and physical sovereignty 
Bodily integrity I (c) (ii) 
Re F (1990) 
at p. 12C 
I (d) (i) Freedom from unwanted physical, 
psychological and political 
interference 
Freedom from 
interference (or 
liberty) 
I (d) (ii) 
Re W (1992) 
at p. 77H 
I (e) (i) A protected sphere of spatial 
separateness from others  
(Spatial) Privacy I (e) (ii) 
Re A (2011) 
at p. 82C 
I (f) (i) Truly thinking and deciding for 
oneself 
Independence  I (f) (ii) 
Re B (2002) 
at para. 21 
I (g) (i) Being in possession of one’s own 
person 
Self-possession I (g) (ii) 
Yearworth 
(2009) at p. 
14C 
I (h) (i) Self-belonging entailing rights of 
self-disposal and self-sovereignty 
Self-ownership I (h) (ii) 
Re B (2002) 
at para. 21 
I (i) (i) Capacity to control one’s body, 
behaviour or life 
Self-control I (i) (ii) 
Re T (2002) 
at pp. 102D 
I (j) (i) Freedom to choose one way or 
another 
Freedom of 
choice 
I (j) (ii) 
Re MB (1997) 
at p. 436 
I (k) (i) Decision-making capability 
unimpaired by mental  injury or 
disability 
Mental capacity I (k) (ii) 
Re C (1994) 
pp. 294 D – 
295 E 
I (l) (i) Freedom to conduct one’s life in the 
manner of one’s own choosing 
Self-
determination 
I (l) (ii) 
Purdy (2009) 
at para. 35 
I (m) (i) Freedom from unwanted psychic 
intrusion, including the space to 
reimagine who one is and what one 
seeks to become 
Psychological 
integrity 
I (m) (ii) 
Burke (2005) 
at p. 446A 
I (n) (i) The holistic treatment of a person as 
morally worthy of respect, including 
the preservation and promotion of 
her mental health 
Moral integrity I (n) (ii) 
Chester 
(2005) at p. 
144B 
I (o) (i) The affirmation and protection of 
one’s physical and psychological 
integrity and the avoidance of 
humiliating and demeaning 
behaviour 
Dignity I (o) (ii) 
Pretty (2002) 
at p. 807G 
I (p) (i) A composite of bodily, 
psychological and moral integrity 
and dignity, including physical and 
social identity 
Privacy (as 
‘private life’) 
I (p) (ii) 
Chester 
(2005) at p. 
144D 
I (q) (i) Freedom to self-define through 
choice and action 
Self-creation I (q) (ii)  
Purdy (2009) 
at para. 42 
I (r) (i) The manifestation of the ‘self’ 
through respect for personal values 
Self-realisation  I (r) (ii) 
Re B (2002) 
at para. 81-83 
I (s) (i) Respect for the irreducible 
differences that separate us as 
subjects 
Subjective 
character of 
experience  
I (s) (ii)  
 
Figure 3.3 – Coding of elemental uses of autonomy  
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interference; liberal individualism; independence; dignity; self-creation; bodily 
inviolability; bodily integrity; mental capacity; self-ownership; psychological 
integrity and moral integrity. The rationale for the identification of an elemental 
meaning of autonomy has been explained in the previous section.  
 
Although a number of these conceptions are explicitly used by the judiciary, some 
represent first-order abstractions from the particulars in the law reports. Thus, in the 
case of Re T (1993) the statement that a person has a “right to live his own life how 
he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature death” (p. 112E) 
is abstracted as “self-determination” which is paraphrased for the purposes of 
analysis as the “voluntary determination of one’s future”.  This paraphrase is 
influenced, but not determined, by the meaning of self-determination in the 
literature. Again, “the right to decide one’s own fate” is abstracted as “self-
determination”. But this right to self-determination “presupposes a capacity to do so” 
(p. 112G) which is abstracted as a distinct conception: “mental capacity”. The 
justification for the identification of “mental capacity” as a distinct conception of 
autonomy is that it is associated as such elsewhere in the research sample, according 
to the coding procedure described above (e.g. Re B (2002) at para. 100(x)).  
 
On the whole, the judiciary do not tend to define the terms they use. Rather, they are 
drawn fluidly into play as it responds to the particular medico-legal problems which 
it is required to address. The findings support the initial hunch which precipitated the 
thesis, that the judiciary tends to use the concept of autonomy intuitively and that 
there is variation in such usage. Judges, as has been pointed out in the some of the 
literature (e.g. Pannick, 1987; Foster, 2011), do not have the luxury of reflecting on 
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their discourse under pressure of delivering judgement. Accordingly, the implicit 
meanings of the concepts they use need to be related to their broader discourse and 
practice through a process of inferential analysis (cf. Brandom, 1994).  
 
Following initial scrutiny of the data base of law reports the research begins to 
develop enquiry into the literature on autonomy in medical law as well as philosophy 
to enable understanding of the potential links with judges’ interpretations of 
autonomy in the law reports. In Chapter 1, what was seen as the central issue of 
autonomy in the context of ethically-contentious medical law cases was set out. It 
was stated there that the conception for this project was prompted by the intuition 
that the judiciary was using autonomy in a variety of senses.  Initial involvement, 
and engagement, with the medical jurisprudence indicated that there was variety of 
judicial usage. This observation encouraged theoretical inquiry into factors 
explaining this diverse usage and the possible influence of the academic literature as 
an explanatory factor. Experience of legal practice and twenty years’ reading in 
medical law and ethics, aroused my suspicion that law, ethics and philosophy were 
closely related. This suspicion was confirmed through more systematic engagement 
with the literature.  
 
3.5.1 The special relationship between medical law and ethics 
The relationship between medical law and the academic literature has been entangled 
in a way that other legal topics have not. When medical law was in its infancy it 
relied on materials from outside the law, such as bioethics, philosophy, sociology, 
and theology. Since then medical law has been ‘normalised’ as a legal topic, with its 
flood of cases, statutes, and regulations, making textbooks look more like those in 
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traditional legal fields, and a subject of greater interest to legal practitioners. In 
addition, unlike most other academic disciplines, bioethics and applied philosophy 
are practical disciplines whose theories have been regularly tested in the courts and 
by legislation. Capron & Michel (1993)  write that “the field grew out of the 
practical realities of the physician-patient relationship, biomedical research, and the 
behavior of health care institutions” (1993: 33). Rothstein (2010) has pointed to 
medical law’s role in providing consistent responses to bioethical issues. Elliot 
(1999) has drawn attention to the ‘law-like’ structure of modern bioethics, describing 
law as its lingua franca. There has thus been closeness between medical law and 
bioethics and applied philosophy which distinguishes it from other legal topics and 
academic disciplines.  
 
3.5.2 Elemental uses of autonomy in the bioethical and philosophical literature 
This early suspicion that there were regularities of usage between medical 
jurisprudence and the literature prompted a semi-systematic semantic analysis of the 
latter as a means of investigating the potential variations of usage of autonomy in it. 
An electronic search using legal (Lexis Library; Westlaw) and bioethical (PubMed) 
databases, search terms ‘autonomy’, ‘medical law’, and ‘medical ethics’, over a 27-
year time line (1980-2007), yielded 43 bioethical and 27 academic legal articles that 
appeared to contain discussions of autonomy, creating an initial ‘pool’ of academic 
discourse concerning autonomy. This pool of material was enlarged by reviews of 
their bibliographies and investigation of books and articles which promised 
discursive treatment of the concept. The results of the analysis were arranged into 
four sections: the particular meaning assigned to the concept of autonomy; an 
exemplar quote which best represented the meaning assigned; my own paraphrase of 
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such based on examination of the literature; and a number of further examples of the 
way the assigned meaning of autonomy were in use. This empirical investigation 
provided the database for the semantic and hermeneutical analysis of the literature 
which followed.  
 
This wider background reading revealed that the literature on autonomy is sizeable 
and complex, figuring in a number of recent, sophisticated philosophical treatments 
(Feinberg, 1986; Lindley, 1986; Raz, 1986; Young, 1986; Christman, 1988; 
Dworkin, 1988; Rawls, 1993; May, 1998; Taylor, 2005). These reveal a widespread 
conviction that the concept of autonomy, and the principle of respect for personal 
autonomy, is a legal, ethical and philosophical value of paramount importance (e.g. 
O’Neill, 2002; Brazier, 2006). In addition, it confirms that there are numerous 
desiderata of autonomy which vary between philosophers (cf. O’Neill, 2002; 
Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Sumner, 2011). Dunn & Foster (2010) 
have argued that its complexity, the fact that it “means different things to different 
people”, might militate against its consistent use by the courts (2010: 88). In 
philosophy, Sumner has stated that: 
 
The concept of autonomy has received a great deal of 
attention (arguably too much attention) in recent 
decades, resulting in a bewildering array of competing 
analyses, many of which have little or nothing to do 
with the decision-making context of informed consent. 
The more robust concepts of autonomy require 
sophisticated capacities – for rational determination of 
the will or a high level of critical self-reflection – 
which no informed consent protocol demands. 
(Sumner, 2011: 33). 
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For the purposes of this thesis, eight different elemental meanings assigned to the 
concept of autonomy in the analysed literature have been selected. There are no 
doubt others which might have been chosen, but it is proposed that the classes of 
elemental meanings (or conceptions) of autonomy set out in what follows provides a 
serviceably comprehensive range. The analysis has been complicated by the lack of 
consensus in the literature about the meaning of the various conceptions. The 
definitions of the elemental uses of autonomy are meant to be heuristic; influenced, 
but not determined by, its use in the literature. Eight elemental uses of autonomy 
have been identified: (1) Self-government –the individual as the ultimate arbiter in 
matters affecting one’s own person;  (2) Self-determination – the freedom a person 
has to follow a self-chosen ‘life-plan’; (2) Self-creation – the freedom to construct a 
self ex nihilo ; (4) Self-realisation – the freedom to manifest one’s ‘core’ self, or true 
being; (5) Self-ownership – the quasi-proprietary freedom of self-disposal; (6) Self-
legislation – being responsible for who one is and what one does; (7) Privacy – 
freedom from unwanted spatial interference; and (8) Dignity – freedom from 
humiliating and degrading treatment.  
 
Sometimes, other conceptions of autonomy are given the sense assigned to one of 
those in the list (self-rule is used instead of self-government, or self-legislation). The 
analysis shows how mercurial is the ordinary language use of this terminology in the 
literature. This is an important observation, it is proposed, because while the 
meaning of autonomy is taken for granted in everyday discourse, it defies clear-cut 
definition. This should matter if it is regarded as a key value in law, ethics and 
medicine. 
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3.5.2.1 Self-government: Christman (1988) argues that whatever autonomy is, at the 
very least, the notion of self-government underlies the central use of the concept. 
Historically, the concept of autonomy has its genesis in the notion of political self-
governance, initially characteristic of Hellenic city-states, a concept subsequently 
extended to notions of individual self-rule (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). The 
ordinary language of self-government is, in many contexts of use, almost impossible 
to distinguish from notions of self-rule and self-control. In the historical record, self-
government is understood in the negative or ‘privative’ sense as freedom from 
unwanted external constraint by other states. A lot of emphasis is normally placed in 
the literature on this negative construction of political self-government. But in Greek 
thought there is also a more ‘positive’ and individualised notion of individual self-
government related to ideals of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) and independence 
deriving from the philosophical anthropologies of Plato and Aristotle.  
 
In contemporary philosophy, Feinberg (1973; 1986) associates autonomy with self-
rule, self-government and self-sovereignty. He states that a person is autonomous 
“… if I rule me, and no one else rules I” (1973: 16).  Autonomy can also be 
understood four-fold as: the capacity for self-government, the actual condition of 
self-government, a character ideal, and as sovereign authority. Harris (1985) extends 
the semantic associations of self-government to capacities for self-control, self-
determination and rational deliberation which equip a person to be the final authority 
or arbiter in decisions regarding his own body and other aspects of his person. 
Secker (1999), Jackson (2000) and O’ Shea (2008) use self-government and self-
determination synonymously.  Levinsson (2008), in contrast, regards them as distinct 
interpretations of autonomy. Freyenhagen (2009) links self-government with mental 
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capacity. For Buss (2009), the authority a person has over her actions is an intrinsic 
feature of human agency. 
 
3.5.2.2 Self-determination: Self-determination is the elemental meaning most 
commonly identified with autonomy in the literature.  In the literature, self-
determination seems to encapsulate the idea of having freedom to pursue one’s goals 
in life, rather than freedom of choice simpliciter. Harris (1985) states that the: 
 
…point of autonomy, the point of choosing and having 
the freedom to choose, between competing 
conceptions of how, and indeed, why, to live, is simply 
that it is only thus that our lives become in any 
reasonable sense our own. 
 
On this version of self-determination, freedom of choice is not an absolute value, but 
linked to having freedom to pursue one’s own vision rather than someone else’s 
(Jones, 1999; Smith, 1999). This version does not always hold in the literature. Fan 
(1997) identifies it (citing Beauchamp & Childress (1994)) with “autonomous 
actions [that] should not be subjected to controlling actions by others” and that 
insofar (citing Brody (1990)) “as an agent’s choices do not infringe upon the rights 
and liberties of others that person should be able to carry out his or her choices.” 
Struhkamp (2005) explicitly associates self-determination with freedom from 
unwanted interference: 
[T]he mainstream interpretation of patient autonomy in 
contemporary liberal bioethics [is] giving the patient 
the right to self-determination in order to protect him 
from unwanted interference (2005: 105).  
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Self-determination has a wide range of reference in the literature.  For example, it is 
used in association with preferential choosing (Stirrat & Gill, 2005); self-control 
(Drought and Koenig, 2002); self-direction (Callahan, 2002); a counterpoint to the 
ethical value of the sanctity of life (Morgan and Veitch, 2004); and political 
freedom. Marshall (2008) conjoins self-determination and self-creation in her 
characterisation of one of two versions of autonomy. On this construction, self-
determination is “the freedom to be and become the person one chooses” (2008: 
349). She explicitly associates it with liberal and postmodern ideals of human 
personhood in contrast with the other version of autonomy she considers – self-
realisation and self-discovery – which is informed by Aristotelian, communitarian 
and feminist perspectives.  
 
It is clear from the literature that self-determination is a fluid concept easily 
conjoined with a range of other conceptions. Although it is premised on freedom of 
choice, there is no consistency in the literature about the ends to which self-
determining choices should be directed, though it tends to be associated with 
freedom to pursue a life ‘vision’ or life-plan.  
 
3.5.2.3 Self-creation:  Schmitt (2005) defines self-creation as the capacity and ability 
to: 
 
… make ourselves be who we are….We are 
autonomous when we choose our own ideas and 
values, create our own life plans, choose our own 
moral principles, and in all these ways create our own 
selves. A self is not something that comes with us at 
birth, but is of our own making (2005: 9) 
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This idea of self-construction is distinguishable from Schmitt’s definition of self-
realisation (see below). Self-creation imports the idea of bringing a self into being 
“out of nothing” through a succession of choices. On his version, self-creation 
presupposes, on its dominant construction, self-determination – the freedom to 
pursue a personal life plan. Indeed, this conjoining of self-creation and self-
determination is a feature of Marshall’s (2008) analysis. Husted (1997) states that 
human lives are “a continuous process of self-creation” which comes about through 
“the successful pursuit of freely chosen goals…through successive choices and 
actions during their lives.” According to Moser et al. (2006) self-creation 
presupposes the requisite “competency’ meaning ‘the individual repertoire of skills 
that recognising the possibilities and having the ability, capacities and expertise that 
allow people…to shape their own lives” (2006: 423). 
 
Self-creation is central to the theories of three major thinkers: Rawls (1972; 2001), 
Raz (1986) and Dworkin 1993). For Rawls & Kelly (2001), it is closely related to his 
concept of self-respect which he defines as a ‘basic good’ or ‘primary good’ 
normally essential if citizens are to have “a lively sense of their worth as persons” 
(2001: 59). Raz (1986) contends that “the ruling idea behind the ideal of personal 
autonomy is that people should make their own lives and that the ‘autonomous 
person is a (part) author of his own life” fashioned through a succession of choices 
(1986: 369). Dworkin (1993) argues  that autonomy makes self-creation possible for 
it “allows for each of us to be responsible for shaping our lives according to our own 
coherent or incoherent – but in any case distinctive – personality” (1993:223, 224).  
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Thus, the conception of self-creation is inextricably bound up with conceptions of 
self-determination, and the freedom of choice and mental competency it 
presupposes.  
 
3.5.2.4 Self-realisation: Schmitt (1995) defines self-realisation as the process in 
which persons: 
 
…attain personal autonomy to the extent that we fully 
develop that self in the course of a lifetime. Thus 
philosophers have thought that one’s conscience or 
one’s free will are moral capacities that are ours from 
birth and that conformity to one’s conscience or the 
exercise of free will made one fully autonomous 
(1995: 9).  
 
This definition assumes that persons are born with a set of inborn characteristics and 
capacities which are, by degrees, made manifest through free choice-making out of 
which a self-emerges, or is acquired, or discovered. Thus choice is integral to the 
process of self-realisation. Sherwin (1999) states that making choices “is often an act 
of self-discovery or self-definition and as such it requires the active involvement of 
the patient” (1999: 21). Englehardt (2001) equates the process of self-realisation with 
the cultivation of virtue: 
Autonomy is not just freedom from internal impulses 
or external constraints, but human flourishing as self-
possession or self-development. Autonomy as 
determination by what is must truly oneself is integral 
to self-realization. Such a self-realization allows one to 
act fully in accord with oneself and the good one 
affirms (2001: 290).  
 
 
For Marshall (2008), the distinction between self-realisation and self-creation is 
substantive, not merely analytical. Self-realisation entails reconciliation with “one’s, 
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perhaps pre-determined, core essence, through some sort of process of self-
discovery” (2008: 349). There is thus a naturalistic property pertaining to self-
realisation which contrasts with the voluntarist character of self-creation.  
 
3.5.2.5 Self-ownership: The conception of self-ownership has deep roots in the 
history of English philosophy. The exemplary definition is perhaps offered by Locke 
who stated that every man has a “‘property’ in his own ‘person’” (Locke & Laslett, 
1988: 287). In the modern literature, Nozick (1974) describes individual human 
beings as being ‘self-owners’, although this appears to be a particular interpretation 
of the Kantian principle of treating persons as ‘ends-in-themselves.’ While self-
ownership is explored in philosophy, there is scant discussion in medical law. This is 
perhaps because the proposition that that a person can own himself, or perhaps parts 
of himself, was not legally-recognised until very recently (Harmon & Laurie, 2010). 
Notwithstanding, self-ownership has been rendered in various ways.  
 
Archard (2008) distinguishes two models: proprietarian and sovereignty. 
Proprietarian self-ownership, he contends, underpins injunctions against bodily 
trespass, which are essentially property claims. Sovereignty is Archard’s alternative 
model of moral relationship of a person to her body defining the scope of legitimate 
authority. On Archard’s analysis, therefore notions of self-ownership move fluidly 
into closely-related ideas of privacy and self-government. This broadly corresponds 
to Schmitt’s (1995) analysis, who distinguishes self-ownership from self-creation 
and self-realisation. This is so in its emphasis on the idea of a person having some 
kind of proprietary right over his own self. This involves corresponding rights to 
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enforce “a certain kind of exclusion” (1995: 7) and thus to restrict access and use of 
one’s person (connoting spatial privacy).  
 
But the concept also embraces the more positive idea of holding rights of absolute 
disposal over one’s own person, analogous with slaves and chattels (a form of self-
government). In addition, Schmitt identifies, although he questions it, a popular 
association between “being one’s own person” and “living according to one’s own 
life plan” (connoting ‘self-determination’). Por (2002), in terms redolent of Berlin 
(1969)) implicitly connects self-ownership with ‘self-mastery’:  
 
Since I am master of myself, there is at least one thing 
that I own, mainly, I myself. No one may kill or 
cripple me. Hence my right to preservation. I own my 
body. So I may go where I like.  
 
 
Thus, self-ownership is a concept which is revealed to be closely articulated with a 
wide variety of elemental meanings of autonomy.  
 
3.5.2.6 Self-legislation: The idea of autonomy as self-legislation is principally 
associated with the philosophy of Kant. Although, as some would expect, there is a 
lot of discussion of its meaning in the philosophical literature, there is relatively little 
in the legal literature (although see Veitch, 2007). This is perhaps because the 
standards of rationality implicit in Kant’s thought are unrealistic in the context of 
quotidian medical practice and as a realistic legal standard (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009; Sumner, 2011). Apart from the notion of ‘self-rule’ with which it is often used 
synonymously, there is little association between self-legislation and the other 
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meanings assigned to autonomy in the literature. Englehardt (2001), however, seems 
to use self-legislation in terms that connote some form of ‘self-realisation’. On his 
version, a person, by freely adopting the moral law by which she becomes ‘self-
ruled’ gives expression  to her ‘true self’ as a rational being and in that sense 
‘realises’ her true nature.  
 
The conception of ‘self-control’ can also be understood in the Kantian sense of a 
refusal to submit to laws that are given by others (heteronomy) as opposed to self-
given (autonomy) (Gaylin & Jennings, 2003). Wolff (1970) further specifies this 
Kantian stances stating: 
 
As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a submission to 
laws that one has made for oneself. The autonomous 
man, insofar as he is autonomous is not subject to the 
will of another. The autonomous…man may do what 
another tells him, but not because he has been told to 
do it…By accepting as final the commands of others, 
he forfeits his autonomy (1970: 14).  
 
 
Although there has been a great deal of critical reflection on what Kant means by 
self-legislation, it can perhaps be encapsulated through the notion of responsibility; 
that is, taking responsibility for who one is and what one does according to 
universalisable norms. O’Neill (2002) has provided an updated version of the Kant’s 
conception of self-legislation which she calls ‘principled autonomy’. By this she 
means those non-derivative, or self-given, laws which are delivered to us by practical 
reason, whose principle for action ‘could be adopted by all others’ (O’Neill, 2002: 
85). O’Neill distinguishes moral autonomy from individualistic autonomy, locating 
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the latter at the nexus between reason and responsibility and the former in the 
deliveries of the individual’s wishes, desires and inclinations.  
 
3.5.2.7 Privacy: Autonomy as ‘privacy principally refers to the right to be left alone 
to do one’s own thing, to be free from unwanted interference and secluded from the 
presence or view of others. Dworkin (2003) identifies privacy with a version of 
autonomy he designates ‘physical essentialism’, “the view that one is entitled to be 
left alone, especially to have one’s body left alone” (2003: 238-39). Channick (1999) 
categorises this as “a negative liberty interest establishing a zone of privacy and non-
interference around each person” (1999: 585-86). This broadly corresponds with 
Wilson’s (2007) equation of autonomy with “a sphere of decisional privacy” in 
which “we should respect autonomy by allowing persons to make choices for 
themselves without coercing or otherwise interfering with them” (2007: 353). Laurie 
(2001) defines privacy as “a state of separateness from others” further specified as “a 
state of non-access to the individual’s body or psychological person”, i.e. “spatial 
privacy” (2001: 27).  
 
3.5.2.8 Dignity: The conception of dignity is used in close association with 
autonomy and a wide range of its other conceptions. It is used conjunctively with 
self-determination (Biggs, 2003), privacy (Jackson, 2008; Price, 2009), liberty, 
liberal-individualism and freedom (Feldman, 1999; Marshall, 2008).  Bowman 
(2004) identifies autonomy as the intellectual and moral foundation of bioethics and 
the expression of the Western concept of individualism, that is, a “belief in the 
importance, uniqueness, dignity and sovereignty of each person and the sanctity of 
each individual life.” (2004: 666).  It is connected with ‘bodily autonomy’ (Gillon, 
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1985; Jackson, 2000) and Kantian rationality. Benkler (2001) states that 
“[A]utonomy is a value rooted in equal respect for the equal dignity of humans as 
rational beings” (2001: 58). He also contends that autonomy “is central to our 
intuitions about liberty and dignity generally. Bratza (2009) identifies “the dignity 
and distinct identity of all human beings” as key concepts with which the European 
Court of Human Rights has been involved in response to the field of medical law and 
practice (2009: 105).  
 
The width of dignity’s range of reference is implicit in Beyleveld and Brownsword’s 
(2001) distinction between dignity as ‘empowerment’ and as ‘constraint’. As 
empowerment, dignity is closely associated with liberal individualist notions of 
autonomy and human rights. As constraint, it is more concerned with duties, than 
rights. According to Brownsword (2003), dignity as empowerment makes a triple 
demand entailing respect for agential capacity for free choice; for the choices in fact 
made; and for the enabling and supporting conditions needed for free and informed 
choice. Thus, on this view, acknowledging the dignity of others requires ‘respecting 
the autonomy of persons’ (2003: 416). Dignity ‘as constraint’ entails setting limits 
on autonomous action (in the empowerment sense) because, following Kant, human 
beings “owe themselves a duty of self-esteem” (2003: 421). Failure to respect such 
dignity would militate against the common good (Andorno, 2009).  
 
3.5.2.9 Summary of section on element meanings of autonomy: The Cycle 1 analysis 
of a wide range of medico-legal, bioethical and philosophical literature shows that 
that a wide range of meanings are assigned to the concept of autonomy through 
conjunctive or associative use. It demonstrates that most academics do not use the 
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concept of autonomy with precision, but rather inflect its meaning through fluid use 
of a wide range of different conceptions. It is suggested that these conceptions 
encapsulate distinct notions which nevertheless bear ‘family resemblances’, allowing 
lawyers and philosophers to range mercurially over a range of ethical values 
associated with autonomy without defining their terms. This is not meant to advance 
a criticism of such quotidian philosophical use, but rather to draw attention to the 
need, given autonomy’s paramount status as a legal and ethical concept, to make a 
little more clear what the law and medical practice is required to protect, uphold and 
promote in respecting the principle of patient autonomy. 
 
It is a presupposition of this first cycle of enquiry that the law is not an immured, 
autonomous discipline, but potentially porous to broader intellectual currents, which 
might be reflected in judicial discourse responding to the ethical challenges of 
medical law and practice. In the next section the potential relationship between 
judicial usage and the literature is considered. 
 
3.6 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACADEMY TO JUDICIAL USAGE  
 
To date, there has been no systematic analysis of the impact of academic thought on 
judicial thinking in medical jurisprudence, and therefore of academic influence on 
judicial interpretations of autonomy. There are, broadly speaking, two sources of 
evidence for academic influence on judicial constructions of autonomy in the 
medical law reports: the law reports themselves, and sources outside the law reports. 
Firstly, the law reports themselves may specify sources of influence and guidance. 
The sources of influence explicitly indicated in the law reports themselves can be 
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jurisprudential, academic legal and academic non-legal. Secondly, where the law 
reports do not supply direct evidence of academic influence on judicial thinking, the 
influence of the academy might plausibly be inferred on the basis of regularities of 
particular usages between the academy and the case decisions. In view of the history 
of the relationship between law, bioethics and philosophy, it is a plausible 
presupposition of enquiry that the judiciary might be at some level influenced by 
academic discourse in their constructions of autonomy in medical law cases.  
 
The common law has traditionally adopted a dualist model of legal authority 
distinguishing between mandatory, or ‘binding’, and ‘persuasive’ legal authority; in 
other words, the ‘binding sources’ model (Moran, 2004). Binding authorities 
constrain a court to follow them, e.g. the decision of a higher court, or the earlier 
decision of the same court where a strong norm of stare decisis exists. Persuasive 
authorities do not constrain a court in that way, but rather provide reasons for 
decisions, or conclusions, which a court may follow because it finds them 
persuasive. These persuasive authorities may be found in legal reasoning in domestic 
law cases which are ancillary, rather than central, to the rationale of those decisions, 
or conclusions, or in the legal reasoning in cases decided in foreign common law 
jurisdictions, e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, whether such 
reasoning is central to the case or not,  
 
A distinction can also be made between documents of primary or secondary 
authority. A document which establishes the law in a particular area, e.g. a statute or 
domestic case law, is referred to as a primary authority. Secondary authorities, in 
contrast, explain, or supplement, primary authorities and can include ‘journal 
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articles, legal encyclopaedias, textbooks and the like’ (Smyth, 2008: 145) The 
precise jurisprudential status of these secondary authorities is not certain. Although 
they clearly do not have the ‘binding’ authority of statute, or binding precedent, it 
seems that the courts have been prepared to assign them ‘persuasive’ or ‘permissive’ 
authority (Zander, 2004; Wacks, 2008). Braun (2010) has argued that judges are 
showing increasing interest in academic legal writing.  
 
These changes in citation practice reflect deeper shifts in what counts as legal 
argument, and the place that ethical language has in such argument. Schauer (2008) 
states that if the law is construed as constituting authoritative practice, “then a great 
deal turns on what the authorities are” (2008: 1060). He contends that determining 
what a legal source is best understood as a practice in the Wittgensteinian sense:  
 
…a practice in which lawyers, judges, commentators, 
and other legal actors gradually and in diffuse fashion 
determine what will count as a legitimate source-and 
thus what will count as law (2008: 1957). 
 
The reasons for citing secondary, and therefore non-binding, authority may vary. The 
judiciary may cite them because they: reinforce views it has arrived at 
independently; conveniently compile cases the judge want to rely on as authority; 
summarise the state of the law in domestic or foreign jurisdictions; or flesh out the 
policy implications of a decision (cf. Smyth, 2009).  
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Nature of authority Legal influences Non-legal influences 
Binding  Statute law 
Domestic case law 
 
Persuasive/Permissive  Non-domestic case law 
Academic legal literature, e.g. 
textbooks, journal articles, Law 
Commission Reports 
Non-academic legal 
literature 
 
Figure 3.4  Table of sources of legal influence and guidance 
 
The former refusal of the English courts to accept citations from living academics is 
giving way to increased reliance on non-legal sources of authority and guidance 
(Zander, 2004; Braun, 2006; Duxbury, 2001; Duxbury, 2008). Duxbury (2001) 
argues that the example of medical law supports the proposition that judges are more 
likely to rely on academic literature in order to resolve cases which do not fall 
squarely within traditional legal topics. He conjectures that ‘when deciding cases 
revolving around cases of medical ethics ... appellate judges are possibly more 
inclined than they otherwise would be to introduce academic opinions…into their 
judgments.’ He also suggests that the impact of the ECHR will further encourage the 
trend towards academic citation. To date, however, as Duxbury acknowledges, there 
has been no systematic study corroborating such academic conjecture.  Nevertheless, 
it is suggested as a result of the empirical analysis carried out in this thesis that the 
cases in the selected medical law reports do provide prima facie evidence of 
academic influence on judicial thought.  
 
3.6.1 The bases of judicial reliance on academic thought 
It is proposed that there is enough evidence in the selected medical law reports to 
indicate that the judiciary are aware of academic developments which might 
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influence their interpretations of autonomy. Fourteen of the cases in the research 
sample refer to academic literature (see Appendix 3). The majority of these 
references are legal, although there is some reference to non-legal literature. The 
appellate courts tend to cite academic literature more frequently than courts of first 
instance (i.e. the High Court). The Court of Appeal case of Re A (2001) and House 
of Lords case of Pretty (2002) cite the literature most frequently. However, while the 
judiciary draw on academic literature, it is difficult to discern consistent pattern of 
usage. Illustrations of, and reasons for, this inconsistency are explored below: 
 
3.6.1.1 Self-justification: The courts have used it for self-justificatory purposes. In 
Re W (1992), the Court of Appeal (Lord Donaldson) cites (p.75A-D) a cluster of 
literature (Bainham, 1992; Thornton, 1992; Dyer, 1992; Brazier, 1992), perfunctorily 
summarises it, before dismissing it as inapplicable to the case it was deciding. This 
literature was promoting the ‘human rights’ analysis of the law of consent dismissing 
as ethically incoherent the more conservative court stance which allowed for parental 
autonomy override of a competent child’s treatment refusal.  
 
3.6.1.2 Quest for legal and ethical guidance: The courts sometimes refer to 
academic authority for ethical guidance. In Bland (1993) (at pp. 825H-826A), one 
Court of Appeal judge (Lord Justice Hoffmann), not noted for citing academic 
authority (Rodger, 2010) claims to have gained assistance from the unpublished 
manuscript of a work by a noted legal and moral philosopher (Dworkin, 1993) and 
personal conversations with another well-known thinker (Bernard Williams). He 
states that these interlocutors have helped him in his attempts to think through the 
moral principles that have underpinned his decision to authorise the removal of life-
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sustaining ANH from a permanently-insensate patient. However, the judge does not 
specify precisely what assistance he has received, or offers a philosophical analysis. 
It can be plausibly inferred (although the passage is neither cited nor quoted) that 
Dworkin’s examination of autonomy has lubricated the judges’ analysis of the 
relationship between ethical values of self-determination, dignity and sanctity of life.   
 
In Re A (2001), the Court of Appeal’s relatively wide-ranging appeal to academic 
authority appears to assist the judicial thinking process, rather than providing the 
intellectual framework within which the ethical and legal issues can be 
systematically explored and rationalised. The court refers to a range of precedents, 
legal treatises and textbooks, articles by medical lawyers and ethicists, and 
hypothetical case-studies. This is used to assist the court in the quest for a legal 
justification for separation surgery that would, without it, constitute murder and 
(despite the court’s insistence that it was ‘a court of law, not of morals’ (p.155D-E)) 
to resource the search for an ethical justification for a foreseeably lethal invasion of 
the twins physical autonomy and bodily integrity (cf. p.218F). James (2008) argues 
that in the conjoined twins case, the Court of Appeal prefers real-life cases over 
hypothetical, and historical (precedents) over philosophical (generalisations) method.  
 
3.6.1.3 Context of ethical pluralism: The courts sometimes consult academic 
literature to highlight the presence of ethical diversity, rather than as sources of 
guidance. In Pretty (2002), the House of Lords (Lord Steyn) (p.831B-F) cites a 
sizable body of academic literature addressing assisted suicide and euthanasia 
(Williams, 1958; Dworkin, 1993; Keown, 1995; Otlowski, 1997; Warnock, 2006). 
The House of Lords states: 
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It is not for us, in this case, to express a view on these 
arguments. But it is of great importance to note that 
these are ancient questions on which millions in the 
past have taken diametrically opposite view and still 
do. 
 
It is suggested that questions of autonomy lie at the heart of this diversity of opinion: 
does an individual’s autonomy extend to the manner and timing of his death, or is it 
restricted for reasons of principle and good practice? 
 
3.6.2 Academic authority and autonomy 
In two cases, questions of autonomy have been more directly addressed by appeal to 
academic literature: Re B (2002) and Chester (2005). 
 
3.6.2.1 The case of Re B (2002) 
In Re B (2002), the High Court declared that a middle-aged professional woman, 
who was quadriplegic and ventilator-dependent following a cerebro-spinal 
haemorrhage, possessed mental capacity and was therefore entitled to refuse the 
continuation of the ventilator keeping her alive. This determination was in keeping 
with the legal proposition established in Re T (1993) that a person with mental 
capacity has an unqualified right to refuse all medical treatment for whatever reason. 
The court refers to a recently-published academic article (Atkins, 2000), which is 
brought to its attention via the testimony of an expert witness, Dr Sensky. At 
paragraph 82, the court quotes part of the article (2000) which states that: 
 
If we accept that the subjective character of experience 
is irreducible and that it is grounded in the particularity 
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of our points of view, then we are bound to realise that 
our respect for each other’s differences and autonomy 
embodies a respect for the particularity of each other’s 
points of view. Respect for autonomy is at the same 
time recognition of the irreducible differences that 
separate us as subjects… While we can imagine, we 
cannot know objectively ‘what it is like to be’ another 
person, no matter how many facts we are in possession 
of … 
 
The judge states that she finds the article helpful in the present case and “Dr Sensky 
to be a most impressive witness” (para.84). However, she does not specify why she 
has found the article of assistance, or how it in any ways influences the legal 
determination she is required to make having already rehearsed the chief precedents 
under heading “the principle of autonomy” (paras. 16-21). It might plausibly be 
suggested that the court is reaching for a robust ethical justification for a legal 
determination that would very likely eventuate in the patient’s death once her 
ventilator was switched off.  
 
The philosophical interpretation of autonomy as “respect for the particularity of each 
other’s points of view” and “recognition of the irreducible differences that separate 
us as subjects” is meant to command empathy. It is also meant to encourage 
‘epistemological humility’ on grounds that no one can have direct access to the 
contents of another person’s mind and subjective values. Morgan & Veitch (2004) 
maintain that this argument is misplaced in the context of a capacitous patient who is 
perfectly capable of articulating and communicating subjective values. It is more 
appropriately applied to incapacitate patients, e.g. Re F (1990) (cognitively-impaired 
adult) and Bland (1993) (permanently-insensate adult).  
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3.6.2.2 The case of Chester (2005) 
In Chester (2005), a majority (3:2) of the House of Lords extended the traditional 
rules of causation in medical negligence in order to compensate a patient for 
infringement of her autonomy. The case concerned the allegedly negligent failure of 
a surgeon to disclose the inherent risks of developing a serious neurologic condition 
(equina cauda syndrome). The dissenting minority in the court held that there could 
be no finding of negligence because the patient had agreed that she would have 
eventually have undergone surgery with its attendant risks, after seeking advice and 
making further enquiries. The majority, however, held that the principal harm for 
which she merited compensation was not the physical harm which ensued, but harm 
to her autonomy: the patient’s ‘right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be 
vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles’ 
(p.146G). The function of informed consent, held one of the majority (Lord Steyn) 
(p. 144B-E) is ‘to ensure that due respect is given to the autonomy and dignity of 
each patient’ as well as giving a patient an opportunity to avoid an unacceptable risk.  
 
To this end, the House of Lords appeal to legal and philosophical authority (Hart & 
Honore, 1985; Dworkin, 1993; Honore, 1999). The majority draw upon legal 
causation theory, with whose interpretation the minority disagree, to provide a 
rational justification for discerning a causal link based on justice. They use an ethical 
argument to reinforce their view of the legal interests at stake (p.144B-E): 
 
The most plausible [account] emphasizes the integrity 
rather than the welfare of the choosing agent; the value 
of autonomy, on this view, derives from the capacity it 
protects: the capacity to express one's own character 
— values, commitments, convictions, and critical as 
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well as experiential interests — in the life one leads. 
Recognizing an individual right of autonomy makes 
self-creation possible. It allows each of us to be 
responsible for shaping our lives according to our own 
coherent or incoherent — but, in any case, distinctive 
— personality. It allows us to lead our lives rather than 
be led along them, so that each of us can be, to the 
extent a scheme of rights can make this possible, what 
we have made of ourselves. We allow someone to 
choose death over radical amputation or a blood 
transfusion, if that is his informed wish, because we 
acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own 
values. 
 
The approach of the majority is, like Re W (1992, suggestive of the ‘human rights’ 
approach to medical law and the law of consent (Chapter 1) advocated by Kennedy 
(1988) and Grubb & Kennedy (2000); noting with approval Lord Scarman’s 
statement in Sidaway (1985) (at p.152H) that ‘the patient's right to make his own 
decision might be seen as a basic human right protected by the common law.’ The 
decision in Chester (2005) could plausibly be interpreted as a modest attempt by the 
majority in the highest court to give rational structure to the law, around autonomy.  
It is noteworthy that this is attempted in the face of the dissenting minority who 
wished an outcome in conformity with traditional causation principles and precedent.  
 
3.7 CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY  
 
The approach described in this chapter represents a methodical approach to the 
examination of judicial decisions which differs in important ways from conventional 
legal commentary on legal cases. The examination of the structure of a law report, 
the doctrine of precedent, methods of choosing the cases themselves and the 
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particular published series’ of reports to examine are essential stages in the 
disciplined analysis of law reports.  
 
The empirical analysis of the law reports undertaken is premised on the view that 
they constitute published material eminently suitable to forms of systematic, 
qualitative documentary analysis. This approach differs from methods of 
conventional legal analysis which tend to focus on the disjunction between the 
current state of the law and the law as it, in the view of the legal commentator, ought 
to be. Because this form of analysis of the law reports has not been undertaken 
before, it has been necessary to describe and explain at some length the nature of the 
database of law reports and the justification for choosing the cases in the research 
sample and excluding others.  
 
Nevertheless empirical investigation, because of its preoccupation with description 
and association, is not adequate alone to understand and explain the focus of enquiry. 
A purely semantic enquiry would have resulted in trite description of the uses and 
variety of use of autonomy common to the jurisprudence and the literature. It would 
not have afforded any explanation why these uses, associations and variety of uses 
existed in the first place This rather truncated enquiry would have been 
understandable in view of the initial, descriptive, research questions. Instead, the 
prospect of an outcome restricted to trivial description forced a critical reappraisal of 
the nature of the enquiry and prompted the formulation of further explanatory 
research questions. These were designed to generate understanding of the meanings 
implicit in jurisprudential and academic use of autonomy (Cycle 2) and the structures 
and practices generating such meanings (Cycle 3).  
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Accordingly, a thesis which began as (with the benefit of hindsight) a rather limited 
linguistic analysis of the jurisprudence, became a more significant enquiry into the 
proximate and underlying influences explaining judicial meaning in practice of use. 
This development was not, and could not, have been predicted at the outset of the 
research and is testament to the ’revelatory’ power of the grounded theory approach 
employed. Accordingly the next chapter, the investigation will proceed to the 
process and findings of the second cycle of (hermeneutical) enquiry. 
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PART 2 
DEEPENING THE CYCLES OF RESEARCH ENQUIRY 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE SECOND CYCLE OF HERMENEUTICAL ENQUIRY: 
UNDERSTANDING THE MEANINGS OF AUTONOMY 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter sets out the main components of the second cycle of (hermeneutical) 
enquiry into the sources of meaning, understanding and interpretation of autonomy 
which were not evident to empirical analysis.  In what follows, the philosophical 
grounds of the enquiry will be set out, followed by an account of the hermeneutical 
strategy of investigation. The differentiation of the elemental uses of autonomy into 
the personal dimensions of ‘body’, ‘mind’ and ‘identity’ in the literature and the law 
reports, and the development of an integrated concept of the autonomy as the 
capability of the person will be accounted for. This development will be placed in 
the context of an understanding of autonomy as relating to two traditions of freedom. 
The chapter will end with an account of the impact that the hermeneutical cycle of 
enquiry has had on the coding process and the limitations of hermeneutical analysis. 
This will then lead on into the third cycle of critical realist enquiry in the next 
chapter.  
 
111 
 
4.2 DEVELOPING THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ENQUIRY 
 
The constant interaction between researcher and data generates the theory that 
explains the object of enquiry. In this research, the scrutiny of law reports on judges’ 
use and understanding of autonomy in ethically-contentious medical law cases will 
generate analysis of the relative influences of common law precedent, the literature, 
and, as it is being proposed, wider traditions, on decision-making. The unfolding 
relationship between researcher and data develops a further level of theoretical 
analysis concerning the presuppositions underlying the research, enabling the 
researcher to deepen understanding of the nature of the objects of enquiry (ontology) 
and how they are to be known (epistemology). Pole and Lampard (2002) emphasise 
that the discovery of theory depends on the capacity of the researcher to relate the 
codes and concepts to the epistemological and ontological questions which shape the 
research. Glaser and Strauss (1967) did not offer a detailed methodology, nor one 
systematically related to questions of ontology and epistemology. Accordingly, in 
the development of grounded theory, there have been a variety of different ways of 
presenting the theoretical presuppositions reflecting the position taken by the 
researcher on the ‘empirical data-theory construction’ dimension. The work of 
Johnson et al (1984) provides a helpful analysis of different forms which 
presuppositions of enquiry can take, while recognising the limitations of the dualities 
embodied in typologies.  
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 How is Social Reality Known? 
Nominal Real 
What is the nature of Social 
Reality? 
Material Empiricism Substantialism 
Ideal  Interpretivism Rationalism 
 
Figure 4.1 A typology of forms of enquiry (Johnson et al, 1984) 
 
Researchers can emphasise different aspects of the reality they perceive in their data. 
Some will stress the material qualities of the world they are studying, the solid nature 
of substantive experience, while others will argue that this misses what is distinctive 
about human activity and focus instead on the intentions and ideas that endow action 
with meaning. Researchers equally differ on the weight they attribute to 
conceptualising and categorising their data. Some believe that concepts are merely 
convenient names to summarise what remain in reality particular things or events 
which make up the social world (nominalists), while others believe that concepts 
reveal or disclose a reality, structures, that exist independently of any individual not 
immediately accessible to observation and experience (realist).  
 
The first cycle of engagement with the research data began with the purpose of 
developing understanding of judges’ interpretations of the meaning of autonomy in 
their decision-making and necessitated hermeneutic enquiry (Cycle 2). As the 
investigation proceeded, the presuppositions of enquiry needed further development. 
In the analysis of the law reports, the process of abstraction was driven by anxiety 
caused by initial reading of the reports and wider background reading. It was feared 
that the initial codes and concepts were not adequate to medical law reports. Reading 
and research suggested underlying structures – traditions of moral and political order 
113 
 
– which were not immediately appreciated, that needed to be unearthed and 
accounted for, adopting the presuppositions of critical realism (Cycle 3). 
 
4.3 STRATEGY OF INVESTIGATION: ITERATIONS OF MEANING 
(CYCLE2) 
 
The first cycle of enquiry was principally concerned with use. The second 
hermeneutical cycle is chiefly preoccupied with questions of meaning in use and the 
continuities of meanings and interpretations of autonomy in the law reports and 
literature.  
 
4.3.1 Interpretation and understanding: the presuppositions of hermeneutics 
‘Hermeneutics’ is the art of interpretation and principally refers to the method of 
understanding the meaning of texts and social practices (Gadamer (1989) and 
Ricoeur (1991; 2004)).  The meaning of the social world is not inherent in a set of 
natural conditions, but consists in people’s thoughts and interpretations of it. In order 
to uncover these, individuals’ subjective interpretations need to be investigated.  
Interpretivism, which is a form of hermeneutics, rejects the view that the meaning of 
the world disclosed in texts is off-limits to human understandings. It also refuses 
purely creative interpretative processes in which human actors are free to interpret 
the meaning of the social world, including texts, in any way they desire or choose 
 
This tension between subjectivism and objectivism exists within legal philosophy.  
The Critical Legal Studies movement which reached its zenith in the 1970s in the 
works of Unger (1983) and Kennedy & Klare (1984), argued against the objectivity 
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of legal operations to the point of existential solipsism. In contrast, Dworkin (1996) 
has contended for a ‘purposive’ interpretation of legal texts and practice, known as 
‘constructive interpretation’. Dworkin rejects the view that legal interpretation is 
necessarily whimsical and argues that legal interpreters can arrive at the correct legal 
answers based on the legal documentary tradition.  There is a more stringently 
objectivist tradition of legal hermeneutics in contemporary legal philosophy 
focussing on ‘original intent’. On this view, the correct interpretation is the one that 
supposedly most closely approximates what the original framers of the text intended. 
 
Interpretivist approaches toward social reality share an opposition to positivism. 
They also share a weakness; they leave reality untouched. Delanty has stated that 
hermeneutics “has been conceived more in terms of a dialogue than an interrogation 
of reality” (Delanty, 1997: 57). Because it implies that social reality is wholly made 
up of personal interpretation, it declines to travel beyond interpretation to unearth the 
concealed structures which make sense of the surface reality. Its exclusive 
preoccupation with ‘meaning’ has led to its failure to engage with the structures of 
power and advantage that make up the public world.  
 
4.3.2. Reflecting on meaning in the use of autonomy in the law reports and 
literature 
The focus in Cycle 1 was on semantic analysis of the law reports and literature with a 
descriptive focus on uses of autonomy disclosing variation in use, but not revealing 
the meanings or interpretations which inform such use. Accordingly Cycle 2 
developed enquiry into the meanings informing use of autonomy through 
investigating of the medical law and philosophical literatures in search of meaning.  
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4.3.2.1 Reflecting on data collection: It became apparent on further reflection that 
the various elemental meanings of autonomy identified in Cycle 1 could be related to 
three distinct dimensions of the ‘self’, disclosing an emerging concept of autonomy 
as body, mind and identity. This discovery suggested that there might be layers, or 
sources, of meaning underlying and informing the elemental ones and that continued 
scrutiny of the law reports and the literature should be undertaken with this new level 
of awareness. The descriptive limits of the first cycle of enquiry led to the insight 
that the concept of autonomy was part of a wider field of discourse which required a 
different form of analysis (textual and hermeneutic) to locate the sources which 
informed meaning.  
 
Deeper review of, and enquiry into, the literature (e.g. Arendt, 1985; Veitch, 2007; 
Bogdanor, 2009) led to a new appreciation of the significance of the importance of 
philosophical lineages and the implications of these for the relationship between the 
literature and the jurisprudence.  As a result, the significance of the dimensions of 
person was not simply left at the level of a convenient general category for various 
elemental meanings, but rather as things which implicated distinct aspects of the 
philosophical heritage, e.g. the association of the body with the tradition of ‘negative 
liberty’, the mind with the rationalist tradition associated with Kant, and its 
relationship with notions of personal efficacy, self-mastery and positive liberty, and 
personal identity and its historical connections with the recognitive tradition of inter-
subjectivity derived from Hegel. Cognisance of these contrasting traditions 
heightened awareness of the degree to which these discursive traditions were 
implicated in the different rationalities of bodies of law and the meanings of 
autonomy which are informed and underlain by them.  
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4.3.2.2 Theoretic elaboration: Closer attention to philosophical lineages, in turn, 
clarified the central importance of freedom, and its two contrasting traditions –
‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom for’ (which can be expressed as negative/positive 
liberty or liberty/freedom).Thus, underlying and informing the meanings in the use 
of autonomy are two contrasting traditions of freedom. The concept of autonomy is 
informed by discursive traditions of liberty and freedom. It was observed how fluidly 
this vocabulary of freedom is used, leading to the new observation that the law 
reports and the literature appear to refer to ‘bodily’, ‘intellectual’ and ‘social’ 
autonomy as if they were they were autonomies in their own right rather than simply 
a part of autonomy.  
 
4.3.2.3 Recoded concepts and categories: As a result of this deepened understanding 
of the meanings in the use of autonomy in the literature and law reports, it was 
possible to construct a new conceptual hierarchy. It could be seen that the various 
elemental meanings assigned to autonomy identified at Cycle 1 could be related to 
the concepts of body, mind and identity. These in turn could be connected more 
abstractly to new categories of liberty, self-determination and capability. The 
category of liberty could be seen to relate to ‘bodily’ constructions of autonomy 
which emphasised freedom from unwanted interference. Self-determination could be 
seen to be a more foundational concept than simply one conception amongst the 
range, encapsulating the notion of intellectual autonomy and its associated 
competencies, conditions and capacities. Capability, was a concept drawn from the 
philosophical literature (e.g. Sen, 2009; Nussbaum, 2011), which promised to 
encompass those more complex conceptions of autonomy informed by the 
jurisprudence deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights.  
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4.3.3 Cycle 2 coding: concepts of person  
The conceptions of autonomy identified in the first cycle of enquiry were iteratively 
and interpretatively re-coded following the second cycle of analysis of the literature. 
As a result of this second cycle, the various elemental uses autonomy identified in 
the first level of analysis could be seen to correspond with distinct aspects of the 
‘self’ or ‘person’ (body, mind and identity) and conceptualised (Level 2) as distinct 
expressions of autonomy: bodily, intellectual and social.  
 
For example, in Re M (2011), the link between the elemental use of autonomy and 
the distinctive bodily aspect of the person is made explicit at para. 95:  
Personal autonomy survives the onset of incapacity to 
consent or refuse medical treatment “Article 8 protects 
the right to personal autonomy, otherwise described as 
the right to physical and bodily integrity. It protects a 
patient’s right to self-determination and an intrusion into 
bodily integrity must be justified under Article 8(2). 
 
The link between privacy (as ‘private life’) and identity, or social autonomy is made 
explicit in the Court of Appeal judgement in Purdy (2009) at para. 55: 
Elusive though the concept is, I think one must 
understand “private life” in Article 8 [of the ECHR] as 
extending to those features which are integral to a 
person’s identity or ability to function socially as a 
person. 
 
The third level of analysis led to the formation of capability as a conceptual 
category, which can be seen to offer an interdependent theory of autonomy integrate 
the otherwise partial and incomplete perspectives of body, mind and identity. While 
not explicitly part of the jurisprudential lexicon, nevertheless the concept capability 
captures the concern extant in a number of the law reports decided under the 
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European Convention on Human Rights, with its emphasis on ‘the whole person’ 
and the means needed to promoted self–realisation. 
                            
 Levels of coding 
 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Cycle  2 
Concepts of 
person   
Particulars Code Concept Category 
Bodily inviolability  II (a) (i) Body (or bodily 
autonomy) (II A (ii))  
Capability (II 
(iii)) Physical sovereignty II (b) (i)  
Bodily integrity II (c) (i) 
Freedom from interference 
(or liberty) 
II (d) (i) 
(Spatial) Privacy II (e) (i) 
Independence  II (f) (i) 
Self-possession II (g) (i) 
Self-ownership II (h) (i) 
Self-control II (i) (i) 
Freedom of choice II (j) (i) Mind (or intellectual 
autonomy) (II B (ii)) Mental capacity II (k) (i) 
Self-determination II (l) (i) 
Psychological integrity II (m) (i) 
Moral integrity II (n) (i) Identity (or social 
autonomy (II C (ii) Dignity II (o) (i)  
Privacy (as ‘private life’) II (p) (i)  
Self-creation II (q) (i)  
Self-realisation  II (r) (i)  
Subjective character of 
experience  
II (s) (i) 
 
Figure 4.2 – Concepts of person (Level 2) 
 
4.3.3.1 Research questions and hypothesis: In Cycle 1, three descriptive research 
questions guided empirical enquiry: 
 
1a. is there judicial use of autonomy? 
1b. is there variation in judicial usage? 
1c. is there associations between the academy and judicial usage? 
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It was realised, however, that while empirical enquiry could identify autonomy’s 
different usages, it could not establish its meaning in use. This prompted the second 
cycle of textual enquiry and hermeneutical analysis which helped to generate deeper 
understanding of its sources and layers of meaning. The limitations of the descriptive 
research questions which were focused on what uses and influences pertained to the 
judiciary, led to the formulation of an additional research question pertinent to 
Cycle2: 
 
2. what meanings and interpretations do judges give to their usage of 
autonomy? 
 
Though the semantic analysis of elemental meanings of autonomy in judges 
decisions had led to the discovery that there was use and variety of use of autonomy 
in judicial decision-making which corresponded to similar variation in the literature, 
it did not explain that use and variation. The regularities of particular usage between 
the jurisprudence and the literature provide good prima facie evidence that the use of 
autonomy in the literature is a source of influence on judicial thinking. However 
deeper enquiry into the literature led beyond observation of interdependence between 
the law reports and the literature to the discovery that the elemental meanings 
assigned to autonomy in both was materially related to an emerging concept of 
autonomy as body, mind and identity and thus a more holistic concept of the person. 
Thus, the autonomy of the whole person needed to be understood not simply in terms 
of autonomy’s values, but also its purposes and conditions. This deepened enquiry 
led towards the search for an integrated theory of autonomy which reconciled each.  
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4.4 TOWARDS A HOLISTIC CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY AS THE 
CAPABILITY OF THE PERSON 
 
In Chapter 3, a potentially confusing array of elemental conceptualisations of 
autonomy has been identified in the academic literature. There is, accordingly, a 
need to order these in terms of their distinctive values, purposes and conditions. This 
will be done in two sections: the first conceptualises the values and purposes of 
autonomy as focusing on ‘the self’; the second conceptualises the social and political 
conditions of autonomy.  
 
4.4.1 Dimensions of autonomy as the self in the literature 
The foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates that the various conceptions of 
autonomy in the academic literature pertain to various aspects of the ‘self’, or 
person, e.g. self-government, self-determination, self-realisation etc. On closer 
inspection, it becomes apparent to particular dimensions of the self: (i) the body (e.g. 
self-ownership); (ii) the mind: reason and choice (e.g. self-legislation); and (iii) 
identity (e.g. self-realisation). Analysing autonomy as the self in three dimensions 
allows its further theoretical investigation and progress towards a fuller theory of 
autonomy.  
 
4.4.1.1 The dimension of ‘the body’ 
In philosophy and law, the concept of autonomy is strongly associated with 
conceptions of bodily integrity, or physical sovereignty. These notions have negative 
and positive sense. In its negative sense, bodily integrity refers to personal liberty or 
freedom from unwanted outside physical interference. In its positive sense, it 
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concerns a person’s freedom to move her body through space and time as desired. 
The notion of bodily integrity has deep roots in part of the philosophical tradition. 
Hobbes (Hobbes & Gaskin, 1996) defines freedom in negative, and mechanistic, 
terms as the absence of external obstacles and hindrances: “[A free man] is he that in 
those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe 
what he has a will to” (1996: 167). Hobbes’ view has been associated, albeit 
contestably, with an extreme version of negative liberty (van Mill, 1995). Hobbes’ 
concept of ‘bodily’ autonomy is echoed by Locke (Locke & Laslett, 1988)) and Mill 
(Mill & Gray, 2008). For Locke, “to be at liberty is to be free from restraint and 
violence from others” (2008: 306). For Mill, “he only purpose for which power can 
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is 
to prevent harm to others” (2008: 14).  Locke also regarded persons as having 
“property in their own person”. This is a central notion in the contemporary theories 
of Pufendorf (2005), Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974).  
 
Thus, the association between autonomy and freedom from bodily restraint, or 
hindrance, by material, or legal, obstacles runs deeply in part of the philosophical 
tradition.  But although Hobbes has acquired a reputation as the primary theorist of 
‘pure negative liberty’, Van Mill (1995) argues that Hobbes actually discusses a 
great many other conditions of freedom apart from the absence of external 
constraints.  Similarly, Locke and Mill place their concepts of bodily autonomy as 
part of their wider concern with freedom from arbitrary third-party or state 
interference.  
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English law reflects the concept of bodily autonomy in a number of different ways. It 
is the premise on which criminal and civil laws proscribing non-consensual touching 
are based. In the healthcare context, consent functions to transmute otherwise 
unlawful physical intrusions into professionally responsible behaviour. These 
proscriptions reflect the importance English law places on notions of negative 
liberty. Dworkin (1992) distinguishes physical essentialist from liberal individualist 
concepts of autonomy. Physical essentialist autonomy is ‘rooted not so much in 
choice as in being left alone. If you touch me or eavesdrop on me, you have injured 
my autonomy by invading my space’ (1992: 733). Similarly, Laurie (2001) defines 
‘spatial privacy’ in terms of a person’s physical and psychological separateness from 
others. The legal, and philosophical, emphasis on bodily autonomy may reflect an 
even deeper concern. The commitment to negative liberty may be a manifestation of 
a more profound commitment to notions of personal dignity, and the principle of 
non-humiliation.  
 
The status of the doctrine of consent is a bone of contention within English medical 
law. There are broadly two views. Firstly, it has been regarded as an exculpatory 
factor justifying or excusing otherwise unlawful behaviour in the healthcare context. 
This is the ‘defensive’ construction of medical law in which individual consent 
supplies the doctor with a ‘legal flak-jacket’, providing her with a defence in 
criminal and/or civil proceedings.
10
  Brazier summarises (2003: 30):‘[o]nce consent 
is obtained, the doctor is protected from legal gunfire. Consent protects his back. He 
                                                                                       
 
10 See the judgment of Lord Donaldson in Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627at 
635. 
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cannot be sued’.  Secondly, consent has been regarded as the legal expression of 
autonomy rooted in human rights (cf. Kennedy, 1996; 2000; Wicks, 2007)). This 
ideological difference has had one important practical implication in medical law, 
the law of consent relating to treatment refusals by ‘mature minors’. It is a very good 
example of how the common law works within the interstices of statute.  
 
The common law currently confers on ‘Gillick-competent children rights of consent 
and refusal of consent to medical treatment (Gillick (1986). However, statute 
(Children Act 1989) confers on parents as legally-authorised proxies’ rights of 
consent on behalf of their minor children. So where a child refuses treatment, parents 
are empowered to override that refusal by supplying collateral consent under the 
protection of the ‘flak-jacket’ principle. The logic of a human rights analysis (pace 
Kennedy), however, would eschew the asymmetry introduced into the law by this 
parental autonomy override, on the basis that an unqualified right of a competent 
child to consent to treatment, must entail a corresponding, and unqualified, right to 
refuse it. Thus, in this context, the appeal to common law, and statutory, principles 
has created a legal structure which human rights advocates would regard as 
rationally indefensible on human rights principles.  
 
4.4.1.2 The dimension of ‘the mind’: choice and reason 
In philosophy and law, there is an equally strong association between the notion of a 
‘self’, the workings of the intellect, and the authority of reason. According to Kant’s 
conception of self-legislation, autonomy is a property of the human will which is 
designed by nature to render universal laws to which the individual is subject as a 
matter of pure, practical reason. Kant (1998), in the social contract tradition of 
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Rousseau (1997), understands autonomy as acting on intentions (or ‘maxims’) that 
all rational persons in the moral community could adopt, i.e. ‘giving the law to 
oneself’. While the basis of the moral law lies beyond comprehension, in the 
noumenal realm, reason mediates our ability to know and to follow the dictates of 
reason in the phenomenal realm (Tauber, 2001). O’Neill (2002), in her highly-
influential contemporary interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy, has argued that 
autonomy is the property of choosing freely and rationally, as opposed to merely free 
of coercion, constraint or deception.  
 
Kant’s view of the autonomy of the will, and reason (i.e. moral autonomy), contrasts 
sharply with the role of choice in the tradition of Hobbes, Locke and Mill, who 
associate autonomy with the freedom to act on the basis of individual desires, 
preferences and inclinations; in other words, ‘being a law unto oneself.’ Mill, in 
particular, gives weight to the roles of passion and emotion, over against reason 
(Dryden, 2010). Freedom of choice is not subject to rational constraints, but rather 
constrained by the rights of others according to the ‘harm principle’: “the only 
purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’”(Mill, 2008). For Mill, the 
authority of choice also functions as a means to ‘self-realisation’. In this, distinctive 
personhood is “realised through acts of self-determining inner freedom that engender 
processes of personal growth” (Carter, 2009).  
 
Like the bodily dimension of the self, the dimension of choice is regarded as a 
central manifestation, or component, of autonomy in academic medical law 
(Kennedy and Grubb, 2000; Laurie, 2001).  Dworkin (1992) has distinguished what 
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he calls ‘liberal individualistic’ autonomy, from ‘physical essentialist’ autonomy. On 
a liberal individualist view, autonomy refers to “…the ability and the opportunity to 
choose one’s course of action and to act to effectuate one’s choice” (1992: 733). 
Manson and O’Neill (2007) state that autonomy in the medical law context is 
operationalised through the legal consent procedures. The largely cognitive criteria 
for rendering a legally valid consent, which were initially developed at common law, 
are now enshrined in statute through the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).   
 
In addition to the informational and non-coercion requirements, a person must, in 
order to qualify, or, rather, avoid disqualification, as legally competent, have the 
requisite mental capacity. The MCA stipulates both diagnostic and functional 
criteria. The presumption of legal competence in adults is overridden if: (1)  it can be 
demonstrated on diagnostic grounds that a person is incapable of expressing a true 
wish ‘because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind 
or brain’ (section 2(1) of the MCA); and (2) it can be demonstrated on functional 
grounds that they are incapable of understanding and retaining information, and 
using, or weighing up, that information as part of the process of making that 
decision, and communicating that decision (section 3(1)).  
 
There is considerable debate relating to the standard of intellectual autonomy the law 
requires and how it relates to philosophical standards. In the earlier analysis of the 
various elemental uses of autonomy (see above), the connection between ‘choice’ 
and decision-making authority was shown to be a central component of the theories 
of three of the twentieth century’s most important legal and moral philosophers: 
Rawls (1971); Raz (1986) and (Ronald) Dworkin (1993).  Although the standards of 
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rationality required by those theories are not precisely specified, some minimal 
degree of rationality is required, e.g. enough to choose ‘basic goods’ from behind the 
veil of ignorance in the original position in Rawls’ (1971) theory.  In law, whatever 
the standard is, it is a standard that attempts, however imperfectly, to address the 
quotidian realities of healthcare decision-making. The law requires more than the 
ability merely to evidence a choice, but less than fully, comprehensive actual 
understanding (Roth et al., 1977; Gunn, 1994).  Whether the courts look for 
particular standards of rationality, or acceptability of outcome, is a matter of 
continuing controversy.  
 
Veitch (2007; Morgan and Veitch, 2004) has argued that the courts in the judicial 
determinations of treatment refusal cases are implicitly requiring patients to give 
account of their reasons for refusal, while at the same time, explicitly claiming that 
the content of patients’ decision is beyond the judicial remit. Judges, he argues, are 
importing moral considerations into their assessment of a patient’s mental capacity, 
even though the capacity criteria are meant to be value-neutral in content. Veitch 
(following Kennedy (1997)) argues that this is inevitable for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is impossible to make an inquiry into the state of a patient’s mind without taking into 
account the nature of the decision the patient has in fact made, a matter which is 
meant to lie beyond the scope of judicial consideration.  
 
Secondly, on closer inspection of the legal capacity criteria, it transpires that the 
requirement for a patient to demonstrate that he has weighed up the information 
relevant to the treatment decision in order to arrive at a decision is itself inherently 
value-laden and, thus, invites inquiry into the patient’s reasoning process. As a 
127 
 
result, the courts have merged the procedure for making assessments of mental 
capacity with their moral concerns over the nature, and content, of the patient’s 
decision. In so doing, the judiciary is, in reality, subverting the judicial impartiality, 
and procedural neutrality, that supposedly lie at the core of the mental capacity test.   
 
Veitch, therefore, identifies two distinctive stages in the judiciary’s determination of 
a patient’s legal competence. Firstly, there is the mental capacity stage, which is 
designed to establish whether the patient is capable of making a decision. Secondly, 
there is the autonomy stage, which is directed to demonstrate whether this patient in 
this context is the sort of person to whom the court is prepared to attribute, or 
ascribe, autonomy. These two stages, though formally consecutive, are in reality 
concurrent, or interpenetrative. For Veitch, the autonomy stage represents those 
aspects of a patient’s decision – its nature, the patient’s values and personal traits – 
that have a bearing on the judicial evaluation of the patient’s reasoning process. The 
results of judicial deliberation at this stage are then ‘retrojected’ into the mental 
capacity stage of judicial deliberation. Miola (2009: 116), commenting on Veitch 
(2007) contends that “capacity cases are shown to present a qualifying round for 
autonomy that allows the courts to remove autonomy from undeserving patients.”  
Thus, the assessment of mental capacity itself is subject to the prior value-laden 
determination of a patient’s status as autonomous.  
 
4.4.1.2.1 Individualistic and principled autonomy 
Veitch goes on to identify two constructions of autonomy present in a number of 
medical law cases: individualistic autonomy and principled autonomy. At the level 
of judicial rhetoric, he contends the legal system is ideologically committed to the 
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construct of the ‘atomistic’, rights-bearing patient and a self-image as a neutral, 
impartial, and objective legal system. The courts do this in order “to promote a 
certain image of the patient and the courts themselves.” However, this rhetoric 
under-determines the role autonomy actually plays in the cases he considers. Rather, 
Veitch demonstrates that the courts are in fact upholding a concept of ‘principled’ 
autonomy which is ‘inextricably bound up with ideas of obligation and 
responsibility’ (2007: 77). Veitch concludes that the courts are not, in fact, 
protecting, upholding, and promoting a concept of individualistic autonomy based on 
rights, but rather one in which patients’ responsibilities are lexically-prior to their 
rights, e.g. obligations of identity, ability and sympathy, i.e. the ‘responsible’ patient. 
Veitch (2007: 86) states that: 
 
…this conflation of the nature of the decision with the 
assessment of mental capacity points not to the casting 
aside of autonomy; rather it is consistent with a certain 
notion of autonomy, albeit one that some 
commentators in the medical law field, and the 
judiciary itself, would not feel comfortable 
recognizing. This autonomy is of the principled, rather 
than of the individual, variety…it is bound up with 
obligations and responsibilities rather than rights.  
 
Veitch gives the presence of the concept of principled autonomy in medical law a 
wider interpretation. It plays a structural role, needing to be understood in relation to 
‘the nature of law’s regulation of the existence and non-existence of life [and] the 
manner in which the law regulates the threshold between life and death’ (Morgan 
and Veitch, 2004: 107).  
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4.4.1.3 The dimension of ‘personal identity’ 
In addition to the emphasis on the bodily and intellectual dimensions of the self, the 
academic literature has also emphasised the dimension of personal identity.   One 
recent philosophical development of autonomy in its dimension of identity is through 
the concept, or concepts, of recognition (Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Margalit, 
2001) Ikaheimo (2002) has observed that “recognition’ has many different senses 
which have not been clearly distinguished in the literature by their authors, although 
they are clearly related. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake an in-depth 
analysis of the theory of recognition.  Nevertheless, various recognition theories 
share the view that autonomy should principally be conceived in terms of the 
development of the individual’s personality, which happens not in isolation, but in 
relationship with others. The theory of recognition draws upon a philosophical 
tradition more dependent on the early Hegel, with his emphasis on inter-subjectivity, 
rather than on the classical liberal thinkers such as Kant and Mill.  Hegel describes 
freedom as “being at home with oneself in another” (Baynes, 2010: 562). Honneth 
and Anderson (2005) have proposed a recognitional model of autonomy “that 
emphasises the intersubjective conditions for being able to lead one’s life as one’s 
own” (2005: 144).  
 
Honneth and Anderson contend (2005: 138) that “gains in freedom and power come 
from having other’s see one’s needs and aspirations as legitimate.” They argue that 
their recognitional account, as with other such accounts, demonstrate that full 
autonomy, which they describe as “the real and effective capacity to develop and 
pursue one’s own conception of a worthwhile life”, can only be achieved “under 
socially supportive conditions” (2005: 130).  The very possibility of identity 
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formation depends on the cultivation of three particular ways of “relating to oneself 
practically”, namely (i) self-respect – one’s self-perception as a legitimate source of 
reasons for acting; (ii) self-trust – a disposition of openness and trust towards one’s 
own feelings, desires, impulses, emotions etc.; and (iii) self-esteem – a proper sense 
of self-worth. All this presupposes a supportive recognitional infrastructure.  The 
distinctive contribution of this particular interpretation of early Hegelian philosophy 
is that the development of personal identity is not an atomised, introspective process; 
rather it is intersubjective in which an individual’s attitude to herself is influenced by 
how others perceive her and her condition.  
 
4.4.1.3.1 Individualistic and relational autonomy 
There is little evidence in the medico-legal literature that academic lawyers are 
reflecting deeply on the Hegelian tradition, or recognition theory, and how it might 
help to reconfigure the legal, or judicial, construction of autonomy.  There is 
evidence, however, that medical lawyers (e.g. Herring, 2008; Maclean, 2009; 
McLean, 2010) are becoming increasingly influenced by an emphasis on the 
importance of interdependency present in feminist, and communitarian reflection 
upon the concept, and conceptions, of autonomy (e.g. Nedelsky, 1989; Mackenzie 
and Stoljar, 2000; Donchin, 2001).  The concept of relational autonomy is now being 
drawn upon to challenge the traditional legal construct of the atomised, rights-
bearing, individual exercising self-determination in the healthcare context through 
the mechanisms of free, informed, uncoerced choice. Herring (2008: 1) states that in 
“medical law, as often in legal thought, the focus is on the image of an autonomous, 
competent man who can enforce his rights”. However, there is a growing 
consciousness amongst medical lawyers of a need in law to understand autonomy 
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socially and to develop legal concepts which capture the daily realities of 
relationships of interdependence and care (Williams, 2005; Gilbar, 2005; Dunn and 
Foster, 2010).  
 
The signs of this growing consciousness of the need for a more complex concept of 
autonomy are operative in law in the context of care of vulnerable adults, and 
genetics. This consciousness is implicit in the recently enacted Mental Capacity Act 
2005 which has blurred the formerly somewhat binary common law distinction 
between autonomy and ‘best-interests’, e.g. by repeatedly stipulating throughout the 
legislation a requirement to optimise the conditions in which otherwise incompetent, 
vulnerable adults become capable of rendering legally competent decisions. The 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009), in its report on the ethical issues arising in the 
context of care for persons with dementia, argue that autonomy should be construed 
in relational terms:  
 
… that is, that a person’s sense of self and self-
expression should be seen as being firmly grounded in 
their social and family networks. In addition, most 
people would wish that their carer’s interests should be 
given considerable weight: their interests include their 
carer’s interests.’ (2009: 117).   
 
The Nuffield Council’s concept of relational autonomy is brought into close alliance 
with the concept of ‘solidarity’ (‘we are all in this together’), which, through the 
Council’s various reports, is becoming an ethical principle of first-rank.  
 
Herring (2008) has argued that the culture of individualism and medical law’s focus 
on individual rights has had deleterious effects in the context of caregivers and 
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vulnerable adults.  The dominant, individualistic, right-based, approach, he argues, 
grossly underdetermines the degrees of dependency, and vulnerability, that actually 
characterises the carer-cared-for relationship. Herring castigates the separation of the 
interests of carer and cared-for because in reality their interests are inextricably 
bound up, and that this reality should be reflected in law. As this is not possible on a 
solely rights- or rule-based approach, a legal approach based on responsibilities and 
relationships, rooted in an ethics of care, might provide a better legal framework. 
Herring, however, does not clarify how a care-based approach would be translated 
into law. Although he cites the seminal work of Gilligan (1982) and Held (2006), he 
makes no reference to the work of Annette Baier (1986; 1994) whose concept of 
‘appropriate trust’ supplies one attempt to reconcile the universalising demands of 
justice, with the particularising requirements of care. 
 
Two important medico-legal monographs have emphasised the importance, and even 
presence, of relational autonomy in medical law (Maclean, 2009; McLean, 2010). 
McLean’s is the first to undertake a rigorous analysis of models of autonomy present 
in a range of situational contexts in medical law. Although aware of O’Neill’s (2002; 
Manson and O’Neill, 2007) seminal work on principled autonomy, McLean chooses 
to compare, and contrast, individualistic and relational models. One of her key 
insights is that medical law is ambivalent about the applicable model of autonomy in 
its various situational contexts: 
 
… a certain ambivalence has emerged that has resulted 
in an inconsistent application of apparently clear legal 
rules, and – on occasion – a perceptible drift away 
from respecting the individual’s choices and 
preferences, sometimes in the alleged interests of 
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others and on other occasions with an eye to policy 
implications. (2010: 219) 
 
McLean argues that in the context of treatment refusals at the end-of-life, the courts 
seem to adopt an individualistic approach to autonomy which is expressed in the 
courts’ explicit endorsement of  an adult competent patient’s unqualified right to 
refuel life-saving, or life-sustaining medical treatment. In the assisted suicide 
context, however, the patient’s right of self-determination is qualified by the state’s 
discretion to pass laws which are designed to protect the interests of the vulnerable. 
These decisions, McLean states “are tested against a version of autonomy that seems 
more akin to a relational model” (2010: 219). 
 
McLean’s second key insight is her view that distinction between individualistic and 
relational autonomy is overdrawn. She maintains that the contrast is drawn too 
sharply because in reality the self-governing self does acknowledge its social 
formation: 
 
… it seems counter-intuitive to suggest that even a 
firmly individualistic form of autonomy necessarily 
ignores the link between those participating in a caring 
interaction based in trust –that is, the patient and the 
healthcare provider (2010: 39).  
 
Moreover, the encapsulation of relational dimensions of autonomy within the 
language of rights is possible because few rights are absolute, usually admitting of 
qualifications (e.g. the derogations set out in Article 8(2) of the ECHR). These 
derogations specifically take societal and democratic values into account and thus 
potentially qualify the individualism implicit in the primary right.  
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The discussion has so far construed the autonomy of the person in largely pre-social 
and separatist terms, although attention has been drawn to a growing consciousness 
of the contribution notions of inter-subjectivity and relationships are making to 
concepts of the person in the philosophical and medico-legal literature. It has also 
focussed on what is valued about the self, or person, i.e. the body, the mind, personal 
identity. The aim of the next discussion is to develop the insight that autonomous 
personhood is an emergent property of the natural and social context of which the 
person is inescapably a part, and that personal values, preferences and choices are 
not simply self-generated, but acquired in social contexts.  
 
4.4.2 Dimensions of autonomy as the self in the law reports 
The analysis in this chapter addresses the second research question; do judges 
express a variety of uses of autonomy in complex cases? As the medical 
jurisprudence develops, it becomes apparent that autonomy can be understood in a 
number of different senses. These different constructions are not so much competing 
alternative interpretations of autonomy, but rather ones that address different 
dimensions of the ‘whole’ person. The courts do not address these different 
dimensions of the person as discrete categories; rather the courts begin to develop a 
much more complex concept of autonomy, differentiating its distinct constituent 
meanings, incorporating the idea of bodily integrity, but subsuming it within a larger 
concept of autonomy of the person as body, mind and identity. This development is 
not neat and sequential, but rather arises discernibly, if somewhat piecemeal, out of 
the factual contingencies of the cases arising for adjudication.  
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4.4.2.1 Autonomy as ‘bodily integrity’: the case of Bland (1993) 
This case arose out of the Hillsborough football disaster in 1989 when a teenage 
supporter was crushed and asphyxiated by an entrapped crowd. The patient was 
eventually diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), retaining a 
functioning brain stem, but lacking all higher cerebral function. After two-and-a-half 
years, the patient’s family, with the agreement of the hospital authorities, sought a 
legal declaration that would allow his treating clinicians to withdraw the artificial 
nutrition and hydration, and antibiotic treatment, that was keeping him alive. The 
High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were successively asked to 
determine the lawfulness of withdrawing life-sustaining artificial nutrition and 
hydration and other medical treatment from the permanently insensate adult patient. 
The House of Lords held that withdrawal would count as a lawful ‘omission’ rather 
than a criminal ‘act’.  ANH constituted ‘treatment’ rather than ‘care’ which in the 
circumstances was legally-permissible to discontinue because of its medical futility.  
 
In Bland (1993) the issue of bodily integrity is fundamental. The key legal (and 
ethical) question was whether it was right to continue invading the insensate 
patient’s body with medical tubes when there was no prospect of the patient 
recovering consciousness. The House of Lord’s opined that the whole case turned on 
the extent of the “right to continue lawfully to invade the body of Anthony Bland 
without his consent” (p.883E), concluding “… that perpetuation of life can only be 
achieved if it is lawful to continue to invade the bodily integrity of the patient by 
invasive medical care” (p.884B). That the case raises questions of ‘bodily autonomy’ 
is confirmed in the recent Court of Appeal case of Yearworth (2010), where Bland is 
explicitly referred to in this connection (p.13G):  
136 
 
Notwithstanding these principles, the law compensates 
by making an elaborate series of rules for the 
protection of the body and bodily autonomy: see, e g, 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
 
Both appellate courts in Bland refer to recently-decided and analogous American and 
Commonwealth authorities which had emerged in the meantime, e.g. Quinlan 
(1976); 
11
 Conroy (1985);
12
 Jobes (1987); Cruzan (1990); 
13
 Jane Doe (1992)
14
; and 
Auckland (1993). 
15
 Like Bland, all these cases involve patients who for reasons of 
disability are not able to express their wishes and on behalf of whom decisions need 
to be made by others. The Court of Appeal (quoting Conroy via Jobes) triangulates 
bodily integrity, dignity and privacy and holds that (p.821G):  
 
Eventually, pervasive bodily intrusions, even for the 
best of motives, will arouse feelings akin to 
humiliation and mortification for the helpless patient. 
When cherished values of human dignity and personal 
privacy, which belong to every person living or dying, 
are sufficiently transgressed by what is being done to 
the individual, we should be ready to say:  [“enough”]. 
 
The fundamental importance of bodily integrity is heavily reiterated throughout both 
appellate court judgements, running closely together with conceptions of dignity and 
privacy, principally because of their centrality to the American legal and 
constitutional framework in the cases relied upon. The sight of the supine patient 
                                                                                       
 
11 Quinlan, Re  70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976)). 
12 Conroy, Re 486 A. 2d. 1209 (1985). 
13 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health et al. 497 U.S. (1990). 
14
 In re Jane Doe, 418 SE 2d 3 - 1992 
15 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235. 
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framed by the medical apparatus that was keeping him, albeit insensately, alive led 
the Court of Appeal to speculate that the ‘privacy’ of the patient’s body was being 
“invaded’ with ‘tubes, catheters, probes and injections” (p.828C).  
 
Although in Bland the concept of bodily autonomy is fundamental and forms part of 
the rationale (or ratio) of the decision, the case also offers an extended, albeit 
ancillary (or obiter), discussion of the conception of self-determination. This is not 
strictly required because the patient was clearly unconscious and not in a position to 
express his wishes. In Re F (1990), where such discussion was also not strictly 
required, self-determination is only used three-times, twice in the Court of Appeal 
and once in the House of Lords. It is used only once in Re W (1992) where the case 
required direct consideration of the scope of a child’s right to self-determination. In 
Bland, it is used twenty-two times, nineteen times in the Court of Appeal (per Lord 
Justices Butler-Sloss and Hoffmann), and three times in the House of Lords (per 
Lord Goff).  In addition, the conception of self-determination is tied to the use of the 
term autonomy on the three occasions it is used (twice in the Court of Appeal, once 
in the House of Lords). In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Hoffmann states 
(p.826F):  
 
Another is respect for the individual human being and 
in particular for his right to choose how he should live 
his own life. We call this individual autonomy or the 
right of self-determination. And another principle, 
closely connected, is respect for the dignity of the 
individual human being: our belief that quite 
irrespective of what the person concerned may think 
about it, it is wrong for someone to be humiliated or 
treated without respect for his value as a person.  
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The preoccupation in Bland with self-determination has a two-fold explanation. 
Firstly, the court is concerned with the question of whether the patient had made an 
anticipatory decision which could have been valid and applicable in the 
circumstances which had arisen in the instant case. A treatment decision made on 
behalf of an incompetent patient in violation of such an advance decision could 
potentially have constituted trespass. This question is directly addressed by Lady 
Justice Butler-Sloss who had been one of the appeal court judges in the case of Re T 
(1993). In Bland (p.816F), she reiterates, as she had done in Re T, a statement of 
Lord Templeman in Sidaway (1985), that a self-determining must be respected 
whether it is “rational or irrational”. This applies even if the patient puts her life in 
jeopardy as a result. Secondly, and relatedly, the court argues that the right to self-
determination sets a limit to the scope of the sanctity of life principle (per Lord 
Hoffmann; cf. Lord Goff at p. 864E) Both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords affirm that it the state’s duty to protect life must give way to the patient’s right 
of self-determination (e.g. at p827A).  
 
The Bland case reveals the closely related natures of bodily and ‘intellectual’ 
autonomy. Bodily integrity provides the necessary foundation for more complex 
constructions of autonomy, encompassing patient choice. This close association of 
bodily integrity and patient choice probably has its seedbed in the Schloendorff 
(1914) case. This case, cited four times in Bland, combines physical and intellectual 
autonomy, i.e. the right an adult person of sound mind to determine what shall be 
done with her body and without whose consent to physical touching an action in 
trespass may ensue (Bland (1993) at p.864D). Schloendorff is twice-cited in Re F 
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(1990) (once in the Court of Appeal and once in the House of Lords), cited in 
argument, but not referred to in judgement in Re T (1993).
16
 
 
4.4.2.2 Autonomy as ‘self-determination’ and ‘freedom of choice’: the case of Re 
MB (1997) 
The case of Re MB (1997) concerned a 23-year old woman who was 33 weeks 
pregnant and admitted to hospital with a footling breech. This posed mortal danger to 
her foetus, requiring an emergency caesarean section. The patient had had an 
intermittent attendance record at ante-natal clinic largely due to her fear of needles 
and the need to supply routine blood samples.  The alternative possible procedure 
involved epidural anaesthesia during vaginal delivery to minimise the risk of pushing 
prematurely, with emergency section as a last resort. Although the patient had given 
consent for surgical intervention on several occasions, she repeatedly refused pre-
operative venepuncture because of her needle phobia. The hospital sought and 
obtained a High Court declaration that she was incapable of making a legally valid 
treatment refusal and could therefore be treated non-consensually in her ‘best 
interests’. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision her irrational fear of needles had 
rendered her temporarily incompetent and thus incapable of making a decision. As a 
result, it would be lawful to undertake a caesarean section without her consent. 
 
The Court of Appeal emphasises the link between the concept of autonomy and the 
state of the patient’s mind. The single reference (p.436) to the term ‘autonomy’ is in 
a discussion about the conditions under which autonomy might be removed from a 
                                                                                       
 
16 Schloendorff (1914) is also cited in argument in Sidaway (1985). 
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person: “the cause of the disability must be examined so that only disabilities caused 
by disorder or disability of the mind result in the removal of the patient's autonomy.” 
The Court of Appeal also develops the common law concept of mental capacity set 
down in Re T (1993) and Re C (1994).  In Re T (1993) the Court of Appeal notes that 
mental capacity can be undermined in various ways (pp.112G – 113E). In Re C 
(1994), the High Court lays out a set of capacity (or more accurately incapacity) 
criteria (p.295D-E) stating that the presumption of adult capacity can be overridden 
where the patient “does not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and effects” 
of the treatment proposed. The court in Re C analyses the decision-making process in 
three stages: “first, comprehending and retaining treatment information, second, 
believing it and, third, weighing it in the balance to arrive at choice.” 
 
The Court of Appeal takes the development of the common law concept of mental 
capacity a step further. Building on the test in Re C (1994), and the recommendations 
of the Law Commission’s report on mental incapacity (Law Commission, 1995), the 
court formulates a ‘diagnostic’ and ‘functional ‘test of capacity.17 The diagnostic test 
(principally influenced by the Law Commission report) requires a “disorder or 
disability of the mind”. The functional test (principally influenced by Re C) states (at 
pp.433-4) that a person will not have mental capacity if she is “unable to understand 
or retain the information relevant to the decision, including information about the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or another or failing to 
make the decision’ or ‘unable to make a decision based on that information”.  The 
                                                                                       
 
17 The terms ‘diagnostic’ and ‘functional’ are used in Re M (2011) a p.76F-G decided under the MCA 
which focus on the interpretation of sections 2 and 3 of the MCA which largely enshrines the 
common law capacity criteria.  
141 
 
patient’s freedom of choice in refusal context depends on the presence of mental 
capacity: A “mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to 
medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even 
where that decision may lead to his or her own death”. The patient’s right to self-
determination depends on the patient’s state of mind: “The right to decide one's own 
fate presupposes a capacity to do so” (p.433).  
 
The emphasis on freedom of choice and self-determination emerges from a basic 
concern to preserve the patient’s right to be protected from unwanted bodily 
invasions. The Court of Appeal juxtaposes (p.432) for the first time two legal 
propositions which had been independently established in the case law. Firstly, the 
court affirms the proposition established in Re F (1990) that non-consensual physical 
invasions may amount to criminal or unlawful behaviour: “it is a criminal and 
tortious assault to perform physically invasive medical treatment, however minimal 
the invasion might be, without the patient's consent”.  Secondly, the stress on the 
patient’s right to bodily integrity is reinforced by the principle drawn from Sidaway 
(1985), and reiterated in Re T (1993), that a mentally capacitous patient has an 
unqualified right to decide. This freedom of choice, and right to self-determination is 
not compromised simply by the presence of mental disorder (pace Re C (1994)), or 
advanced pregnancy (contra the obiter suggestion in Re T (1993) a p.102G).  
 
The nature and scope of a heavily pregnant woman’s right to refuse potentially life-
sustaining (for both her and her foetus) medical treatment raises issues of bodily and 
intellectual autonomy. The conception of bodily integrity appears once in the 
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judgement in the context of a line of American case-law establishing the paramount 
rights of the pregnant woman over her foetus:   
 
a competent woman's choice to refuse medical advice 
to obtain a Caesarean section during pregnancy must 
be honoured, even in circumstances where choice may 
be harmful to her foetus because her rights to bodily 
integrity and religious liberty were not diminished 
during pregnancy.  
 
The case of Re MB (1997) is a vivid example of the way the court is required to 
develop a more complex concept of autonomy in order to address the ethically-
contentious question of pregnant women’s rights. The presence of a foetus raised the 
stark question whether the law was justified in undertaking a massive physical 
intrusion into the woman’s body in order to preserve not only the mother’s life but 
also that of her unborn child. Rights to freedom of choice, and self-determination, 
depend on the presence of mental capacity which supplies the intellectual condition 
for the protection of a person’s bodily integrity.  
 
4.4.2.3 Autonomy as identity and dignity: the case of Burke (2005) 
The claimant was a 44 year-old man, suffering from a fatally progressive neuro-
degenerative disease, cerebellar ataxia. He was concerned that that professional 
guidelines (General Medical Council, 2002) governing the withdrawal of potentially 
life-sustaining treatment, would give his treating clinicians discretion to discontinue 
life-support once he became insensate, or sensate, but unable to communicate his 
wishes to the contrary. He felt that the way the relevant provisions of that guidance 
were drafted were incompatible with several of his rights under the ECHR, in 
particular, Articles 2 (the right-to-life), 3 (protection against inhuman and degrading 
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treatment) and 8 the right to private-life) and would be unlawful under domestic law. 
He sought a court declaration to that effect by way of judicial review. In an 
unusually long and detailed judgment, the High Court upheld his challenge.  
 
The judgment uses the term autonomy forty-nine times, self-determination twenty-
six times, freedom of choice thirteen times, dignity seventy-four times, and physical 
integrity seventeen times. Though the judgement is long (225 paragraphs), the sheer 
number of references to autonomy and autonomy-related concepts represents a step-
change from previous law. The court acknowledges that the concept of autonomy 
has become embedded in common law: “the personal autonomy which our law has 
now come to recognise” (p. 430F; cf. Chester (2005) at p. 163H). In a section headed 
“Autonomy and self-determination” (at pp.443E- 444E), the High Court rehearses a 
chain of legal authority establishing the autonomy’s bodily and intellectual 
dimensions. It quotes Schloendorff, the seminal American authority underlying both 
(p.443F).  
 
In an important section of the judgment (444F-451D), the court develops a concept 
of autonomy as identity and dignity. It takes into account ECtHR jurisprudence, 
starting with the decision in Pretty v. UK (p.444F-H).  This case is the first to 
identify an autonomy right with Article 8 of the ECHR which protects the right to 
“private life” or ‘privacy’:  
 
… the concept of “private life” is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can 
sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical 
and social identity … Article 8 also protects a right to 
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personal development, and the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world. Though no previous case has 
established as such any right to self- determination as 
being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the 
Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy 
is an important principle underlying the interpretation 
of its guarantees. 
 
The ECtHR goes on to add that the “very essence of the Convention is respect for 
human dignity and human freedom.”  
 
The court affirms the ethical value of bodily integrity, but extends this to include 
psychological integrity. The court associates psychological integrity with notions of 
mental health and stability.
18
 Mental health is treated as an aspect of moral integrity 
(p.446A-B), which is interpreted as the holistic treatment of a person as someone 
morally worthy of respect and security (p.446D). The concept of private life is 
extended still further to embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social 
identity. The meaning of this is not explained at any great length in Burke, but it 
implies that social conditions have an impact on the formation of individual identity 
and personality.
19
  
 
The conception of dignity is of great significance in Burke. It is regarded, at the very 
least, as a notion closely associated with the concept of autonomy, protected by 
                                                                                       
 
18 Bensaid v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205.  
19 The background to the meaning of integrity and identity can be found in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
that informed the court in Pretty. The gist of this background law is that autonomy can never be 
private in a strongly negative sense, but that autonomy has a public dimension which the right to 
“private life” encompasses.  
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common law and the ECHR. At common law, it is regarded as an ‘intrinsic value’ 
pertaining to the whole person (p.443C), “a solemn affirmation of the law's and of 
society's recognition of our humanity and of human dignity as something 
fundamental” (p.444F-H). Dignity is regarded as immanent within the provisions of 
Article 8 and therefore also an aspect of an expansive definition of ‘private life’:’ 
personal autonomy and dignity are both aspects of the “private life” respect for 
which is guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention’ (p.445F). The High Court states 
(at.p.443F-H): 
 
The recognition and protection of human dignity is one 
of the core values — in truth the core value — of our 
society and, indeed, of all the societies which are part 
of the European family of nations and which have 
embraced the principles of the Convention. It is a core 
value of the common law, long pre-dating the 
Convention. 
 
The court affirms that the notion of dignity is under-determined by freedom of action 
and choice. It needs to be used to “to promote respect for the inherent dignity of all 
human beings but especially those who are most vulnerable to having that dignity 
ignored” (p. 451C-D).  
 
4.4.3 Conclusion to section 
The empirical analysis of the law reports in Chapter 3 show that there are various 
elemental uses of autonomy in the law reports which the judiciary use in intuitive 
and fluid ways and that there is an association between judicial and academic usage. 
The meaning and interpretation judges give to their usage of autonomy has been 
explored in this chapter and shown that they have initially differentiated their 
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interpretations to describe elemental concepts of autonomy as the autonomy of body, 
mind and identity. It is contended that the description of autonomy as identity is 
tending towards an integrated concept of autonomy that is beginning to be expressed 
in terms which approximate the notion of the capability of the person.  
 
It can be seen, with reference to Figure 4.3 that autonomy not only has values and 
purposes, but also conditions..  The values of autonomy are largely represented by its 
elemental uses, what autonomy in its elemental sense is. The purposes of autonomy 
pertain to particular theories of autonomy expressing why autonomy is valued which, 
in turn finds its basis in some particular conceptualisation of the person, e.g. as body, 
mind, or identity. Most of autonomy’s elemental uses can be aggregated to some 
particular dimension of the human person which has invited emphasis on some 
aspect of the philosophical tradition. It can further be seen that most of these theories 
of autonomy that underpin its purposes tend to be partial taking a one-sided view of 
the human person and the tradition of freedom. It is proposed that the elements of 
autonomy – its values, purposes, conditions – need to be taken as an interconnected 
whole.  Such an inter-dependent model, or theory, of autonomy would allow a 
critique of each, or both, traditions of freedom. It is suggested that a theory of 
‘capability’ may represent a promising candidate for such an interdependent model.  
 
4.4.4 Towards a theory of autonomy as capability 
Over the last twenty-five years, Capability Theory (CT) has emerged as a powerful 
analytical framework for understanding the nature of human liberty, autonomy, and 
freedom. It has emerged within the context of development and theoretical 
economics (e.g. Sen, 1995; 1999; 2009), and, latterly, political philosophy (e.g. 
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Nussbaum, 2000; 2006; 2011). On this view, freedom is not simply freedom from 
constraint (as in the Hobbesian tradition), or exemplifying a rational or psychological 
ideal (in the Kantian tradition), but actually having the social, economic, political 
and material conditions necessary for achieving freedom (as in the Marxian 
perspective). Capability theorists hold in common that freedom rights cannot be 
exercised outside the polity which either affords or denies the necessary capabilities. 
Paraphrasing Sen (1999), true freedom means having rights to do or be what one has 
reason to value. 
 
CT employs a technical vocabulary which defines the meaning of ‘capability’. Sen 
(1999) distinguishes ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’: functionings are the goals or 
things that a person might value doing or being. Capabilities are related to the 
freedom a person actually has to pursue or to realise what they value. Building on 
Sen, Nussbaum (2011) distinguishes ‘innate’, ‘internal’ and ‘combined’ capabilities. 
Innate capabilities are undeveloped capabilities which require cultivation and 
maturation. Internal capabilities are matured capabilities which are ready to be 
employed. Combined capabilities are internal capabilities which supporting 
conditions have enabled.  
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Figure 4.3  Towards a theory of autonomy 
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Nussbaum’s concept of innate and internal capabilities broadly corresponds with 
Sen’s functionings, and, indeed, Nussbaum uses the term in these senses. Sen’s 
capabilities are Nussbaum’s combined capabilities:  “the totality of opportunities she 
has for choice and action in her specific political, social and economic situation” 
(2011: 21). These are “trained or developed traits and abilities, developed in most 
cases, in interaction with the social, economic, familial and political environment.” 
Nussbaum (2001; 2011) identifies ten central capabilities to which a person should 
be entitled in order to live a life of dignity. These encompass bodily (e.g. bodily 
integrity), intellectual (e.g. practical reason) and identity (e.g. imagination, emotion, 
play) dimensions. Nussbaum challenges the enlightenment construction of 
personhood articulated by Kant  who establishes reason and rationality as the 
defining features of personhood and the status of person’s as ‘ends-in-themselves’. 
She also challenges Mill’s privative theory of liberty restricts state intervention to the 
confines of the ‘harm principle’. For Nussbaum, substantive freedom involves a 
combination of personal abilities and supporting social and political conditions. 
 
 In Sen and Nussbaum, the relationship between liberty, autonomy, freedom and 
capability is left rather vague. It is never clear what the principal category is in 
relation to which the others must be brought into systematic relation. Liberty seems 
to be construed mainly as negative liberty. However, Nussbaum (2011) argues that 
the idea of negative liberty is incoherent because the liberty to do or to be something 
is by definition positive because they require the inhibition of interference by others. 
This echoes the point made by Skinner above in the context of his discussion of civic 
republicanism. The same point is powerfully made in the legal context by Fredman 
(2008) who points out that even the most ‘negative’ of civil and political rights 
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protected by the ECHR require state guarantee, e.g. rights of access to justice under 
Article 6. Sen, in contrast, argues that negative liberty has both instrumental and 
intrinsic value and that, with regard to the latter, violation of another’s negative 
liberty involves a failure of moral agency on the part of the perpetrator.  
 
The dividing line between ‘capacity’ and ‘capability’ is also left unclear. In Sen, 
‘functionings’ is a broad concept which could encompass the notion of capacity if 
understood in Nussbaum’s terms as internal capability. Nussbaum’s concept of 
innate capability might also connote some form of more limited capacity. The 
concept of functionings might therefore embrace the concept of ‘positive’ liberty in 
the sense that Berlin (1969) and Taylor (1985) might give it to the extent that it 
encompasses the notion of sufficient capacity to amount to agency. Castillo (2009) 
argues that autonomy involves both agency and structure. She equates agency with 
Nussbaum’s concept of internal capabilities, “being able to make reasoned choices 
and act accordingly”, while autonomy is the equivalent of combined capabilities, 
“…being able to make reasoned choices in significant matters, authentically 
motivated” (2009: 8). 
 
The transformation of agency into autonomy requires multi-levelled structural 
support in the form of natural, material, social and political resources and 
entitlements. These involve legal and regulatory contexts, economic, social and 
political relationships, and organisations.  Castillo identifies two forms of autonomy: 
‘basic’ and ‘critical’. Basic autonomy requires “an adequate level of competence and 
realisation of human potentials” and critical autonomy involves “a critical level of 
competence, multi-cultural knowledge and political freedom” (2009: 9). Thus 
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autonomy is more than negative liberty, but agency, and the presence of structural 
conditions that enable the agent to realise their valued functionings.  
 
Claasen (2010), like Castillo, argues that CT should promote autonomy by attending 
to the cultivation and realisation of those capabilities that contribute to it. Unlike 
Castillo, however, he takes issue with the inherent perfectionism of Nussbaum’s 
approach. He argues that her ‘primary good’ interpretation of her list of central 
capabilities is too ‘thick’ to remain politically uncontroversial and seeks to offer a 
minimally perfectionist, politically less controversial version of CT. He claims to 
offer this by seeking to inform Nussbaum’s list with further autonomy-developing 
capabilities, and making it sufficiently determinate by drawing upon Feinberg’s 
(1986) widely-anthologised distinction between four meanings of autonomy: (i) the 
capacity for self-government; (ii) actual self-government; (iii) autonomy as an ideal 
of character’ and (iv)the sovereign right to govern oneself.  
 
According to Claasen, the capacity for self-government requires (i) the capacity to 
form and revise one’s plan of life; and (ii) the capacity to realise this plan in one’s 
actions. Drawing, with slight modifications, on Raz (1986), Claasen identifies three 
conditions for autonomy: (i) personal, including cognitive, emotional and volitional, 
conditions; (2) independence; and (iii) an adequate range of options. The first two 
conditions are treated as basic capabilities which constitute citizen entitlements to be 
guaranteed by the state, while the third is a secondary capability, which the state is 
not required to guarantee, though it may have a direct responsibility to make citizens 
aware of an adequate range of options. This itself depends on the “spontaneous 
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processes of economic life’, rather than the direct involvement of the political 
authorities (2010: 12).  
 
Claasen then attempts to translate the two limbs of self-government (or autonomy) 
into a list of primary capabilities (to supplement Nussbaum’s own list) and to this 
end draws on Rawls’ list of primary goods which were proposed “to enable people to 
live a life of their own choosing” (2010: 14). These include: (i) basic rights and 
liberties; (ii) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; (iii) powers and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; (iv) income and 
wealth; and (v) the social bases of self-respect. While the first three of Rawls’ 
primary goods are easily translated into Nussbaum’s list of fundamental 
entitlements, especially her tenth (control over one’s material and political 
environment), the other two are less so. Claasen jettisons the fifth. But he expands 
the fourth into a broader concept of “capability for economic security” (2010: 16). 
This encompasses the modicum of income and wealth necessary for ‘independence’ 
(in Raz’s terms), but is extended to incorporate the personal, and political difficulties 
that threaten independence, e.g. in the workplace. Claasen adds two further primary 
goods (or now capabilities) to Rawls’ list: healthcare and education – which in 
combination with the others is subject to the relevant distribution rule which accepts 
that autonomy may admit of degrees beyond a minimum threshold.  
 
4.5 AUTONOMY AND THE TWO TRADITIONS OF FREEDOM 
 
Reflection upon the values, purposes, and conditions, for achieving autonomy 
involves recognition that “the effective pursuit of personal autonomy requires forms 
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of legal, political, and moral autonomy as well” (Baynes, 2009: 552). As Figure 4.4 
illustrates, the values of autonomy pertain to the concept of the person – what is it 
about the person which is valued. Is it, for example, the bodily, intellectual or 
identity dimension? The purposes of autonomy (why autonomy should be protected, 
upheld or promoted) refer to the concept of moral order which will be dealt with in 
this section. Is the purpose of autonomy to promote individual rights, or to bring 
about personal self-realisation? Reflection on the conditions of autonomy (how 
autonomy can be protected, upheld or promoted) brings to the fore fundamental 
political questions relating to the kind of freedom the State is called upon to promote 
or refrain from hindering.  
 
There is a fundamental distinction in contemporary moral philosophy and ethics 
between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’. (See Figure 4.4) The ‘good’ can be construed as 
the morally positive goal to be achieved through our acts. The right, in contrast, is 
principally concerned with rules, laws, or moral norms, which constrain pursuit of 
the good.  
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Figure 4.4  The values, purposes and conditions of autonomy 
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In contemporary moral philosophy, this distinction between ‘good’ and ‘right’ is 
often related to three others: (1) between means and ends: (2) between substantive 
and procedural notions of ethics; and (3) between perfectionist and non-perfectionist 
accounts of ethic. The legal and moral philosophies of Dworkin (1993) and Raz 
(1986) provide an illuminating contrast. Both construe autonomy as self-creation, or 
self-authorship. While Dworkin interprets autonomy within a theoretical framework 
that prioritises the ‘right’ over the ‘good’, Raz insists that “autonomy is only 
valuable if exercised in pursuit of the good” (1986: 381). 
 
Dworkin holds that autonomy is inherently good, regardless of the moral quality of 
the choice actually made. This because it allows individuals to shape their lives out 
of their own distinctive personalities: “[r]ecognising an individual right of autonomy 
makes self-creation possible” (Dworkin, 1993: 224). Because self-creating choices 
are intrinsically valuable, the state should not intervene simply because it believes 
the choices immoral, remaining neutral between competing conceptions of the good. 
Raz agrees with Dworkin that autonomy is (at least in part) the basis of self-
authorship. He defines autonomy as: 
 
…the thought that what we are is, in significant 
respects, what we become through successive choices 
during our lives, that our lives are a continuous process 
of self-creation (Raz 1994: 104). 
 
 However, in contrast to Dworkin, Raz contends that in order to be autonomous, or 
self-authoring, one must not only be free to make uncoerced choices, but also have 
an adequate range of options to choose from. Because the value of autonomy lies in 
its forming part of leading a good worthwhile and flourishing life, freedom of self-
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creating choice does not extend to making bad choices. An autonomous life “is 
valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects and 
relationships” (1986: 330). So it is no abrogation of autonomy in restricting an 
individual’s actions in order (pace Mill) to prevent harm to others, or even to the 
individual himself.  
 
In the academic medico-legal context, very few, if any, commentators advocate the 
value of mere, sheer, choice, consistent with certain theories of the market. For 
Montgomery (2006), giving value to choice simpliciter is ultimately incoherent 
because it would “[undermine] the creation of a value system by presenting choices 
over time as unconnected with each other and encouraging arbitrariness rather than 
consistency”(2006: 186). Academic medical lawyers have usually explicated the 
value of autonomy in terms of a person’s capacity to pursue, or realise, a ‘life-plan’, 
or living according to one’s own system of values. Jackson (2001: 2) states that “the 
liberal notion that an individual’s life may be enriched by her capacity to direct the 
course of her life according to her own values.”  McLean (2010) offers a non-
perfectionist, and ‘negative’, account of choice roughly along Millian lines. She 
holds that in the interests of personal self-respect and self-development, an 
individual’s private behaviour should not be subject to societal scrutiny, unless it is 
calculated to produce harm to others, in which case, outside intervention to prevent 
that harm becomes legitimate.  
 
Donnelly (2011), while acknowledging Mill’s philosophy as highly influential, has 
argued that that the negative liberty approach to autonomy and freedom has under-
determined the true character of autonomous agency. She advocates, following Raz, 
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a notion of autonomy as empowerment. In her view, the development of the law has 
proceeded too individualistically, insufficiently attuned to the concrete realities of 
healthcare decision-making and the impact of the social context and the values of 
responsibility and trust. Autonomy, therefore, is best seen as “a kind of 
achievement” (Donnelly, 2010: 41). There are ‘positive’ obligations to build and 
develop agency and to deliver adequate choice. It is perfectionist in a way in which 
traditional liberalism is not, in that it contends that the state (and the law) has a role 
in developing individual autonomy and facilitating individual empowerment. 
Donnelly goes on to make the important observation that the ECtHR may be the 
harbinger of a “jurisprudence of positive rights” (2011: 271), underscoring the duty 
of the state to supply enabling conditions for the cultivation, and exercise, of 
autonomy.  
 
The presence of a perfectionist ethics driving judicial determinations in medical law 
cases is implicit in Veitch’s identification of a disjunction between judicial rhetoric 
and reality in the earlier discussion. According to Veitch, the judiciary is claiming to 
employ a value-neutral, cognitive test of legal competence, which allegedly takes no 
account of the reason’s patients give for their decisions (i.e. a non-perfectionist 
ethic). In practice, however, a form of judicial ‘perfectionism’ is being brought into 
play through the manipulation of the malleable element of the capacity criteria in 
order to achieve the desired outcome.  
 
The debate over the nature, and scope, of individual autonomy is, at heart, an inquiry 
into the very character of human freedom, one of the most highly contested areas in 
political philosophy. Judgements concerning the values, purposes and conditions of 
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autonomy will vary according to the particular theory of freedom being considered. 
Berlin (1969) famously distinguished ‘two concepts of liberty’: negative liberty; and 
positive liberty. The former was a development of the Hobbesian tradition which 
identifies freedom with the absence of physical, legal and political constraints which 
would otherwise hinder the moral agent in the fulfilment of her will. Hobbes stated 
that “liberty or freedom signifies (properly) the absence of opposition” and, 
similarly, Locke, that “liberty consists in a power to do nor not to do; to do or 
forbear doing as we will.”  The latter Berlin identifies with ‘self-mastery’, to be self-
dependent in life and choice, rather than dependent, to be self-directed, rather than 
directed by others. The concepts of negative and positive liberty, broadly correspond 
with Taylor’s (1985) distinction between ‘opportunity’ and ‘exercise’ concepts of 
freedom, ‘freedom-from’ and ‘freedom-to’.  
 
Taylor (1985) argues that for a person to be free in any meaningful sense, he must 
enjoy not only the absence of external obstacles (i.e. negative liberty), but also the 
internal motivational fetters which hinder the pursuit of his important purposes. The 
identification of these purposes is not a task that can be advanced in isolation but 
only with the support and enabling conditions supplied in the public sphere. Freedom 
requires a positive definition, for the journey to self-realisation cannot be undertaken 
solitarily but only within the framework of institutional structures that make the 
journey possible in the first place. Accordingly, self-determination and self-
realisation presuppose a range of opportunity and exercise conceptions of autonomy.  
Skinner (2002), in his critique of Berlin, argues that the heart of positive liberty is in 
self-realisation: “the freedom of human agents’ consists in their having managed 
most fully to become themselves” (2002: 16).  
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The meaning of the concept of autonomy varies within the frameworks of different 
theories of freedom. For example, the bioethicists, Gaylin & Jennings (2003) and 
Beauchamp & Childress (2009) distinguish liberty and autonomy, the former 
pertaining to negative liberty, and the latter to agency, which presupposes 
conceptions of positive liberty. Elsewhere, autonomy and liberty are used 
synonymously.  Nelson (2005) argues that the distinction between negative and 
positive liberty is “one concept too many”, and that all freedom-talk entail absences 
of constraint. The only relevant distinction is between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ liberty, 
which relates only to the degree of specificity with which those constraints are 
defined, e.g. constraints on movement (narrow) as opposed to constraints on my self-
realisation (broad). What is of relevance is not the distinction between negative and 
positive liberty, but rather “the substantially different claims about the ends of 
human life, the character of human beings and the elements that can constraint 
us”(2005: 73-4).  
 
Skinner (1984) has observed that a number of contemporary negative liberty 
theorists, influenced by the Hobbesian tradition, have maintained that a theory of 
negative liberty is tantamount to a theory of individual rights. Skinner, with 
reference to the tradition of neo-republican thought (of which Machiavelli was an 
exemplar), contends that this is a wholly unrealistic construction of freedom and a 
corruption of citizenship: 
 
 …the prudent citizen recognises that, whatever the 
extent of negative liberty he may enjoy, it can only be 
the outcome – if you like the reward of – a steady 
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recognition and pursuit of the public good at the 
expense of purely individual and private ends (1984: 
218).   
 
The civic structure, and the cultivation of civic virtues, is the indispensable condition 
for the attainment of private ends, or interests, or individual rights at all. Thus, even 
if there were legal and political support for the most extreme versions of negative 
liberty, some form of governance, is required.  This would, in the modern democratic 
polity, also entail various positive rights for citizens, requiring action from the state, 
e.g. education to help new skills, physiotherapy to help one walk again, various 
forms of welfare assistance that raise a person out of poverty etc. (see also O’Shea, 
2008).   
 
In the medical law context, most of the rights protected by the courts, statute, and 
human rights are negative, non-interference rights (Feldman, 2002; Herring, 2010).  
In Hohfeldian terms, the law mainly protects ‘liberty –‘rather than ‘claim-rights’ 
(Hohfeld, 1913). The most obvious form of negative liberty rights in law relate to 
rights of freedom from interference, e.g. civil and criminal laws against non-
consensual touching, save de minimis, and, in the healthcare context, the right of 
adult competent patients to refuse all and any medical treatment, the medico-legal 
form of negative autonomy right. However, according to Donnelly (2011), there has 
been little analysis of ‘negative liberty’ autonomy at the level of principle, which has 
resulted in a superficial treatment of the questions of the right’s limits and the nature 
of autonomy.  
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This lack of analysis is especially relevant to the characterisation of the rights and 
duties pertaining to the consent procedures which ‘operationalise’ individual 
autonomy. Manson and O’Neill (2007), Maclean (2009), and Donnelly (2011) have 
each taken issue with the “take-it-or-leave-it’ dynamic between doctor and patient. 
Manson and O’Neill (2007) distinguish the current approach to consent in which 
healthcare practitioners assume that they have discharged their legal obligations once 
they have conveyed the relevant parcel of information to the patient, thus obviating 
the genuine communicative interaction necessary for adequate understanding of the 
treatment being proposed. They advocate an agency model of communication which 
“locates informed consent in communicative transactions between agents” (2007: 
69). Maclean (2009) has also joined the search for a more ‘relational’ model of 
consent, distinguishing ‘consent-as-agreement’ from ‘consent-as-permission’ (2009: 
112), implying a genuine meeting of minds, rather than the mere transfer of 
information. Donnelly argues that a “liberal account of autonomy fails to recognise 
the relational nature of capacity and the practical and normative consequences of the 
epistemological fallibility of capacity assessment” (2011:130).  
 
Notwithstanding these critiques of the liberal stress on non-interference in the 
treatment refusal context, Donnelly (2011) observes that there is evidence in statute 
and the European human rights jurisprudence of a growing emphasis on positive 
rights. For example, in spite of the fact that the Mental Capacity Act 2005  
perpetuates the liberal principle that a competent adult patient may refuse treatment 
for any, or no, reason, it is notable for the emphasis it places on optimising the 
circumstances in which otherwise incompetent patients may exercise choice, a form 
of positive right. This requires sensitivity on the part of healthcare practitioners, and, 
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in the case of vulnerable adults, carers, to the relational and institutional context 
within which decisions are made and the factors which may be conspiring to prevent 
the possibility of autonomous choice.  
 
Donnelly (2011), along with Marshall (2008), has also drawn attention to 
developments in European human rights jurisprudence which place obligations on 
the State to take steps to protect individuals. A number of cases
20
 have suggested that 
the protection of an individual’s privacy right under Article 8 could entail the 
imposition of positive obligations by the state. Marshall (2008) has argued that the 
courts have begun to read autonomy rights out of Article 8 which are not restricted to 
the protection of individual rights of non-interference, but also rights to personal 
identity and recognition rights which require the state to take active steps to secure 
them, e.g. changing the law to recognise the changed gender status of post-operative 
transsexuals.  
 
Following the analysis of the discourse of autonomy in the literature, I propose to 
draw a clear distinction between liberty, freedom, and autonomy. The concept of 
liberty is assimilated to its ‘negative’ construction, notwithstanding that Berlin 
(1969) distinguishes it from ‘positive’ liberty, which he associates with conceptions 
of self-mastery and self-control. The medico-legal and bioethical literature often 
distinguishes liberty, meaning freedom from constraint, from agency, which broadly 
connotes a person’s physical and psychological efficacy (Jennings, 1998; 
                                                                                       
 
20 X and Y v. The Netherlands (1986) 8ECRR 235; Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35EHRR 1; 
Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35EHRR 447; and Tysiac v. Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42.  
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Beauchamp and Childress, 2009). The distinction between liberty and freedom has 
been explored in depth by Arendt (1973), whose analysis of the history of political 
ideas, identifies liberty with the Hobbesian tradition “whose fruits are the absence of 
restraint and possession of ‘the power of locomotion” (1973: 32). Freedom, in 
contrast, while presupposing the absence of restraint, is construed as the portal to 
political life. It is “participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm” 
(1973:32). Arendt’s conceptual distinction is similar to the one to which attention 
was drawn in the Chapter 1 between the permissive character of ‘civil liberties’ and 
the prescriptive character of positive ‘human rights’. 
 
In this thesis, autonomy as ‘capability’ presupposes liberty, and embraces the 
expansive ‘positive’ concept of freedom. Autonomy understood in this sense 
provides a potentially powerful conceptual basis for a legal concept of (decision-
making) capability rather than capacity simpliciter, which would assume the 
presence of the components of freedom – decision-making ability, decision-making 
supports, and the reasonable accommodations of third-parties, i.e. goods and 
services. This chapter has established that ‘capability’ is a paradigm tradition of 
autonomy potentially to rival the dominance of other paradigmatic traditions of 
autonomy derived from Hobbes, Kant and Mill. It is a journey that has progressed in 
stages. Firstly, the investigation into the academic literature  as a possible source of 
influence on judicial decision-making in complex medical law cases has ascertained 
that a wide variety of elemental meanings are assigned to the concept of autonomy in 
the academic literature.  This finding reflects the academy’s own perception that 
academic usage of the autonomy concept is largely intuitive and under-theorised. 
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The investigation disclosed that this raft of elemental meanings, or conceptions, of 
autonomy was principally centred on the concept of the person, or ‘self’.  
 
This finding was the point of departure for the second, more conceptual, stage of 
investigation. On closer inspection of the various elemental meanings assigned to 
autonomy in the literature, it was determined that they tended to converge on the 
human ‘self’ in three principal dimensions of body, mind and identity, representing 
different values, purposes, and conditions, and informed by two principal concepts of 
liberty, or freedom, styled positive and negative liberty, or ‘freedom-from’, or 
‘freedom-to’. Further reflection on these two senses of liberty and/or freedom led to 
a realisation that these two concepts represented distinct ‘traditions’ of 
liberty/freedom and that the different theories of autonomy which make up the 
philosophical heritage develop according to traditions which are partial and take a 
one-sided perspective. 
 
This led to the third stage of the investigation which enquired whether there existed, 
or could be constructed, an interdependent model or theory of autonomy that could 
allow a critique of each or both theoretical traditions. This led to the consideration of 
a capability approach to autonomy which offers the possibility of a reconciliation of 
autonomy’s otherwise disaggregated values, purposes and conditions, and the two 
traditions of freedom: freedom-from and freedom to. This led, fourthly, to the 
distillation of the function of this chapter for the next part of this thesis, how 
freedom can be deconstructed into analysable elements for research and what 
strategy of investigation is required to interrogate them in the medical law reports.  
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4.6 CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS TO HERMENEUTICAL 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
The discovery of the role of philosophical traditions of freedom in the use and 
interpretation of autonomy, together with the recognition drawn from the 
background reading in Chapter 1, about the potential  clash between traditions of law 
point to the need for a further cycle of enquiry to investigate the influence of 
traditions on the practice of judicial decision-making. The hypothesis is that these 
philosophical and legal traditions are informed by traditions of moral and political 
order. Textual analysis is insufficient to establish whether these philosophical and 
legal traditions are present in the practice of judicial decision-making. While it has 
helped to deepen understanding of the concepts of autonomy by providing tools to 
explore its layered discourses, it is ill-equipped to uncover the material, structural 
relations between the concepts, discourses and practices of the judiciary in their 
determinations in ethically-contentious medical law cases. Thus, there is need to 
return to the law reports using a strategy of investigating the inferential relations 
between concept, discourse and practice, as well as mapping and contextualising the 
cases over time in order to reveal the  influence of policy and politics. It is to this 
third and final level of enquiry and discovery that the next two chapters are devoted.  
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE THIRD CYCLE OF CRITICAL REALIST ENQUIRY: 
ANALYSING DIMENSIONS OF INFLUENCE AND THE 
TRADITIONS 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the strategy for developing a critical realist analysis designed to 
interpret whether there are structures that may underlie the data of the law reports 
will be set out. This will be followed by a synchronic and diachronic analysis of the 
underlying structures of variation in the use of autonomy of autonomy in the law 
reports. This analysis will be followed in the next section with the development of a 
framework for analysing the concept of tradition and its application to judicial 
decision-making in ethically-contentious medical cases. In this connection, the work 
of MacIntyre (1981; 1988; 1990) - who has provided a sophisticated theoretical 
concept of tradition – and Brandom (1994) – who has developed a set of analytical 
tools to investigate the claims and sentences expressed in discursive traditions – will 
be set out. This will lead on in the next chapter to the application of the framework 
of analysis and the tools derived from both to assess whether judicial use of 
autonomy has been influenced by tradition.  
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5.2 THE STRATEGY OF INVESTIGATION 
 
The need for a need to develop a critical realist analysis of the data to determine the 
presence of underlying structures in the medical jurisprudence was driven by the 
limitations of empiricism (which provides descriptive data without understanding or 
explanation) and hermeneutics (which provides understanding but no explanation). 
Philosophically, the strategy of investigation is constructed on the basis of 
materialist understanding of social reality and a realist approach towards the problem 
of acquiring knowledge of that reality. Employing a critical realist strategy which 
combines the materialist and realist solutions to the problem of understanding of the 
social world, the construction and investigation of a distinctive data base of law 
reports proceeded on the critical realist assumption that what could be observed 
would need to be explained in terms of underlying structures of material relations.  
 
The feasibility of theory-neutral observation of the social world associated with 
purely empiricist views of grounded theory have been subjected to widespread 
criticism on theoretical and practical grounds (Bulmer, 1979; Bryman, 2004). The 
motivational impulse for the research mentality and process is difficult to understand 
without conceptual and theorised awareness of the world within which the researcher 
‘lives and moves and has her being’. The task for the researcher is to make the 
presuppositions explicit. It is accepted amongst qualitative researchers that grounded 
theory does not supply researchers with an algorithm guaranteeing robust theoretical 
outcomes, but a set of procedures which may be flexibly used within the constraint 
of keeping theory related to data. Following Bryman’s processual account of 
practice, concepts and categories do not readily emerge, but come from dialectic 
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between researcher and the field of investigation, processual analysis informing data 
collection and shaping the direction of research. This account captures the nature of 
the interaction between the researcher, the law reports (the primary data base) and 
background reading in academic law, bioethics and political philosophy (the 
secondary data base) and how the researcher was led towards deeper analysis of the 
law reports. 
 
The substantialist argues that the structures which underlie experience are real 
phenomena, not just conceptual labels, and rejects the empiricist view that reality is 
given to experience. As Johnson et al. observe:  
 
Science is not, for the substantialist, the mere 
accumulation of empirical factors. Science goes 
beyond the observation that things are related to one 
another in a regular fashion, for such knowledge 
merely describes an existing state of affairs, which 
must, in turn, be explained (Johnson et al., 1984: 116). 
 
It is the task of research to investigate and disclose underlying structures which 
explain the regularities of experience. For the substantialist, knowledge of the 
underlying realities can only be gained by attempting to understand the structures 
which are not observable and to construct hypotheses to explain the relationship 
between structure and experience. Thus, the effort to make sense of the regularities 
of particular usages, and understandings of autonomy in the law reports and the 
academy (the first research object) has led to the hypothesis that legal (second 
research object), moral and political (third research object) traditions underlie and 
explain these regularities.  
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Contemporary critical realists, working across a range of disciplines, have further 
developed the substantialist position: in theology (Wright, 1992); philosophy 
(Collier, 1994); sociology (Archer, 1995); law (Norrie, 2010); and philosophy of 
science (Bhaskar, 2008). This approach is committed to the proposition that all 
knowledge of the social world is theory-laden and eschews the relativist claim that 
because knowledge of the underlying structures of reality cannot be verified they 
cannot exist. As a counter to the epistemic fallacy, Bhaskar , cited in Archer et al.  
(2004), has drawn a distinction between the world’s transitive and intransitive 
dimensions, between “our beliefs and knowledge claims about the world’ and ‘what 
the world is actually like apart from us” (Archer, et al., 2004: 2). Knowledge in the 
transitive dimension is a “social’ product which is in a constant process of 
development, revision and change, but is nevertheless knowledge of an intransitive 
object.” Critical realism affirms that there is an objective material world which exists 
independently of our thoughts about it, and which our thoughts can in principle 
grasp. 
 
The dynamic methodology of grounded theory, focussing as it does on the 
interactive relationship between researcher and the data is well-equipped to research 
the hidden material structures proposed by substantialism and critical realism. 
Grounded theory can provide, it is proposed, the methodology required by critical 
realism. Within this critical realist framework, grounded theory’s processual 
approach is well-equipped to build up, in the transitive dimension, a knowledge-base 
of its material object(s), iteratively, developmentally, and subject to constant 
revision. The truth about the material world is yielded through the researcher’s 
critical engagement with the world, i.e. the data, rather than through passive receipt 
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of sense impressions from objective reality (empiricism), or as the construction of 
the social world as the outcome of the interpretative activities of individuals 
(subjectivism), or through that reality’s construction in thought (rationalism). The 
test of the truth of knowledge of the world acquired through theoretical sampling and 
data collection is its capacity to generate effective action, namely ongoing fruitful 
engagement of researcher and social world. 
 
Thus, an empiricist view of grounded theory which presupposes that the social world 
can be directly reflected in the senses of the observer atheoretically is rejected as 
academically untenable and practically unrealistic. Rather, grounded theory was 
developed not to advance empiricism as the truth about the world and the physical 
senses as the criteria of validity, but rather in reaction to a brand of rationalism that 
threatened to assimilate the nature of social reality to logic and the structures of the 
human mind obviating engagement with the real world. The power of a substantialist 
approach to grounded theory is that it abjures the passive orientation of the 
researcher to the world, redolent of the empiricist approach, giving him instead a 
central role requiring continuous interaction between the interpretive activity of the 
researcher and the data. This approach rejects the imposition of a given theory to 
provide a predetermined explanation and interpretation of the data, but allows theory 
to emerge from an analysis which is unique, or tailored, to the enquiry in hand and 
its specific data, and avoids the fiction of atheoretical enquiry into the social world. 
 
The discussion now proceeds to develop a first stage of analysis to examine the 
potential underlying dimensions that explain why judges might use and interpret 
autonomy in complex medical cases. 
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5.3. PROXIMATE PATTERNS OF VARIATION IN THE LAW REPORTS 
 
The discussion in this section will take place in two parts. Firstly, it will examine 
dimensions of potential variation in the law reports. Secondly, it will examine 
variation in use of autonomy over time (diachronic analysis). 
 
5.3.1 Dimensions of variation (synchronic analysis)  
In this section, the dimension of potential variation will be considered by type of 
case, by nature of case, by judge and between levels of the court hierarchy.  
 
5.3.1.1 Variation by type of case  
The first dimension to be analysed is the potential influence of the type of case on 
judges’ use of autonomy. Does the judge in one type of case give a different 
interpretation and use of autonomy than if the same judge were hearing a different 
type of case? The cases suggest that there can be such an association between case-
type and the language of autonomy being used. It is proposed that judges, broadly 
speaking, do differ in their interpretation and use of autonomy in relation to three 
types of case: firstly, cases concerning patients who are cognitively under-developed 
or impaired; secondly, cases relating to patients whose capacity to consent or refuse 
medical treatment is in dispute; and thirdly, cases relating to patients who are clearly 
capable of making a legally-valid treatment decision but who, for legal reasons, are 
not able to realise their choices.  
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5.3.1.1.1 Cognitively-impaired or underdeveloped patients 
In cases involving patients who are unable to express a legally-valid treatment 
choice, either because they are too young to do so, or because they are cognitively 
impaired, the meaning the courts have assigned to autonomy is typically its 
overriding importance as bodily integrity. In Re A (2001), which concerned the 
lawfulness of separation surgery on infant conjoined twins, the concept of bodily 
inviolability (which is a dimension of integrity) is enunciated as a fundamental 
principle of medical law (p.176D-G). The Court of Appeal provides the first instance 
of the term ‘physical autonomy’ medical law reports (p.219B). Similarly, in Re F 
(1990), which concerned  whether a cognitively-impaired adult should be 
permanently sterilised on grounds of necessity, the Court of Appeal and House of 
Lords undertake extensive analyses of English assault law, in the course of which the 
term ‘bodily inviolability’ is coined (p.13F; cf. p.72E). Their reasoning is adopted in 
Bland (1993) (p.892B-D to which the Court of Appeal in Yearworth (2010)) refers as 
a case “making an elaborate series of rules for the protection of the body and bodily 
autonomy” (p.13G).  In Re M (2011), the High Court, in a case determining the 
lawfulness of withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment from a woman in a 
‘minimally-conscious state’ declares that “the right to personal autonomy, otherwise 
described as the right to physical and bodily integrity” is a right protected under 
Article 8 of the ECHR (para. 95).  
 
The courts focus on the concept of bodily inviolability, integrity and autonomy in 
cases where patients lack an intellectual dimension. It is noteworthy that notions of 
bodily inviolability and integrity seem to be gradually assimilated to a concept of 
bodily autonomy in the post-2000 cases.  
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5.3.1.1.2. Patients with ambiguous mental capacity 
The reports also reveal an association between case-type and meanings assigned to 
autonomy in relation to patients of ambiguous mental incapacity. In these cases, 
concerns about the precise state of the patient’s mind, have invited courts to 
determine criteria for mental incapacity and thus the scope of self-determination and 
freedom of choice. It is proposed that these can be regarded as forms of ‘intellectual 
autonomy’ which relate to the mental dimension of the ‘self’. Dworkin ( 1992) has 
coined the term ‘liberal individualism’ to refer to autonomy as an intellectual 
concept to which freedom of choice and self-determination are integral. In Re T 
(1993), which concerned the lawfulness of a potentially life-sustaining treatment 
refusal on supposedly religious grounds by a pregnant woman, the Court of Appeal 
declared that an adult patient with mental capacity had unqualified freedom to 
choose “notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent” (p.102E-F). The High Court, in the 
subsequent case of Re Z (2005), which concerned the scope of the right of a 
vulnerable woman with an incurable degenerative brain disease to travel abroad for 
an assisted suicide, explicitly refers to this seemingly untrammelled freedom to 
refuse, as an expression of “adult autonomy” (p.965G).  
 
This seemingly ‘absolutist’ approach to intellectual autonomy is dependent on the 
presence of mental capacity in the first place. The courts have developed law relating 
to mental capacity over the last twenty years. The law had held, rather vaguely, that 
to be deemed capable of giving valid consent to medical treatment, the patient 
needed to understand in broad terms the nature, purposes and consequences of the 
treatment being proposed (cf. Re C (1994), p.295C). Subsequently, the law has 
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clarified the degree of cognitive ability required to demonstrate understanding. In Re 
C (1994), which concerned a psychiatric patient’s right to refuse a potentially life-
saving leg amputation which the court concluded was fundamentally motivated by 
his personal values rather than his mental disorder, the High Court established a 
three stage analysis: “(1) to take in and retain treatment information, (2) to believe it 
and (3) to weigh that information, balancing risks and needs” (p.292E). This analysis 
was affirmed clarified, slightly amended, and deepened in the case of Re MB (1997), 
pp.433-4). In that case, the Court of Appeal declared that it would be lawful to 
perform a caesarean section on a woman who was non-compliant due to her ‘needle 
phobia’.  
 
The courts have determined a number of ‘capacity’ cases under the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (MCA). This has introduced a statutory ‘codification’ of the law governing 
mental capacity.  In keeping with the philosophy of the Act, the courts have read 
mental capacity in broader relational and institutional terms. In D Borough Council 
(2001), the court addressed the legal test to be applied in the case of a vulnerable 
adult as to capacity to consent to sexual relations. In Re A (2011), the court 
considered what level of capacity was required in the case of a cognitively-impaired 
adult woman who was refusing contraception. Both cases explicitly refer to section 
1(6) of the MCA which stipulates that acts done or decisions made on behalf a 
person who lacks capacity are to be “as effectively achieved in a way that is less 
restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom” (D Borough Council (2011), p.1264D-
E; Re A (2011), p.70C). The broader philosophy of the MCA is clearly articulated in 
Re A (2011) (pp. 86H- 87A): 
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The purpose, in respect of a capacitated but vulnerable 
adult, is to create a situation where he or she can 
receive outside help free of coercion, to enable him or 
her to weigh things up and decide freely what he or she 
wishes to do. In respect of an incapacitated adult, I 
consider the same should apply, except that the aim of 
providing him or her with relief from the coercion is 
first to gain capacity and, if achieved, then to enable 
him or her to reach a free decision. 
 
In these cases, it is suggested, concern with a person’s capacity and freedom to 
choose is matched by a corresponding concern with the provision of enabling 
conditions necessary to facilitate choice. 
 
5.3.1.1.3 Patients with uncompromised mental capacity 
Decisions under common law have established that, outside the scope of the mental 
health legislation, a competent patient has an unqualified right to refuse medical 
treatment. More recently, however, the domestic courts have been required to decide 
a number of cases under the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and to consider the scope of a person’s right to demand sub-optimal 
‘treatment’, including assisted suicide. Three cases, in particular (Pretty (2002); 
Burke (2005) and Purdy (2010)), have been decided under Article 8 (right to “private 
life”) which, following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Pretty v UK, includes a right to personal autonomy and self-determination. In this 
section, two cases, decided after the decision in Pretty v UK, have been singled out 
for special attention.  
 
In Burke (2005), a 44 year-old man, with a congenital degenerative brain condition 
that would eventually leave him unable to communicate with his doctors, sought a 
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court declaration that General Medical Council guidelines relating to the withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment did not represent an accurate summary of the law. The 
High Court gives (at p.445F-H) an extensive quotation from para. 61 of the 
judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Pretty, observing 
that:  
 
 …the concept of “private life” is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can 
sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical 
and social identity … Article 8 also protects a right to 
personal development, and the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world. Though no previous case has 
established as such any right to self-determination as 
being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the 
Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy 
is an important principle underlying the interpretation 
of its guarantees. 
 
 
The right to privacy “is not susceptible to exhaustive definition”. It covers physical 
and psychological identity, which is enlarged and extended to comprise “social 
identity” and “the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings and the outside world.” The High Court, drawing upon the authority of 
domestic and European jurisprudence,  further specifies the scope of the privacy, 
annexing to it all those features integral “to a person’s identity or ability to function 
socially as a person”, and without which personal identity, development and 
relationships would be compromised. Chief amongst these is the mental stability and 
mental health integral to a person’s “moral integrity”, which requires that she be 
approached and treated “holistically” and as “morally worthy of respect”.  
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The identification of an implicit autonomy right within the broader framework of the 
express privacy right would imply that autonomy is a manifestation, or constituent, 
of privacy and therefore a subordinate principle. To suggest otherwise is complicated 
by the courts’ failure to define autonomy’s conceptual relationship with other 
specified ethical values (e.g. self-determination) with which it is used either 
conjunctively or in close association. However, it is proposed that the court is not 
simply using autonomy as a correlate of these other values; personal autonomy is 
described, more fundamentally, as “an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of the Convention’s guarantees.” It can plausibly be argued that the 
court brings the concept of autonomy into an equal, and integral, relationship with 
the indubitably fundamental notions of dignity and freedom, which are stated 
explicitly to be “the very essence of the Convention” (p.445H).  
 
In Purdy (2010), the claimant sought judicial review of the Director of Public 
Prosecution’s (DPP) refusal to publish details of his prosecution policy in relation to 
assisted suicide. This, she argued infringed her rights under the ECHR, in particular 
her rights under Article 8. She succeeded on the narrow point that the UK’s assisted 
suicide law, though crystal clear on the face of it, was not sufficiently transparent for 
the purposes of European human rights law, because the prosecution policy was 
equivocal and insufficiently crime-specific. The case is legally important because the 
House of Lords affirmed, following the decision of the ECtHR in Pretty, that the 
claimant’s right of personal autonomy included a right to determine how and when 
she chose to die, thus supplying her with a human right to an assisted suicide. This 
right, however, was only prima facie, and subject to the qualifications contained in 
Article 8(2), in particular “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. The 
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UK’s ‘blanket ban’ on assisted suicide was legitimate provided that it complied with 
the ‘proportionality’ requirements of European human rights law, with regard to 
‘accessibility’ and ‘foreseeability’.  
 
The House of Lords (Lord Brown) affirms that the decision of the ECtHR in Pretty 
clearly regarded the absolute prohibition of assisted suicide in the UK as an 
infringement of her “personal autonomy and right to self-determination.” The court 
recognises that interference with the right to autonomy cannot be justified on the 
basis that it is ‘harmful’ simpliciter; people are free, within limits at the extremes, to 
engage in dangerous and harmful activities and, in the healthcare context, to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment. The court (Baroness Hale) offers an explicit justification 
for the existence of a prima facie right to determine the manner and time of death in 
terms of self-determination (p. 399B): ‘If we are serious about protecting autonomy 
we have to accept that autonomous individuals have different views about what 
makes their lives worth living.’  However, the court advances a public policy 
justification for an Article 8(2) rebuttal of the presumptive right to autonomy in the 
assisted suicide context in spite of the argument from ethical pluralism (p. 399F): 
 
It is not for society to tell people what to value about 
their own lives. But it may be justifiable for society to 
insist that we value their lives even if they do not. 
 
The court (Lord Hope) also reiterates the proposition that the “very essence of the 
Convention is respect for human dignity and freedom.” 
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5.3.1.1.4 Concluding discussion 
In this section, the examination of the law reports has led to the provisional 
conclusion that judicial interpretations of autonomy are influenced by case-type. 
There are, however cases where this association does not entirely hold. In Bland 
(1993), the Court of Appeal, and, to a lesser extent, the House of Lords devote 
considerable attention to the ethical and legal significance of self-determination, 
though the patient was permanently insensate. Judicial discussion of self-
determination was not required because the central legal issue was whether the 
patient should have the medical treatment he was receiving removed in order to 
restore his bodily integrity and allow him to die. The lengthy discussion of this 
ancillary issue was prompted by judicial speculation about what the patient would 
have wanted had he been able to utter, and strong judicial conviction that he retained 
a personal interest in how his condition might be viewed by those who most cared 
for him.  
 
5.3.1.2 Variation by judge  
The second dimension to be analysed is the potential influence of the dispositions, or 
orientations, of judges towards the law. Does the judge in one case give a different 
interpretation and use of autonomy than another judge hearing the same case or 
similar, cases? It is proposed that while there is ample evidence to suggest that the 
judiciary share the same family of ideas, there is evidence that judges differ in their 
use of autonomy according to their orientations towards the law, the legal regime 
(common law, statute, ECHR), and the ethical issues being addressed. 
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In Bland (1993), decided under the common law, Lord Justice Hoffmann in the 
Court of Appeal delivers an erudite judgement exploring the status of self-
determination in relation to other ethical principles, e.g. sanctity of life, and dignity, 
to a much greater extent than his fellow judges. This discussion forms part of his 
concern to show that a permanently insensate patient has interests which survive the 
loss of his intellectual autonomy. To this, he draws on a range of academic, as well 
as legal material.
21
  
 
His treatment of ‘dignity’ is the most extensive in common law. He states (at 
p.826F-G) that this “deeply rooted ethical value”, closely connected to “individual 
autonomy or the right of self-determination”, concerns: 
 
… our belief that quite irrespective of what the person 
concerned may think about it, it is wrong for someone 
to be humiliated or treated without respect for his 
value as a person. The fact that the dignity of an 
individual is an intrinsic value is shown by the fact that 
we feel embarrassed and think it wrong when someone 
behaves in a way which we think demeaning to 
himself, which does not show sufficient respect for 
himself as a person. 
 
The judge does not explore its precise relationship to physical integrity, self-
determination, or individual autonomy, and sanctity of life. He may not have felt the 
need given the narrower basis on which the case was decided, i.e. necessity and ‘best 
                                                                                       
 
21 Although his reputation as a thinker and philosopher is acknowledged in the academic literature 
(Kramer, 2003), a fellow judge has drawn attention to his general reluctance to cite academic 
literature in his judgements. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry that ‘Lord Hoffmann, who had been an Oxford 
law fellow for twelve years, showed no particular fondness for citing legal academic work in his 
judgments.’  
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interests’. His discussion of dignity may have served partly to offer an ethical 
foundation for an ethically-contentious decision.  
 
The High Court and Court of Appeal judgements in Burke illustrate two contrasting 
approaches. The case was decided under the provisions ECHR, in particular Article 
8. In the literature, the Court of Appeal’s judicial ‘conservatism’, has been contrasted 
with High Court judge’s  judicial ‘activism’(Miola, 2007; Veitch, 2007).  It should 
be noted that the following analysis is relevant both to this section (variety by judge) 
and the next section (variety by court hierarchy). In the High Court, Mr Justice 
Munby undertakes a wide-ranging review of medical law. He, like Lord Justice 
Hoffmann, considers ‘dignity’, but at much greater length (pp. 445F – 451D). 
Dignity is not expressed in ECHR, but the ECtHR has acknowledged that with 
‘human freedom’, ‘human dignity’ forms “the very essence of the Convention” 
(Burke (2005), p.445H; Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at para. 61).  
 
Although the Court of Appeal does not reject the High Court analysis of dignity 
(cf.Foster, 2011), it criticises in strong terms the High Court’s panoptic survey of the 
legal and ethical issues:  
 
There are great dangers in a court grappling with 
issues such as those that Munby J has addressed when 
these are divorced from a factual context that requires 
their determination. The court should not be used as a 
general advice centre. The danger is that the court will 
enunciate propositions of principle without full 
appreciation of the implications that these will have in 
practice, throwing into confusion those who feel 
obliged to attempt to apply those principles in practice. 
This danger is particularly acute where the issues 
raised involve ethical questions that any court should 
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be reluctant to address, unless driven to do so by the 
need to resolve a practical problem that requires the 
court's intervention. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s reluctance to address directly the ethical issues raised was 
made easier by its hypothetical nature. The patient in Burke (2005) was concerned 
that his incurable neuro-degenerative condition would eventually leave him unable to 
communicate a treatment choice. This circumstance had not yet arisen for the 
claimant – the legal action was to that extent pre-emptive – and so did not merit a 
legal determination.  
 
In NHS Trust A (2001), the High Court (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss) addressed the 
lawfulness of withdrawing life-sustaining nutrition and hydration, from two patients 
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). The case, though factually similar to Bland 
(1993), was decided under the provisions of the ECHR, in particular Article 2 (right-
to-life), which had subsequently come into force. Accordingly, the High Court was 
not bound by the decision in Bland as it otherwise would have been. The judge was 
at liberty to interpret the relevant provisions of Article 2 directly: “no one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally”. Nevertheless, in her use of Article 2 to justify the 
restricted obligation to give life-sustaining treatment to the patient in PVS, she states 
that her approach was “entirely in accord with the principles laid down in Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789…” The court uses as its operational measure, the 
common law distinction, enshrined in Bland (1993), between ‘acts’ and ‘omissions’, 
to interpret the meaning of ‘intentional deprivation of life’: 
 
The analysis of these issues by the House of Lords in 
Bland's case [1993] AC 789 is entirely in accordance 
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with the Convention case law on article 2 and is 
applicable to the distinction between negative and 
positive obligations. 
 
Consequently, the court holds that there can only be ‘intentional deprivation of life’ 
if someone on behalf of the state deliberately acts to bring about a death (p.358F).  
The discontinuance of medically contra-indicated treatment, which would otherwise 
“represent a violation of his autonomy” (p.359H), does not fall foul of the 
Convention, even if the effect is to shorten the life of the patient. Personal autonomy 
“otherwise described as the right to physical and bodily integrity” (p.361F) is 
construed as a right protected by Article 8 (right to “private life”) and its invasion 
must be justified under Article 8(2). This autonomy extends to the protection “of a 
patient’s right to self-determination” (p.361F). A patient’s autonomy is something 
retained even in the midst of her incompetence, and therefore capable of being 
violated by non-beneficent treatment (p. 358D).  
 
It can be said provisionally that there is sometimes a relationship between the 
orientation and disposition of the judge towards the law and their interpretations of 
the meaning to be assigned to the concept of autonomy.  
 
5.3.1.3 Variation between levels of the court hierarchy 
The third dimension of influence to be analysed is the potential impact of the level of 
the court hierarchy tend to give a more elaborate interpretation and use of autonomy 
than his lower court colleague. It is proposed that there is some evidence that courts 
further up the hierarchy enlarge on the concepts that are central to their judgements. 
In addition, there is some evidence that judges in the House of Lords are more likely 
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to depart from precedent in order to develop the law in a rational way more 
protective of patient autonomy.  
 
In the case of Re A (2001), there were significant differences of approach between 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The case concerned the lawfulness of 
surgical separation on infant conjoined twins which would have inevitably fatal 
consequence for the weaker child because a number of vital organs on which she 
depended for survival were largely contained within the body of her stronger sibling. 
The High Court judge (Mr Justice Johnson) was compelled to address a complex 
case under great time-pressure. The Court of Appeal (at p.174E) sympathetically 
observed that his: 
 
… judgment was given, as so frequently happens in 
this kind of case, under even greater pressure of time 
than we have felt. He did not have the benefit of the 
searching arguments we demanded and received of 
counsel. The case as it was presented to him and the 
case in the shape into which we knocked it are as 
different as chalk and cheese. I would like to record 
my sympathy for the judge, sitting alone, having to 
take such a decision as this in such difficult 
circumstances.  
 
The High Court judge relied heavily on Bland (1993) on the legal premise that to 
split the weaker from the stronger sibling was analogous to cases of withdrawing 
life-sustaining medical treatment from moribund patients. Mr Justice Johnson saw 
the stronger twin as an organic life-support system from which the weaker twin 
could be detached: The High Court judge argued that “the operation…would be 
lawful because it represents the withdrawal of [the weaker twin’s] blood supply” 
(p.176A).  
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The Court of Appeal strongly disagreed with the High Court’s analysis. It regarded 
his reliance on Bland (1993) as “utterly fanciful” (p.189G). Its three judges 
unanimously agreed that that separation surgery was an ‘act’, rather than an 
‘omission’, and therefore required legal justification if a murder charge was to be 
avoided. For Lord Justice Ward, this took the form of ‘quasi-self-defence’ (p.204A). 
Lord Justice Brooke extended the ‘necessity’ defence (p.240D)). Lord Justice 
Walker stringently promoted the concept of bodily autonomy (at p.258H):  
 
Every human being's right to life carries with it, as an 
intrinsic part of it, rights of bodily integrity and 
autonomy—the right to have one's own body whole 
and intact and (on reaching an age of understanding) to 
take decisions about one's own body. 
 
Both the High Court and Court of Appeal, however, shared a common law 
methodology. They revealed preference for the authority of real-life cases 
(precedents) over philosophical principles. The Court of Appeal made profligate 
reference to, but restricted use of, hypothetical comparators drawn from academic 
literature (parachutists, mountain-climbers and lifeboat evacuees). While such 
appeals to academic authority seemed on the surface to indicate a need for non-legal 
sources of authority and guidance, the substance of the judgements is ultimately 
constituted on the basis of comparisons and contrasts with decided cases, especially 
Bland  ( James, 2008).  
 
This rather conservative approach can be contrasted with the more adventurous 
approach of the House of Lords in Chester (2005). It involved a surgeon’s allegedly 
negligent failure to disclose the inherent risks of a spinal operation (cauda equina 
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syndrome) which materialised leaving the patient in pain and physically 
incapacitated. The trial judge found that there had been negligent failure to inform. 
Moreover, the court agreed that the patient, properly notified of the risks, would not 
have undergone the operation when she did, though she might have undergone 
surgery later. The House of Lords (by a 3:2 majority) relaxed the normal rules of 
causation in order to compensate a claimant whose right to be fully informed, that is, 
her autonomy, had been violated. The traditional approach has connected conduct to 
an injury, which, ‘but for’ negligent non-disclosure, would not have transpired (the 
‘but for’ test). However, in this case, the evidence suggested that the patient would 
have eventually undergone the procedure, although not at the time that she in fact 
did.  
  
Two Law Lords (Lords Bingham and Hoffmann) followed tradition arguing that 
because she would probably would have submitted to surgery eventually, she could 
not succeed on the ‘but for’ test. In contrast, the majority (Lords Steyn, Hope and 
Walker), held the patient’s “right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be 
vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles” 
(p. 147G, per Lord Steyn). Lord Hope forsook traditional tort principles, which, in 
his view, undermined the link between consent and autonomy and thus perpetuated 
the perceived imbalance between doctor and patient (p154A-C). Instead, he followed 
a foreign authority in a progressive jurisdiction – the High Court of Australia 
(Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232): 
 
The law is designed to require doctors properly to 
inform their patients of the risks attendant on their 
treatment and to answer questions put to them as to 
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that treatment and its dangers, such answers to be 
judged in the context of good professional practice, 
which has tended to a greater degree of frankness over 
the years, with more respect being given to patient 
autonomy.  
 
Lord Hope informed by academic commentary on Chappel, explicitly links consent 
and autonomy: “The principal reason for imposing this duty is to promote the 
patient's decision making autonomy” (p.159H). Lord Walker adopts Lord Scarman’s 
human rights analysis in Sidaway (1985) to justify the imposition of a medical duty 
to respect patient autonomy stating that “during the twenty years which have elapsed 
since Sidaway the importance of personal autonomy has been more and more widely 
recognised.”  
 
It is proposed that in Chester (2005) the majority in the House of Lords demonstrate 
a desire to develop the law in a manner consistent with ethical principle – the 
paramount importance of patient autonomy and the assertive citizen – even if it 
means departing from a traditional common law authority which is wedded to a clear 
causative connection between failure to inform and damage. Instead, they rely on an 
Australian authority – which has persuasive not binding authority – reinforced by a 
raft of academic authorities on causation (cf. Hart & Honore, 1985). It is also 
proposed that the House of Lords thought it could be explicit in its preference for 
principle over precedent in view of its unwritten constitutional authority to depart 
from its previous decisions in a way that they lower courts cannot.   
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5.3.2 Variation in use over time (diachronic analysis) 
This section will consider judicial variation in use of autonomy over time. It will 
look at pre-1990 cases where the term autonomy was not used. It will then look at 
restricted and elaborate uses of autonomy along the research sample timeline.  
 
5.3.2.1 The emerging use of autonomy 
This section focuses on the emerging use of autonomy in the medical law reports.  
It addresses the first research question; do judges use the concept of autonomy in 
their judicial deliberations and decisions? This tests an initial presupposition of 
enquiry that the judiciary use the concept of autonomy in its legal determinations. 
The empirical enquiry has found that although judges’ use of the concept of 
autonomy, this is a recent phenomenon. It will be argued that judges’ use of the 
concept of autonomy has emerged over time in four stages. Firstly, before the mid-
1980s there are medical law reports in which there is no ethical language, i.e. neither 
the term ‘autonomy’ nor any of its conceptions, is used at all. This reveals a world of 
medical law cases prior to the development of ethically-contentious cases. Secondly, 
from 1985 to the mid-1990s judges begin to use an ethical language which expresses 
the component meanings of autonomy but not the concept of autonomy itself, e.g. 
self-determination, bodily integrity (and its variants); freedom of choice (and similar 
constructions). Thirdly, the term ‘autonomy’ is used in a medical law report for the 
first time in Re F (1990) and for a period is given a restrictive use. Fourthly, there 
are cases in which there is an elaborate use of the concept of autonomy. This 
classification of use and non-use of ethical language is summarised in Figure 5.1. 
The categories are discussed briefly before focusing on the cases which have been 
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selected for closer study and analysis. The periodisation reflected in the table below 
is not meant to be rigid but rather expresses predominant usage. 
 
Autonomy and ethical 
language 
Number of cases Dominant period 
Containing no ethical 
language 
Indeterminate number  -1985 
Containing ethical 
language 
7 1985 - 1990 
Containing restricted uses 
of the concept of 
autonomy 
19 1990 - 
Containing elaborate uses 
of the concept of 
autonomy 
5 Post 1999 
 
Figure 5.1 Classification of ethical language in law reports of medical case 
 
5.3.2.1.1 Cases containing no ethical language 
An indeterminate number of medical law reports dating before the 1980s do not 
contain ethical language. If medical law is by definition ethically-contentious, then a 
medical law report not containing ethical language could be seen as a contradiction 
in terms. If, however, medical law embraces all cases which have ever arisen in the 
healthcare context, then clearly there is a world of medical law cases prior to the 
development of ethically-contentious ones. For example, medical negligence is 
obviously a central topic within medical law. All established medical law textbooks 
devote substantial chapters to it. For example, Jackson (2010) devotes a chapter of 
65 pages to ‘medical malpractice’.  A database search for ‘medical negligence’ cases 
yields a very large number of results (1776 cases by LexisLibrary and 811 cases by 
Westlaw). The connectors “medical negligence” (Westlaw) and medical w/3 
negligence were used. ‘Medical negligence’ can be defined as behaviour involving 
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allegedly negligent acts and omissions by medical professionals who cause injury 
and damage. A search for ‘abortion’ which also yields a large database (1251 cases 
by LexisLibrary and 621 cases by Westlaw), of which a minority were considered in 
an explicitly healthcare context. A systematic search of these principal legal 
databases reveals that the English courts do not use ethical language in medical law 
cases before the 1980s. To double-check this unexpected result, leading medical 
negligence cases such as Bolam (1957),
22
 Whitehouse (1981),
23
 McLoughlin 
(1984),
24
 and Thake (1986)
25
 were perused and found to be wanting in ethical 
language in the sense used here. This point will be elaborated in more detail in the 
section immediately following. 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Cases containing ethical language but not the term ‘autonomy’ 
The judiciary rarely uses ethical language before the 1980s. From the 1980s 
onwards, the courts begin to use the component meanings of autonomy, but do not 
actually use the term itself, e.g. bodily integrity, bodily inviolability, self-
determination etc. The first recorded use of the term ‘bodily integrity’ in an English 
medical law case appears in the High Court case of Chatterton (1981)
26
 (at p.442D) 
a case in which a plaintiff brought actions in trespass and negligence against a doctor 
for his failure to warn her of the risks associated with an operation to relieve pain in 
the area of a post-operative scar on her groin. The dearth of precedent is evident in 
                                                                                       
 
22 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
23 Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267.  
24 McLoughlin v. O'Brien [1983] 1 A.C. 410. 
25
 Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644. 
26 Chatterton v. Gerson [1981] Q.B. 432.  
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the judgement of Mr Justice Bristow who states that no “English authority was cited 
before me of the application of the principle in the context of consent to the 
interference with bodily integrity by medical or surgical treatment” (p.442D). All 
three of the cases in which the term ‘bodily integrity’ is used prior to the 1990 case 
of Re F (Chatterton (1981); Freeman (1984)
27
 and Sidaway (1985)
28
) draw on the 
persuasive authority of a statement in the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Reibl 
(1980).
29
 The closely-related term ‘bodily interference’ is used in the seminal case of 
Gillick (1986) at p.189G, which the House of Lords draws from the Ontario High 
Court case of Johnston (1970).
30
 The first recorded use of the construction ‘bodily 
inviolability’ appears in the Court of Appeal judgement in Re F (1990) at p. 13F.31  
It was later in the House of Lords in the same case that the use of the term 
‘autonomy’ is first recorded. 
 
The earliest, and only, ascertainable use of the conception of ‘self-determination’ in 
an English law report before Re F was decided is in the medical negligence case of 
Sidaway (1985)
32
. The Sidaway case concerned a surgeon’s allegedly negligent 
                                                                                       
 
27 Freeman v Home Office (No. 2) [1984] 2 W.L.R. 130. 
28 Sidaway Appellant v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Other 
Respondents [1985] A.C. 871). 
29 Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880. 
30 Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital (1970) 17 D.L.R. (3d) 13 
31 cf. Wilkinson (2002) at p.427D.  
32 Sidaway Appellant v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Other 
Respondents [1985] A.C. 871at 882C.  Outside the jurisdiction of the English courts, the conception of self-
determination is used in the abortion context in a decision of the ECtHR in Brüggemann and Scheuten v Federal 
Republic of Germany (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 244 in the context of the construction of the meaning of a right to 
‘private life’ under Article 8 of the ECHR.  
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failure to disclose inherent and material risks of cervical cord decompression. Lord 
Scarman states (p.882C) that:  
 
The right of "self-determination" - the description 
applied by some to what is no more and no less than 
the right of a patient to determine for himself whether 
he will or will not accept the doctor's advice – is 
vividly illustrated where the treatment recommended is 
surgery. 
 
The term is used twice by Lord Scarman and once by Lord Bridge. Both cite earlier 
use of the term in the US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia case of Canterbury 
(1972)
33, which crystallised the doctrine of ‘informed consent’ in American 
jurisprudence. 
 
Only six medical law reports either directly, or in passing, address the issue of 
freedom of choice before Re F (1990): the High Court in Chatterton (1981); the 
High Court in Hills (1984)
34
; the High Court and Court of Appeal judgements in 
Freeman (1984); the House of Lords in Sidaway (1985) and Gillick (1986).
35
 In 
Sidaway (1985), the House of Lords, drawing on the authority of the Canadian case 
of Canterbury (1972), states that “consent is the informed exercise of a choice, and 
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the 
risks attendant upon each” (p. 887C-D). At this point, it is important to draw 
attention to two noteworthy features of the English courts’ approach to the 
                                                                                       
 
33 Canterbury v. Spence (1972) 464 F. 2d 772. 
34 Hills v Potter [1983] 1 WLR 641. 
35 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another [1986] 1 AC 112. 
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development of ethical language. Firstly, it is the lack of a developed domestic 
medico-legal jurisprudence that prompts appeal to the potentially persuasive 
authority of analogous foreign jurisprudence, or earlier English cases involving 
other, i.e. non-medical, areas of law. For example, the High Court and Court of 
Appeal in the case of Freeman draw on a statement articulating the nature of a truly 
free choice in the much earlier, non-medical, negligence case of Bowater (1944).
36
  
Secondly, in Sidaway (1985) at p. 887C, there are distinct echoes of the seminal 
American case of the Schloendorff (1914).
37
 Schloendorff is the seedbed of the 
American doctrine of informed consent (Paola et al., 2010: 181-2). The influence of 
Schloendorff in Sidaway is important because the conceptions of bodily integrity, 
freedom of choice and self-determination are inextricably linked in Justice Cardozo’s 
declaration that: 
 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has 
a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient's consent commits an assault for 
which he is liable in damages.  
 
Although Schloendorff is only cited in argument – in both Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords - in Sidaway, rather than referred to in the judgements themselves, it 
has an influential trajectory in later English medical law. Schloendorff is explicitly 
referred to in an English legal judgement for the first time in Re F (1990) at pp.35E, 
73D. It is subsequently cited in argument in a number of cases: in the cases of Re T 
                                                                                       
 
36 Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corporation [1944] K.B. 476, 479. 
37 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
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(1993) and Pretty (2002). It is referred to and quoted in Bland (1993) at p.864C; Re 
A (2001) at p.176H; Burke (2005) at p.443F; and Purdy (2009) (Court of Appeal) at 
para. 33. Schloendorff is explicitly associated with the concept of autonomy and 
conception of self-determination in Re A (2001) and Burke (2005).  
 
The issue of mental capacity directly arose on one medical law case prior to 1990. In 
Re B (1988),
38
 the House of Lord’s exercising its wardship jurisdiction gave leave 
for a sterilisation operation to be carried out on a cognitively-impaired 17 year-old 
woman, who had the mental age of a 6 year-old, in her welfare interests. The court 
acknowledged that it was a case which had attracted considerable public interest and 
three of the Law Lords went out of their way to scotch the accusation that they were 
authorising eugenic sterilisation. Lord Oliver opined (p.207B):  
 
My Lords, none of us is likely to forget that we live in 
a century which, as a matter of relatively recent 
history, has witnessed experiments carried out in the 
name of eugenics or for the purpose of population 
control, so that the very word "sterilisation" has come 
to carry emotive overtones. It is important at the very 
outset, therefore, to emphasise as strongly as it is 
possible to do so, that this appeal has nothing whatever 
to do with eugenics. 
 
Only one case uses ‘privacy’ in a sense that could be construed as a constituent sense 
of autonomy, but this only appears in the submissions of counsel (Gillick (1985), 
pp.158G-F). No cases use the language of ‘dignity’.  
 
                                                                                       
 
38 Re B [1988] A.C. 199. 
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There are not many cases in the pre-Re F era which use ethical language. Where 
ethical language is used, it is generally resourced by American and Canadian 
jurisprudence. The judicial use of ethical language emerges in response to new types 
of medical law cases characterised by their inherent ethical content. This is not to say 
that medical negligence and abortion are domains devoid of ethical significance. But 
they are not ethically-contentious in the sense used here insofar as it would be 
uniformly agreed that negligence is a ‘bad thing’ and that abortion is permissible 
where it conforms to law. The ‘new’ medical law differs because of ethical 
consensus about the desirable outcome. The incorporation of the term ‘autonomy’ in 
English medical jurisprudence seems to be part of an ongoing process of 
development and change in legal and judicial thought and practice in response to 
broader developments in medicine, social morals and politics.  
 
5.2.3.1.3 The restricted use of autonomy in the medical law reports 
From 1990, judges begin to use the term ‘autonomy’.  In a number of the early cases, 
the concept of autonomy tends to be used in a restricted sense, meaning the judiciary 
focus on a particular dimension of the ‘self’, typically focussing on autonomy as 
‘bodily inviolability’ or ‘bodily integrity’. As Chapter Two made clear, academics 
have distinguished autonomy as a physical concept from other concepts of 
autonomy, e.g. intellectual. Dworkin (1992) has called this physical concept of 
autonomy physical essentialism and associates it with the idea of ‘being let alone’ 
(1992; 733). Two cases which exemplify this ‘physicalist’ construction of autonomy 
have been singled out for discussion below: the cases of Re F (1990) and Re A 
(2001).  
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5.3.2.1.3.1 The case of Re F (1990) 
In Re F (1990) the court (in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords) was 
invited to declare whether or not it would be lawful to surgically sterilise a 
cognitively-impaired adult woman who was unable to give a legally-valid consent to 
that surgery. It was argued that this was necessary in order to avoid the potentially 
damaging consequences for her of pregnancy and giving birth. The case was 
ethically-contentious because sterilisation surgery represented a major form of 
bodily invasiveness made legally problematic because of the patient’s inability to 
express a true wish due to her impaired cognition. Both the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords upheld the High Court’s declaration that it would be lawful to 
sterilise this sexually-active adult woman without her consent in her ‘best interests’ 
on the basis of the principle of necessity.  
 
Re F is significant in the history of English jurisprudence because in it an English 
court for the first time the term ‘autonomy’ is used in a medical law judgement. The 
House of Lords (per Lord Goff at p.78F) makes a single reference to ‘reproductive 
autonomy’ which is defined as “the right to control one’s own reproduction”. The 
House of Lords is clearly influenced in its use of the term by the arguments of 
counsel (p.45E-F) who contend that sterilisation ‘impinges upon two fundamental 
human and personal rights, the right of self-determination and the right of 
reproductive autonomy.’ The concept of autonomy is expressed as a ‘right’, the right 
to control oneself and one’s reproduction and conjunctively used with the conception 
of self-determination to which the House of Lords earlier refers as the “libertarian 
principle of self-determination” (p.73C). This seems to echo a construction 
formulated by counsel (p.44H), which follows counsel’s enquiry as to whether “the 
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common law is essentially libertarian in its philosophy or whether, at least in some 
cases, it adopts an authoritarian/paternalistic philosophy” (p.43F). 
 
The court in Re F devotes the bulk of its analysis to the search for a legal 
justification for non-consensual touching. The court does not directly associate the 
concept of autonomy with conceptions of bodily integrity, or inviolability; but a 
direct association between these notions is explicitly made in later cases, e.g. 
‘physical autonomy’ (Re A (2001)), and ‘bodily autonomy’ (Yearworth (2010)). The 
court (at both appellate levels) undertakes the most lengthy and detailed analysis of 
the law concerning physical touching in English medical law (rivalled only by Bland 
(1993) which itself was heavily influenced by the reasoning in Re F (1990)).
39
 The 
Court of Appeal (per Lord Donaldson at p. 13F) refers to the “common law right of 
bodily inviolability”. The House of Lords (per Lord Goff at p.72E) declares, more 
discursively, that it is “a fundamental principle, now long established that every 
person’s body is inviolate”.  
 
Re F is procedurally significant because it established a legal process for 
pronouncing upon the legality of non-consensual treatment of adult patients who 
lacked requisite mental capacity to make treatment decisions the law would respect. 
This procedural development was necessary because at the time the case was decided 
there existed no legal means of making proxy decisions on behalf of incompetent 
adults, in contrast with the legal position governing treatment decisions for children 
                                                                                       
 
39 In the Court of Appeal, Lord Donaldson’s analysis of the criminal and civil laws relating to non-consensual 
touching runs to over six pagers (pp.11G-17B).  
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(see Re B (1988) above). The legal position concerning adults has since changed. 
From October, 2007, the MCA (sections 9-14) empowers the donee of a validly-
executed Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA) to make treatment decisions on behalf of 
an incapacitous adult.  
 
The illegality of non-consensual touching has deep roots in English criminal and 
civil law. The function of consent, proxy consent, or some other equivalent, is to 
transform criminal, or otherwise unlawful, acts, into lawful, professionally-
permissible, or even obligatory, behaviour. The fact that the patient in this case could 
not consent explains why the courts thought it necessary to undertake an extensive 
analysis of the law of ‘touching’ stretching back into the Victorian and pre-Victorian 
era. 
 
5.3.2.1.3.2 The case of Re A (2001)  
In Re A (2001), conjoined twins known for legal purposes as ‘Jodie’ and ‘Mary’ 
were born joined at the lower and hinder part of the pelvis (ischiopagus) and with 
their four lower limbs (tetrapus), sharing a torso and umbilicus and bladder 
(emptying into two separate urethras), but each with their own set of vital organs 
(brain, heart, lungs, liver and kidneys). The twins’ arterial circulation flowed from 
Jodie to Mary and the venous from Mary to Jodie through a united inferior vena cava 
and other venous channels in united soft tissues. The prognosis for the twins’ was 
poor (death with 3 to 6 months) unless they were surgically separated. Such surgery 
would very likely enable the stronger twin Jodie to live on to lead a largely normal 
life, albeit with reconstructive surgery, but would almost certainly result in 
immediate death for the weaker twin Mary, who was entirely dependent on Jodie’s 
198 
 
circulation system for survival. The twins’ parents, committed Roman Catholic 
Christians, refused to consent to separation surgery on the grounds that surgery 
would effectively “kill” the weaker, and mentally and physically disabled, twin 
Mary.  
 
The hospital authority applied to the High Court for a legal declaration that 
potentially lethal separation surgery would not open treating clinicians and surgeons 
to a charge of murder, and that their activity was otherwise lawful, being in the ‘best 
interests’ of the twins concerned. The High Court upheld the lawfulness of 
separation surgery treating it as a form of treatment withdrawal. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the High Court decision, but for different reasons. Unlike the High Court, the 
Court of Appeal construed separations surgery as a lethal assault, which was justified 
in these unique circumstances on medical, family and criminal law grounds. As a 
result, separation surgery was carried out, which resulted in Jodie’s survival and 
recovery, and Mary’s immediate death. 
 
The Court of Appeal uses a range of concepts (e.g. bodily inviolability, physical 
sovereignty, freedom from interference, self-determination, privacy and dignity) 
with a strong emphasis on bodily integrity. The term ‘physical autonomy’ is used for 
the first time in a medical law report (p. 219A-B). This was severely reduced in the 
twins’ case because of their unusual physical configuration. The court also uses the 
conception of ‘bodily integrity’, or ‘physical integrity’ conjunctively with the term 
‘autonomy’ (pp. 249E, 258H). This term embraces two distinct notions: protection 
from physical invasion (p.218B); and ‘physical sovereignty’, that is, the ‘natural 
right’ intrinsic to every human being and his ‘right to life’ (p. 258H; cf. p.255E):  
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Every human being’s right to life carries with it, as an 
intrinsic part of it, rights of bodily integrity and 
autonomy – the right to have one’s own body whole 
and intact and on reaching an age of understanding to 
take decisions about one’s body. 
 
The court also uses bodily integrity conjunctively with conceptions of ‘dignity’, a 
term which appears six times in the judgement proper
 
 (pp. 184B, 258D), and which 
is itself used conjunctively with conceptions of ‘independence’, ‘the dignity of 
independence’ (pp.196A, 197B) and ‘privacy’: “Human dignity and personal privacy 
belong to every person, whether living or dying” (p. 258D). The latter is a citation 
from the New Zealand case of Auckland Area Health Board v. Attorney General 
[1993] 1 NZLR 235 at p. 245. 
 
5.3.2.1.3.3 Concluding discussion: Re F (1990) and Re A (2001) 
The cases of Re F and Re A confirm the academic observation that autonomy can be 
understood in physicalist terms.  Persons have a right ‘to be let alone’ unless there is 
a good reason for interfering. These cases construe autonomy as a basic physical 
concept. The cases reveal that the conception of bodily integrity has deep roots in the 
English legal tradition, but that the courts only first articulate it clearly in the medical 
law reports. The conception is implicit in the criminal and civil law tradition which 
has historically protected and promoted a person’s right to be free from unwanted 
touching. But it is made explicit in the healthcare context as part of the language 
drawn upon by the judiciary to express the personal interests at stake in the cases. 
The selected cases as a whole reveal that the concept of bodily autonomy, or 
integrity, not only has ‘staying power’ in the jurisprudence, but is also fundamental; 
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bodily autonomy is what remains after other dimensions of autonomy have 
disappeared.  
 
In the recent case of Yearworth (2010) (a case which addressed the question whether 
frozen semen in storage constituted ‘property’) refers (p.13G) to ‘bodily autonomy’ 
and presupposes the full and complex analysis of bodily inviolability in Bland 
(1993).  In the most recent case in the sample, Re M (2011), personal autonomy 
‘otherwise described as the right to physical and bodily integrity’ and is said to 
survive ‘the onset of incapacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment’ (at 
para.95). This implies that physicalist autonomy is the necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the construction of a concept of autonomy that accounts for the 
complete person.   
 
From 1993, the courts begin to develop a more elaborate and complex use of the 
concept of autonomy. The cases begin to respond to concerns about the nature and 
scope of patient choice and, under the influence of European human rights law, the 
nature of personal identity. The meaning and significance of this more elaborate use 
of autonomy by judges will be the subject of analysis in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
5.3.2.2 Elaborate use of autonomy: the’ millennium watershed’ 
It is proposed that there is a significant upsurge in its use and variety in cases 
decided after 1999 (the Human Rights Act was enacted in 1998 and implemented in 
2000). In the previous section it was reported that the term ‘autonomy’ is used for 
the first time in a medical law report in 1990. Shortly beforehand, the courts begin to 
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use ethical language e.g. bodily integrity, self-determination etc., which they 
continue to use concurrently, and conjunctively, with autonomy. The autonomy term 
is used infrequently in cases decided prior to St. George’s (1999). It is used once in 
Re F (1990) in the main text of a judgement (per Lord Goff at p.78E), although the 
term also appears in submissions of counsel which do not, strictly speaking, form 
part of the judgement proper. It is used on five occasions in Re W (1992), pp. 81E-F, 
87G, 87H, 88A, 88E), once in Re T (pp.116H-117A) in the context of a citation from 
a Canadian case, only four times in the lengthy judgement in Bland (1993) (three 
times in the Court of Appeal (pp.826F, 827E, 827F) and once in the House of Lords 
(p 893A)), three times in Re C (1994) and once in Re MB (1997) at p. 436.   
 
In Re W (1992), it is noteworthy that judicial engagement in autonomy discourse is 
in direct response to its use by counsel representing the Official Solicitor, Mr James 
Munby QC (as he then was) (cf. p. 81E-F). It was in his submission to the House of 
Lords in Re F (1990) that the first reported use of the term ‘autonomy’ anywhere in a 
medical law report occurs. In Re W (1992), the court considered whether it had 
authority, in the use of its inherent jurisdiction, to override a legally-competent 17 
year-old girl’s refusal of life-sustaining specialist treatment for anorexia nervosa. 
The court held where a 16 or 17-year old refuses treatment, that refusal can be 
vetoed by anyone with parental responsibility, or the court.  
 
The autonomy of the child to consent to medical treatment is potentially subject to 
parental, or judicial, override by virtue of statutory authority vested in parents 
through the Children Act 1989 and the inherent authority of the courts in relation to 
children. The Court of Appeal justifies the manifest asymmetry of consent law in 
202 
 
relation to children in traditional common law terms, implicitly rejecting (cf.75H-
76A) the development of the human rights approach taken by Lord Scarman in 
Gillick (1986). The function of consent, it argued, is to provide doctor’s with legal 
protection from criminal or civil proceedings to which they would otherwise be 
vulnerable, i.e. a legal ‘flak-jacket’ (p. 78D-E):  
 
I now prefer the analogy of the legal "flak jacket" 
which protects the doctor from claims by the litigious 
whether he acquires it from his patient who may be a 
minor over the age of 16, or “Gillick competent" child 
under that age or from another person having parental 
responsibilities which include a right to consent to 
treatment of the minor. Anyone who gives him a flak 
jacket (that is, consent) may take it back, but the 
doctor only needs one and so long as he continues to 
have one he has the legal right to proceed. 
 
It is suggested that in the pre-1998-2000 cases there is some evidence in the judicial 
decisions themselves to suggest that the concept of autonomy is being insinuated 
into judicial thinking through submissions of counsel and the sources they are 
drawing upon, in particular more developed foreign medico-legal jurisprudence (cf. 
Re T (1993) at p.116A ff.) and perhaps academic sources as well (see below).  
 
The case of St. George’s (1999) represents an important landmark in the history of 
English medical jurisprudence. The case concerned an enforced caesarean section on 
an otherwise mentally capacitous and heavily 28-year-old pregnant woman. The 
patient, in spite of her pre-eclampsia, had refused potentially life-sustaining 
intervention (for both her and her unborn child) because she wanted a natural 
delivery. Although she clearly had mental capacity and was entitled at common law 
to refuse any medical treatment, the hospital authorities and social services deployed 
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the mental health legislation to justify (under section 63 of the Mental Health Act 
1983) obstetric intervention as a procedure integral to the treatment of her mental 
disorder (for which, in the event, nothing was ever prescribed). The Court of Appeal 
upheld the patient’s application for unlawful detention claiming that her pregnancy 
was a condition unrelated to her mental disorder, and that treatment against her will 
in the circumstances amounted to trespass.  
 
It is suggested that St. George’s represents an important conceptual shift indicating 
that autonomy has become part of judicial lingua franca. It is used nine times: eight 
in the judgement and once in the headnote. Autonomy is referred to for the first time 
as a ‘principle’ (p.47B) ‘personal autonomy’ also makes its first appearance (p.60B). 
The court demonstrates greater assurance in its definition of the legal issues in terms 
of autonomy: “we have been required to consider important questions about the 
autonomy of a pregnant woman and the effect of her right to self-determination on 
her unborn child” (p.35C; cf. pp.50H, 52A). There is also the first example in the 
medical law reports of ‘autonomy’ as a section heading (p.43F-G). The term 
autonomy also appears for the first time in the headnote, although that is the law 
reporter’s editorial summary of the case and does not constitute part of the judicial 
decision itself. This is evidence, supplementing that of Chapter 5, that judges are 
developing a language which is unfolding through time with increasing familiarity 
and sophistication.  
 
It is proposed that there are a number of reasons why evidence exists in St. George’s 
of an upsurge of autonomy in judicial discourse. Firstly, it concerns the balance of 
rights between pregnant woman and foetus, the court concluding that there is no 
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balance to be struck because foetus has no legal personality until ‘live-born’ and 
therefore nothing to weigh-in.
40
 Secondly, and relatedly, the court establishes that 
though the foetus has limited status in English law, its interests cannot outweigh the 
pregnant woman’s right to self-determination, even if her behaviour puts her own 
life and health, and that of her unborn child, at risk. Thirdly, it was the first case 
decided by an English court which had not disregarded the pregnant woman’s wish 
to forgo unwanted obstetric intervention in the form of caesarean section. The case 
has a number of characteristics which provided the court with a suitable opportunity 
to crystallise autonomy as a permanent and familiar feature of the ethical vocabulary 
upon which judges could draw in suitable, ethically-contentious cases.  
 
In later cases, there is considerably more use of autonomy. In Re A (2001), autonomy 
is used eight times. It appears twice in headings. It contains the first reference to 
‘physical autonomy’ and the first direct reference to ‘individual autonomy’, apart 
from a citation of a Canadian decision in the earlier case of Re T (1993) at pp.117A. 
Autonomy appears on forty-nine occasions in the High Court judgement in Burke 
(2005). There are statements in the House of Lords case of Chester (2005) at p.163H 
where the court indicates that the principle of personal autonomy has become a key 
feature of medical law. In Burke (2005), Burke (2006), Purdy (2009), Purdy (2010), 
the courts affirm and reaffirm the legal proposition established by the ECtHR that 
personal autonomy is a human right protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR subject to 
qualifications contained in Article 8(2).  
                                                                                       
 
40 It is noteworthy that the word ‘autonomy’ is first used in a case concerning the limits of reproductive 
autonomy (Re F (1990)). 
205 
 
The House of Lord’s judgement in Purdy (2010) illustrates the embeddedness of in 
judicial thinking under the influence of the ECHR. The Purdy case was decided in 
the context of continuing public debate about the state of the UK’s assisted suicide 
law including arguments surrounding Lord Falconer’s amendment to the Coroners 
and Justice Bill (p.399A). In it, the claimant successfully obtained judicial review of 
the Director of Public Prosecution’s (DPP) refusal to issue crime-specific guidelines 
setting out the circumstances in which he would pursue a prosecution for an offence 
under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. The House of Lord’s held that the UK’s 
‘blanket ban’ on assisted suicide could only be justified under the ECHR if it could 
make it more foreseeable when a clarify the circumstances in which a prosecution 
would be likely to be brought.  
 
The case is significant in its use of autonomy for three inter-related reasons. Firstly, 
it is a sustained discussion regarding the nature and limits of personal autonomy in 
the assisted suicide context. Baroness Hale (the first academic as well as the first 
woman to be appointed to the House of Lords) states that ‘If we are serious about 
protecting autonomy we have to accept that autonomous individuals have different 
views about what makes their lives worth living’ (p.399A-B). Secondly, the Purdy 
case followed the ECtHR decision in Pretty, which had established a personal 
autonomy right was immanent to Article 8 of the ECHR. Accordingly, the UK’s 
absolute prohibition of assisted suicide was an infringement of the claimant’s prima 
facie autonomy right under Article 8(1). Lord Brown states (at p. 400E-F) that it 
was: 
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 … quite plain that the bar on assisted suicide under 
section 2(1) had to be regarded as interfering with Mrs 
Pretty’s right under article 8 of the Convention to 
respect for her private life. More particularly it 
interfered with her personal autonomy and right to 
self-determination. 
 
Thirdly, there is copious evidence of the use of autonomy in the submissions of 
counsel (cf. pp. 354D, 364E, 364F(x3), 364H, 366H, 367D). These, strictly 
speaking, form part of the secondary database because they do not form part of the 
judicial decisions themselves. However, the judicial decisions themselves reveal that 
there is such use (p. 401E). In the Court of Appeal decision in Purdy (2009), there is 
evidence (at para. 33) that the submissions of counsel have a rich texture:  
 
Lord Pannick answers by submitting that [Debbie 
Purdy] is asserting that her right to autonomy and self-
determination permits her to decide how and when to 
end her own life so that suffering and indignity can be 
avoided. The fear of her husband’s prosecution is an 
impediment to the exercise of that right for it affects 
her freedom of choice. This is, therefore, an 
interference with her right which needs to be justified 
under Article 8(2). This “libertarian principle” of self-
determination (so described by Lord Goff of Chieveley 
in In Re: F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 
A.C. 1, 73D and referred to again with approval in 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789, 864) 
was expressed by Cardozo J. in Schloendorff v Society 
of New York Hospital (1914)105 NE 92, 93 in these 
terms: “Every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body … 
 
The case discloses that chains of authority have built up to resource a rounder 
discussion of autonomy. It can be conjectured that the more ‘holistic’ constructions 
of autonomy emanating from ECtHR (see above) will provide a richer database from 
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which counsel in future cases will find resources to bolster their arguments on 
autonomy. 
 
It is suggested that there is considerable evidence of the development of the concept 
of autonomy over time. There is evidence of progression in the courts’ use of the 
concept of autonomy, both in numerical terms and the sophistication of their 
formulations and discussions. This progress in not linear, but ‘ebbs and flows’ 
depending on the contingencies of the particular cases arising for adjudication and 
the extent to which the legal issues which turn on the facts of those cases invite more 
refined reflection. The influence of the ECHR which jurisprudence English courts 
are now statutorily obliged to ‘take into account’ is playing a role, mediated through 
the submissions of counsel, in the creation of a more wide-ranging jurisprudence of 
autonomy.  
 
5.3.3 Concluding discussion  
While variations are revealed in synchronic analysis, the most significant discovery 
is the unfolding of an ethical language for judging complex medical cases. These 
findings demonstrate, overall, that the development of English medical jurisprudence 
is not static, but dynamic. The judiciary is developing a language that informs the 
difficult practice of judicial decision-making in the context of medical law cases.  
This language has ethical layers and is being developed in stages, leading from 
‘simple’ autonomy to ‘complex’ autonomy. Autonomy forms part of the historical 
development of language for this practice. In particular, there is suggestive evidence 
that the judiciary is developing a ‘holistic’ view of the ‘self’, principally under the 
influence of European human rights law. 
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This historical trend needs interpretation and analysis and prompts consideration of 
the potential influence of the changing context of jurisprudence (European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Mental Capacity Act 2005) and the 
possible underlying influence of legal traditions. Thus, a number of elements of the 
preceding enquiry – the changing jurisprudence (Chapter 1) and discussion of the 
literature on autonomy (which has been interspersed throughout the various cycles of 
enquiry – point to the need to develop a systematic analysis of the concept of 
tradition and its application to judicial decision-making in ethically contentious 
medical cases.  
 
The next section seeks to develop a framework of analysing the concept and 
application of traditions. It will look first to the work of MacIntyre (1981; 1988; 
1990) who articulates a theoretical concept of tradition. It will then look to the work 
of Brandom (1994) and his method of investigating discursive traditions to draw out 
the logic, that is, the relations of inference that expresses explicitly what is implicit 
in the language, discourses and practices.  
 
 
5.4 TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING UNDERLYING 
TRADITIONS OF PRACTICE 
 
The processual methodology of grounded theory described in the last chapter, in 
combination with the strategy of investigation described in this chapter, has made 
possible the disclosure of the presence and importance of the core category of 
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‘tradition’ and its relationship with the key categories of liberty, freedom and 
autonomy, which might not otherwise have emerged. The discipline of qualitative 
analysis has enabled the discernment of deeper objects of study – the influence of 
traditions of moral and political orders on the judicial construction of autonomy in 
ethically-contentious medical law cases – which might otherwise have remained 
hidden from view, had conventional methods of legal analysis have been employed 
instead. Critical realism offers a powerful methodology and disciplined analytical 
method enabling the construction of a powerful operational tool with which to 
analyse the law reports  
 
The third cycle of enquiry (Cycle 3) seeks to examine the extent to which 
philosophical and legal traditions are evident in the practice of judges’ decision-
making. The works of MacIntyre (1981; 1988; 1990) and Brandom (1998; 2002; 
2009) have provided the components of an intellectual framework within which to 
conduct an enquiry into the structure of practices and the substantial material 
(inferential) relations between those practices which inform judicial discourses and 
concepts in the law reports. 
 
5.4.1 MacIntyre, practice and tradition. 
MacIntyre advances, and elaborates, the notions of tradition-dependent rationality 
and tradition-constituted practice (1981; 1988). MacIntyre defines a ‘practice’ as 
(1981: 1988): 
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
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definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.  
 
What is and is not a practice is contestable. To distinguish, MacIntyre offers 
examples, rather than criteria. In general terms, however, a practice must have the 
requisite degree of complexity to achieve internal goods and to enjoin ‘acceptance of 
the authority of the standards and paradigms operative in the practice at the time’ 
(Mulhall & Swift, 1996: 83). Loughlin (2003) designates ‘public law’ as a complex 
practice in the MacIntyrean sense. 
 
 MacIntyre regards law as sufficiently complex to qualify as a practice, while a 
“living tradition”, for MacIntyre, “… is an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition.” (1981: 222). He states that: 
 
…when a tradition is in good order, it is always 
partially constituted by an argument about the goods 
the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular 
point and purpose. So when an institution – a 
university, say, or a farm, or a hospital – is the bearer 
of a tradition of practice or practices, its common life 
will be partly, but in a centrally important way, 
constituted by continuous argument as to what a 
university is and ought to be or what good farming is 
or what good medicine is. Traditions, when vital, 
embody continuities of conflict. 
 
 
As with practices, distinguishing traditions is also contestable. It is not always easy 
to discern where one tradition ends and another begins. Nevertheless, MacIntyre is 
open to the possibility of dialectical interchange within and between traditions, 
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through which traditions might acquire an enriched theoretical and conceptual 
structure. 
 
The idea of legal tradition in the ordinary language sense is uncontroversial. There 
are incontrovertibly a range of different legal traditions, e.g. common law, civil law, 
Islamic law etc. (Baker, 2000; Glenn, 2007). However, Glenn (2007) and Holland & 
Webb (2010) explore the idea of legal tradition with explicit reference to MacIntyre. 
Holland & Webb (2010) write that: 
 
 …‘tradition’ becomes a way of understanding and 
explaining the norms and values that make up a 
particular conception of the legal world, and the way 
in which the legal world embraces continuity and 
change (2010: 10). 
 
MacIntyre and these legal scholars provide a good starting point for considering 
medical law as a tradition-constituted practice.  
 
5.4.1.1 Medical law as tradition-constituted complex practice 
Medical law is a subset of law generally and qualifies as a social practice. Judges in 
all legal cases refine the internal goods of their practice of law by cultivating the 
analytic skills appropriate to the judiciary and immersing themselves in the customs, 
rules, canons and conventions that constitute the practice. Standards of excellence 
can only be authoritatively gauged by those whose responsibility it is to reflect 
critically on judicial practice, the judiciary itself, legal practitioners and academic 
lawyers (Denning, 1979; 1980; Lee, 1988; Pannick, 1987; Bingham, 2000).  
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Medical law can perhaps be distinguished from other areas of law by the particular 
traditions that constitute it. In Chapter 1, it was contended that medical law is 
constituted as a distinct legal subject area by the inherently ethical content of the 
medical treatment cases that arise for adjudication. Over the last thirty or so years, 
judges have been required to respond to new kinds of case within a moral ecology of 
individualism and pluralism. A number of these have been characterised as 
‘stigmata’ cases (Lee & Morgan, 2001; Montgomery, 2006a) because they exhibit 
the marks of the intense, legal, moral and public interests that converge on them.  
 
Questions of autonomy have been central to many of these cases, and in response the 
judiciary has employed concepts within a discourse influenced by distinct traditions 
of legal rationality, informed by particular traditions of moral and political order. 
The uses and meanings of autonomy have been profoundly shaped by the particular 
traditions of freedom which have historically inhered in the common law, and more 
recently, relevant statutes and the ethical traditions embedded in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. These traditions have not emerged out of nothing but 
have evolved within the existing forms of social life and the political institutions 
which embody and carry them.  
 
Medical law as a complex practice has in part been constituted by its diachronic and 
synchronic development. It has developed temporally as new cases have arisen for 
adjudication over time. It has also developed synchronically as the potential point of 
convergence for the three distinct legal rationalities of common law, statute and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
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5.4.1.2 Judicial uses of the autonomy concept: expansive or restrictive? 
Chapter 4 identified a variety of conceptions of autonomy in the academic literature 
aiming to build up a conceptual map of autonomy which drew the different 
dimensions of the self (the body; the mind; and personal identity) into an integrated 
whole. It was also contended that these partial theories of the self were informed by 
traditions of moral and political order. It was proposed that capability theory offers 
grounds for a potentially integrated theory of autonomy which encompasses its 
values, purposes and conditions.  Each layer of analysis will be activated to establish 
the connection between the measure, the theoretical concepts and dimensions, and 
the testing of the problematic, explicit.  
 
The most basic layer of analysis is the scrutiny of selected medical law reports for 
conceptions of autonomy. It seeks to establish whether, and to what extent, the 
judiciary is emphasising different dimensions of the self; the courts are giving 
greater weight to particular dimensions; and the emphasis given to these particular 
dimensions alters according to the factual circumstances, and legal issues, which 
arise in each case. The next level of analysis is to identify whether and to what extent 
judicial use of autonomy is informed by traditions of moral and political order.  In 
Chapter 4, procedural and substantive autonomy were distinguished at the level of 
moral order (is the judiciary using the concept of autonomy in value-neutral or 
value-laden terms?) and liberty (negative liberty or ‘freedom-from’) and freedom 
(positive liberty or ‘freedom-for’) were differentiated at the level of political order: is 
the judiciary using autonomy in the sense of liberty or freedom? do judges 
understand autonomy as independence or do they presuppose the presence of 
enabling conditions and accommodations? 
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5.4.2 Codes, concepts and categories: Brandom and inferential relations 
Brandom’s philosophy of language presents the basis for a potentially powerful 
elaboration of judicial linguistic practice by “making explicit” conceptual features of 
judicial practice from which it is elaborated (Brandom, 1994). In so, doing, he offers 
philosophical resources which have helped to render reflective one of the 
precipitating intuitions of this thesis, that judicial concepts and discourse contain an 
implicit philosophy which they are neither inclined, nor equipped, nor able, to make 
explicit.   
 
Brandom (1994) develops a set of analytic tools to investigate the claims and 
sentences expressed in discursive traditions. It is the capacity of humans to assess the 
quality of the reasons articulated by traditions that transforms natural (sentient) 
beings into cultural (sapient) beings who can retrospectively rationally reconstruct 
the traditions they inherit so as to distinguish which elements are progressive and 
how the traditions can be developed.  
 
Brandom’s method of analysis focuses upon the role of concepts in discourses. 
Discursive practice is normative, that is, it asserts claims that such and such ‘ought’ 
to happen or ‘should’ be the case. Concepts confer content (beliefs) on expressions 
and it is the way these concepts serve as premises or conclusions in discursive claims 
that enables the implicit relations of inference to be examined, made explicit and 
thus the quality of reasoning to be assessed. Evaluating the quality of justification 
and evidence articulated in discursive claims embodies and reinforces the practices 
of giving and taking of reasons and thus the rationality of discursive traditions.  
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Brandom regards understanding of inference as pragmatic because inferentially 
articulated norms are related fundamentally to contexts of use, to the social and 
historical processes which constitute social discourses. Brandom thus refers to 
‘material’ relations of inference, to ensure a contrast with formal logic. He wants to 
draw out the logic which is implicit in social and cultural practices that have 
developed historically. The conceptual develops within and expresses historical 
traditions.  
 
Thus, Brandom’s inferentialism is not hermeneutic in the sense of establishing 
meaning in use by looking at a text in context according to interpretive rules. Rather, 
it is a form of structural analysis which is equipped to uncover structural 
relationships between concepts by identifying their material inferential relationships.  
His inferential analysis goes one step further than hermeneutics (meaning in use) by 
elucidating meaning in the practice of use.  
 
An important feature of Brandom’s approach, which is influenced by Hegel (Hegel, 
Miller & Findlay, 1977), is that the normative dimension of discursive activity (the 
giving and receiving of reasons) has, by definition, a social dimension. The 
normative status of inferential commitment is also a social status. The normative 
dimension of discursive activity is socially synthesised by reciprocal recognition. 
This is the indispensable condition for the normative activity of giving and receiving 
of reasons and the normative basis of social practice. Brandom (happily for this 
thesis) gives Anglo-American common law as an example of a social practice within 
which concepts are inferentially articulated and thus acquire their meaning within its 
recognitive structure (see Chapter 1).  
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Brandom settles on common law as a good example precisely because unlike 
positive (e.g. civil) law or statutory law:   
 
…there is no originally authoritative statement of a 
principle to guide judges. All there is to go on is the 
tradition constituted by previously decided cases, in 
which legal concepts have been taken by other judges 
to apply or not to apply in determinate circumstances. 
The current judge’s decision about the case before her 
is authoritative only insofar as it can be justified by 
appeal to a principle she finds implicit in the practice 
of her predecessors in the cases she treats as 
precedential (Testa, 2003: 569).  
 
In order to give a normative account of the decision that she has made, there has to 
be a rational reconstruction of the common law tradition. What is given and received 
as rational within the recognitive structure of the common law involves the: 
 
…gradual unfolding into the explicit light of day of 
principles that were all along implicit (on her telling) 
in the practice of resolving disputes about the 
applicability of the concepts in question (Testa, 2003: 
569). 
 
In this way, the common law judge justifies his current decision by making himself 
(normatively) responsible (another important technical term for Brandom) for past 
judicial decisions and thus the tradition. The right to ‘recognition’ from future judges 
for the decision he has made will depend on how good a job those judges think the 
judge in the instant case has done in rationally reconstructing the tradition and made 
explicit a legal rule or principle that was implicit in previous cases. However, the 
judge deciding the instant case also exercises authority over past judges and future 
judges within in a diachronic recognitive structure. He gives authority to past judges 
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by determining whether or not they have used concepts from which legal rules and 
principles can be inferred. He also rationally compels futures judges to receive his 
reconstruction of the tradition by making explicit the rules and principles implicit in 
earlier cases. Brandom finds “in this complex diachronic recognitive structure a 
model that is of very great help in thinking about the constitution of conceptual 
norms and of normative statuses” (Pritzlaff, 2008: 369).  
 
5.4.2.1 Explanatory coding and theoretical analysis: Cycle 3 
Brandom provides a theoretical basis for the examination of inferential relations 
between the use of autonomy, the traditions of law and moral and political traditions 
which has led to the discovery of the existence and influences of legal, moral and 
political traditions. It can be seen that the medical jurisprudence exhibits a complex 
diachronic (temporal progression) and synchronic (cross-sectional influence) within 
which the concept of autonomy is developed. There has been a temporal progression 
in the development of autonomy in the medical jurisprudence evidenced in the 
familiarity with which the concept and its various conceptions are used and the 
retrospective rationalisation of the elemental meanings of autonomy into more 
explicit forms.  
 
A further iterative and explanatory re-coding of the law reports was prompted by this 
third cycle of enquiry. This was consequent upon the discovery that the elemental 
uses of autonomy and dimensions of the ‘person’ revealed as a result of the first two 
cycles of enquiry. The various particular expressions of autonomy (e.g. bodily 
inviolability, self-determination, dignity etc.) can be seen to entail particular 
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concepts of liberty (negative and positive liberty) which are, in turn, inferentially 
related to the core category of freedom (freedom-from and freedom-to).                                                  
 
Thus, it can be seen (following Brandom’s theory of logical, material relations) that 
there exists a material inferential relationship between the elemental conceptions of 
bodily inviolability, freedom from unwanted interference (spatial) privacy etc., the 
philosophical tradition of ‘negative liberty’. There is a further inferential entailment 
between negative liberty and liberty understood as ‘freedom-from’ and freedom in 
the sense of ‘freedom-for’.  
 
 Coding levels 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Cycle  3 
Categories of 
tradition 
Particulars Concept  Category 
Bodily inviolability (III (a) (i)  
 
 
 
 
 
Negative liberty 
(III (A) (ii)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive liberty 
(III B (ii)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom–from (liberty) 
(III (A) (iii)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom-to (freedom) 
(III (B) (iii)) 
Physical sovereignty (III (b) (i)  
Bodily integrity (III (c) (i) 
Freedom from interference (or 
liberty) (III (d) (i)) 
(Spatial) Privacy  (III (e) (i)) 
Independence (III (f) (i)) 
Self-possession (III (g) (i)) 
Self-ownership (III (h) (i)) 
Self-control (III (i) (i)) 
Freedom of choice (III (j) (i)) 
Mental capacity (III (k) (i)) 
Self-determination (III (l) (i))  
Psychological integrity (III (m) 
(i)) 
Moral integrity (III (n) (i)) 
Dignity (III (o) (i)) 
Privacy (as ‘private life’) (III (p) 
(i)) 
Self-creation (III (q) (i)) 
Self-realisation  (III (r) (i)) 
Subjective character of 
experience  (III (s) (i)) 
 
Figure 5.2 – Categories of tradition (Cycle 3) 
 
219 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
 
The third cycle of investigation has drawn upon critical realism in response to the 
limitations of empirical and hermeneutical enquiry. The restriction of empirical 
investigation to descriptions of judicial uses of autonomy prompted the search for 
meaning in use through hermeneutics. While this second cycle of enquiry develops 
understanding of autonomy as tending towards an emerging holistic concept of the 
person as body, mind and identity ii fails to deliver an adequate account of why there 
was variation in judicial uses and understandings of autonomy. The restrictions of 
these two cycles points towards the need for an analysis of the potential underlying 
structures and traditions that may influence in their use and interpretation of 
autonomy. The proximate patterns of variation in the law reports have been analysed 
disclosing that judges over time have developed an elaborate ethical language of the 
autonomy of the person to decide ethically-contentious medical law cases.  
 
The work of MacIntyre and Brandom provide a sophisticated concept of tradition 
and the analytical tools needed to examine the discursive practice of traditions within 
the complex tradition-constituted practice of medical law. In the next chapter these 
framework and analytical tools are used to assess whether judicial uses of autonomy 
have been influenced by tradition(s). The law reports are analysed as cases in time in 
their legal, moral and political contexts.  
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CHAPTER 6 
AUTONOMY IN THE LAW REPORTS: THE INFLUENCE OF 
TRADITIONS 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The last two chapters have begun to develop understanding of judges’ interpretation 
of and decision-making about autonomy in the ethically-contentious medical cases 
under consideration in this thesis. The findings of the investigation so far reveal that 
an ethical language and specifically the use of the concept of autonomy, has only 
developed gradually over a couple of decades and more. The findings also show that 
judges’ tend to vary in their use of autonomy; the analyses revealing patterns of 
variation associated with case-type, the judge hearing the case and level of court 
hierarchy. While the findings prompt the suggestion that judges’ use of autonomy is 
becoming increasingly sophisticated over time it is nevertheless not clear that the 
developing pattern of use of autonomy has been completely explained. This chapter 
takes up one of the central questions informing this enquiry, that is, whether the 
theoretic concept of ‘tradition’ provides a deeper underlying account of the direction 
and shape of change (research question 5), using the operational measures articulated 
in Chapters 3 and 4 
 
The term ‘tradition’ is used, as discussed in chapter 3, in the theoretical sense 
assigned to it in the work of Alastair MacIntyre, namely as a “historically extended, 
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socially embodied argument” (1981: 222). The relevance of tradition to this analysis 
emerged out of the processual nature of the inquiry required by grounded theory’s 
methodology, and associated strategies of investigation. Interest in the concept of 
tradition grew out of preliminary engagement with different aspects of the data base: 
background reading on context of change in national and European jurisprudence; 
initial reading of particularly public complex ethically-contentious medical law 
cases; and reading of the literature on autonomy. 
 
It was noted in chapter 1 that public discussion  surrounding the creation of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the incorporation of the European Convention 
on Human Right (ECHR) suggested that body of European law derived its authority 
from very different principles than English common law and would potentially be in 
tension with the dominant framework of precedent and legislation in English law 
(cf.Klug, 2000; Loughlin, 2000; Loughlin, 2003; Veitch, 2007; Barak, 2008; 
Bogdanor, 2009; Brandom, 1998). Public discussion of medical law cases such as 
NHS Trust v A (2001) and Burke (2005) suggested the existence of a tension 
between European human rights and common law methods of reasoning pointing to 
potential tension between different traditions of the law (Laurie, 2006; Miola, 2007; 
Veitch, 2007). The relevance of the concept of tradition for this thesis also emerged 
in  reading of the literature on autonomy which led to greater understanding of the 
influences of contrasting traditions of interpreting freedom: ‘freedom-from’ and 
‘freedom-for’. The dimensions of autonomy could possibly be understood as being 
informed by distinct traditions of moral and political orders. 
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The challenge for this chapter is to examine the relationship between the influence 
on judges’ use of autonomy of this changing context of jurisprudence, , and the  
extent of influence of the contrasting traditions of conceptualising autonomy as 
negative or positive freedom. Different strategies were devised in methodology 
chapters 3 and 4, for testing the existence and influence of traditions in judicial 
decision making. In Chapter 3, two analytical measures were devised to investigate 
whether judicial interpretations of autonomy in the medical law reports were 
influenced by ‘traditions’. The first is designed to examine whether the reports 
exhibit different structures of legal rationality. The second measure is calibrated to 
test whether judicial uses of autonomy are restricted or expansive, and to what 
traditions, or political orientations, of autonomy these relate, i.e. liberty, self-
determination and capability.  
 
Chapter Four described the coding strategy and set out the justification for 
identifying terms as elemental meanings, or conceptions, of autonomy. The coding 
process comprised three levels of analysis which express the inferential relations 
between conceptual layers of autonomy (cf. Brandom, 1998; 2001; 2009). The first 
level of analysis identified conjunctive, non-conjunctive and implicit uses of 
autonomy; the second classified higher level concepts of autonomy corresponding to 
three dimensions of self- body, mind and identity – and three key categories – 
liberty, self-determination and capability; the third identified freedom as a key 
concept in its negative (‘freedom-from’) and positive (‘freedom-for’) constructions, 
and freedom  as the core category – in particular, traditions of liberty (‘freedom-
from’) and freedom ‘(freedom-for’). It is this core category of freedom that revealed, 
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it was proposed, the idea of traditions of interpretation It is the task of this chapter to 
put this proposition to the test.   
 
The chapter draws upon these tests and operational measures to examine the question 
whether decision-making in ethically -contentious medical cases does reveal the 
influence of traditions: firstly, do the reports reveal different traditions of legal 
rationality? Secondly, do the reports reveal different traditions of conceptualising 
and interpreting the autonomy of the person? And, thirdly do the judges’ 
interpretations of autonomy reveal the influence of traditions of moral and political 
order?  
 
6.2 TRADITIONS OF LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
The first operational measure to test the existence of traditions is to examine whether 
the law reports reveal different structures of legal rationality that can be said to 
constitute a distinctive tradition of jurisprudence. By legal rationality is meant the 
form of justification for a judicial determination, or outcome. The structure of 
rationality to be applied to the cases examines: the relation of legal decision 
(judgement) to the principle of reasoning (the ordering of argument inductively or 
deductively); and the nature of the evidence recognised (empirical or logical). When 
these elements are ordered cogently then a legal decision acquires authority and 
legitimacy in the courts. When this test of rationality was applied to the research 
cases three very different types of rationality were revealed:  the rationality of the 
past (Precedent and the case of Re W (1992); the rationality of the public sphere 
(Statute and the case of D Borough Council (2011)); and the rationality of values 
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(The case of Purdy (2010)). The discussion will identify exemplar cases of these 
different structures of legal rationality.  
 
6.2.1 The rationality of the past (precedent and the case of Re W (1992)) 
In Re W (1992), the Court of Appeal refused to respect the potentially life-
threatening treatment refusal of a legally-competent child suffering from anorexia 
nervosa and ordered her to be transferred to a unit specialising in the treatment of 
eating disorders. The law had already established the principle that a ‘mature minor’ 
could consent to medical treatment without parental consent (cf. Gillick (1986) and 
that an older child (i.e. 16 or 17-year-old) was to be treated as if an adult for the 
purposes of diagnosis and treatment by virtue of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 
(FLRA). However, in this case, the court held that there was a basis on which the 
child’s competent refusal could be lawfully overridden enabling doctors to treat her 
in her ‘best interests’ without opening themselves up to prosecution or civil liability.  
 
The Court of Appeal could conceivably have held that because the mature minor had 
a ‘human right’ to consent to treatment, there was a corresponding, and unqualified, 
right to refuse it, as had been advocated in some of the literature (p.75A-D). Instead, 
the court seemed to be concerned to identify an alternative source of lawful consent, 
which, it held, could be sourced in the statutory empowerment of parents, or those 
exercising parental authority, or the courts exercising their inherent jurisdiction. In 
the healthcare context, consent functions, as it does in law generally, to transmute 
otherwise unlawful behaviour (i.e. non-consensual touching) into lawful. Consent, 
the court stated, supplied the doctor with legal immunity (a ‘flak-jacket’) in the face 
of a child’s continuing refusal. The court contended that had Parliament intended the 
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FLRA to confer unqualified autonomy on children in the healthcare context, it would 
have made this explicit.  
 
This exemplar case, it is proposed, clearly reveals a structure of common law 
rationality and tradition of argument (Other cases in this tradition are noted in Figure 
1). The court could have followed the rationality of a human rights analysis and 
produced a more logical outcome, i.e. an autonomous child has the right to consent 
to, and refuse consent to, medical treatment, without hindrance. Instead, it followed 
the precedential logic of common law creating an asymmetry in the law of consent as 
it relates to children in the process. The court chose to focus on the question of how 
to confer legal immunity on the doctor using the traditional mechanism of consent, 
reinstating the ‘status test’ of competence for under-18s in cases where children 
make potentially life-ending decisions.  What the outcome lacks in hard logic may be 
compensated for by its ‘prudential logic’.  That logic can be seen in Re W in the 
court’s attempt attempting to reconcile the values of parental authority and child 
autonomy without stirring up too much ethical controversy. The court regards that as 
a matter of social policy which is the responsibility of Parliament which is better 
suited to comprehensive, systematic lawmaking. Kennedy (2004) has described 
English common law as a type of formal legal rationality that is not ‘logical’ 
describing it as being of a “primitive British precedential type”. The past is a 
resource, from which reasons for change may be derived, as common law reason 
moves interstitially within existing principles and categories, without imposing 
broader conclusions than facts and precedent already authorised (Glenn, 2010).  
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Traditions Cases 
Common 
Law 
Re F (1990), Re W (1992), Bland (1993), Re T (1993), Re C (1994), Re 
MB (1997), St. George’s (1998), Re A (2001), Chester (2005) 
Statute  Re Z (2005), Pretty (2002), Purdy (2009), Purdy (2010), D Borough 
Council (2011), Re A (2011), Re M (2011) 
European 
human rights 
Re AK (2001), NHS Trust (2001), Pretty (2002), Re Z (2005), Burke 
(2005), Burke,  (2006), Purdy (2009), Purdy (2010), D Borough 
Council (2011), Re A (2011), Re M (2011) 
 
Figure 6.1  The relationship of the research cases to the different legal traditions   
 
6.2.2 The rationality of the public sphere (statute and the case of D Borough Council 
(2011)) 
In D Borough Council (2011), the High Court declared that a 41-year-old man under 
local authority supervision and in the low range of intellectual functioning (IQ = 48) 
lacked legal capacity under the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) 
to consent to sexual relations with another man. The court issued an interim order 
directing the local authority to provide him with sex education in order to determine 
whether he could be brought up to the low threshold of capacity to consent 
whereupon a further final order would be made. This was one of the first cases 
decided in the Court of Protection under the provisions of the MCA. The court 
recognised that it raised “very profound aspects of civil liberties and personal 
autonomy” (p. 1259H).  
 
The question of capacity was regulated by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which has 
largely enshrined the common law in capacity criteria. The court held that because of 
his low intellectual functioning, the adult did not even meet the low threshold of 
capacity relating to consent to enter sexual relations. The court restricted the test of 
understanding to the mechanical and immediately consequential aspects of sexual 
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activity, preferring the lenient act- rather than stringent partner-specific test of legal 
capacity. However, it is a fundamental principle of the MCA, as it is of recent mental 
health legislation, that a person should not be deemed unable to make a legally-
effective decision unless all practicable steps have been taken to help him do so 
(section 1(3)). As a result, the court only temporarily restricted access to certain 
others until it could ascertain whether the adult was capable of becoming legally 
capacitous with help and support.  
 
The case reveals a structure of purposive rationality inherent in legislation. The 
MCA was drafted to do more than enshrine the previous common law position: it has 
provided the basis for a more ‘capability-based’ approach to adult decision-making. 
The case: (i) seeks to reconcile the legislative intent to promote some of the 
supportive and enabling conditions which may need to be in place to facilitate 
capacitous choice; (ii) is concerned with the need to protect vulnerable adults from 
harming themselves and others; and (iii) seeks to promote their freedom. It seeks to 
reconcile legislative intent (to promote supported decision-making) with the statute’s 
public objectives (to protect and promote the welfare of vulnerable adults) and the 
fundamental values of the legal system (protection against unwarranted intrusion by 
the state with equality of recognition for all citizens) (cf. Barak, 2008). 
 
6.2.3 The rationality of values (the case of Purdy (2010)) 
The facts of the case of Purdy (2010) were set out in detail in the last chapter. An 
MS-sufferer sought a judicial review of the Director of Public Prosecution’s 
prosecution policy arguing that it was defective in relation to assisted suicide 
because it was unclear what factors would weigh in favour, or against, prosecution. 
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The House of Lords held that her autonomy rights under Article 8 were engaged and 
infringed insofar as the UK’s ‘blanket ban’ on assisted suicide remained 
insufficiently crime specific and thus disproportionate.  
 
The key source of law for the House of Lords was the ECHR and Article 8 (the right 
to ‘private life’) in particular. It does not directly address assisted suicide, or 
enshrine an explicit autonomy right. Judges, however, are authorised to interpret the 
Articles of the Convention directly, regardless of precedent and parliamentary will, 
taking into account the determinations of the ECtHR. In this case, the House of 
Lords held that the claimant had a human right to autonomy (established in the 
ECtHR decision in Pretty) and the key question was to determine whether her rights 
under that Article were engaged, and if so, how the Article was to be applied. The 
House of Lords held that her right to autonomy was engaged and unless it could be 
qualified, she had a right to determine how and when she chose to die in the face of 
the unequivocal criminality of assisted suicide under UK law. The positive 
entitlement to the human right to autonomy ‘trumped’ the clear expression of 
Parliament’s sovereign will on the face of the Suicide Act 1961. 
 
In the event, the House of Lords held that under Article 8(2), the UK’s absolute 
prohibition on assisted suicide could be sustained on the basis that it was “in 
accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.” This was so provided that the application of the 
law satisfied European law tests of proportionality, accessibility and foreseeability. It 
failed this test in Purdy leading to the eventual introduction of prosecution 
guidelines specifically relating to assisted suicide at the House of Lords’ behest. 
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Thus the ethico-deductive logic of Article 8(1) is qualified by the logic of Article 
8(2). Purdy reiterates that direct interpretations of the ethical values encoded in 
Article 8 can supervene upon well-established common law and statutory positions 
with regard to autonomy. The crystal clarity of the UK’s democratic statutory 
restriction on assisted suicide would simply give way to the ethical logic of Article 8 
unless it could (as it has been) be justified on grounds accounted for in the 
Convention itself, i.e. Article 8(2).  
 
The European Convention sets forth the basic ethical principles that govern the 
relationship between citizen and state. It constitutes a ‘higher law’. The Articles of 
the Convention contain a set of positive entitlements which the courts are bound to 
secure for its citizens. The meaning of the ECHR is not self-evident. The courts must 
interpret and explain it. Its inherent ethical values are deduced and applied down to 
particular cases. The case is the site for the explication of a general principle, 
whereas at common law it is an instance which may coalesce into one.  
 
In summary, it is possible to conclude that the significant differences between   
common law adjudication, legislation, and European human rights law adjudication 
derive less from their different legal sources than from the structures of rationality 
that reveal them as distinctive traditions of law.  Common law adjudication employs 
inductive reasoning to resolve cases as and when they arise for adjudication. Statute 
law adjudication works by instrumental logic as the common law courts seek to 
given expression to the purposes of Parliament. European human rights law 
adjudication is deductive working downwards from the ethical principles enshrined 
in the ECHR to individual cases. The significant differences between these three 
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bodies of law, and the way judges determined to interpret their cases, enables the 
conclusion that the creation of the new body of European law did as hypothesised 
create tensions for the practice of traditional English Common Law. The cases, it is 
argued, have revealed traditions of legal rationality. The question now raised for 
analysis is whether these traditions of rationality embody traditions of interpreting 
and using the concept of autonomy. 
 
6.3 TRADITIONS OF AUTONOMY IN INTERPRETING THE LEGAL 
PERSON 
 
In the initial stages of analysis, the procedure of enquiry was principally concerned 
with interpreting the meanings the judiciary was assigning to the concept of 
autonomy in the law reports. This hermeneutical enquiry was directed towards 
elucidating the sense of autonomy used in the reports.   In the course of the literature 
review of autonomy, it became apparent that the various elemental meanings were 
associated with different traditions of conceptualising the autonomy of the person, 
some traditions articulating a restricted concept of the autonomy of the person, while 
other traditions sought to express more elaborate conceptions of the autonomy of the 
person.  This section explores a second test to examine the extent to which the 
reports reveal restricted, embryonic and expansive uses of autonomy by judges. 
These are discussed in turn.  
 
6.3.1 Restricted use of autonomy: physical essentialism (the body)  
A number of cases demonstrate a restricted concern with the body. The research 
cases reveal a number of elemental meanings of autonomy explicitly, or by strong 
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implication, associated with the body: bodily inviolability (or bodily integrity); 
physical sovereignty, privacy, dignity and freedom from unwanted interference. 
Three cases identify a distinctive ‘bodily’ autonomy. This is connected to the idea of 
‘physical sovereignty’, that is, having a clearly circumscribed body to exercise 
control over (Re A (2001) (e.g. 249G)). It is used in relation to the elaborate series of 
rules which the criminal and civil law has created for the protection of the body 
(Yearworth (2010) (e.g. p. 13G)). It is also regarded as something which survives the 
loss of legal capacity (Re M (2011) (para. 95)). In these cases, bodily autonomy is 
used conjunctively with conceptions of bodily inviolability and bodily integrity. 
 
There is an implication in the Court of Appeal judgement in Bland (1993) (p. 828E), 
that the withdrawal of the medical apparatus that was invading the patient’s body, 
even though he would die of starvation and dehydration as a result, would restore to 
him his bodily integrity and give him back his privacy. In Re A (2001) (e.g. p. 184B-
C), the Court of Appeal stated that surgical separation, which would be fatal for the 
weaker twin, would nevertheless, restore to her bodily integrity and dignity which is 
part of the ‘natural order’ for humans. These statements, rather startlingly, that 
bodily autonomy is something that can sometimes only be restored at the cost of the 
patient’s life. In the literature, this bodily concept of autonomy has been called 
‘physical essentialism’ The judicial sentiment is perhaps accurately captured in the 
literature by Dworkin (1992) who states: 
 
If you touch me or eavesdrop on me, you have injured 
my autonomy by invading my space. If you actually do 
something to change my body, you have injured my 
autonomy by changing the very constitution of what I 
am. 
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The cases reveal that the judiciary recognise a distinct concept of bodily autonomy. 
The elemental meanings associated with autonomy have deep roots in the history of 
English criminal and civil law as revealed in Re F (1990) (cf. p.11G – 12B).  It 
appears to be the physical basis for the other manifestations of autonomy. It is the 
presupposition for the notion of bodily self-determination and an essential element in 
the more complex concept of autonomy being developed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (see below) that will be explored below.  
 
6.3.2 Embryonic expansion: self-determination (the mind)  
The courts use a range of other elemental meanings of autonomy relating to the 
intellect (freedom of choice, mental capacity, self-determination, self-control and 
self-creation). The cases do not use the expression ‘intellectual autonomy’ to 
correspond with ‘bodily autonomy’. However, it is proposed that such a concept is 
present by inference. It broadly corresponds with the Dworkin’s concept of ‘liberal 
individualism’, referring to the ability to choose and make one’s choices effective 
(Dworkin, 1992). There are, however, a number of different understandings of 
autonomy as an intellectual concept, mainly surrounding the meaning of self-
determination. There is a concept of self-determination firmly anchored to the body. 
There is another, with a more ‘existential’ denotation. Then there is its more 
complex meaning under the ECHR.  
 
A number of cases firmly link self-determination to the body, as ‘bodily’ self-
determination. the roots of this idea are to be found in the American Schloendorff 
cases which states that “every ‘human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body”. The bodily and 
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intellectual dimensions of autonomy are conjoined.
41
  The Schloendorff case is 
referred to in argument or judgement in a further six cases in the sample of medical 
law reports (Re F (1990); Re T (1993); Bland (1993); St. George’s (1999); Re A 
(2002); Pretty (2002); and Burke (2005)). In Burke (2005), in a section headed 
‘autonomy and self-determination’, the High Court contends that the implications of 
Schloendorff ‘have only gradually been recognised’ (p. 443F).  
 
In other contexts, self-determination seems to have an ‘existential’ dimension. The 
Court of Appeal declared in Re T (1993) (p. 112E) that: 
 
…the patient’s interest consists of his right to self-
determination – his right to live his own life as he 
wishes even if it will damage his health or lead to his 
premature death [because] it is well-established that in 
the ultimate the right of the individual is paramount. 
 
In Bland (1993) (p. 864C), the House of Lords states that the principle of self-
determination dictates that “respect must be given to the wishes of the patient”. In 
Burke (2005), this existential connotation is explicitly attributed to “personal 
autonomy’: “the choice of how we are to live and how we are to die — should be left 
to the individual” (p. 430E-F). Self-determination is closely   associated with the 
idea of ‘freedom of choice’ and the ‘mental capacity’ on which the former turns. In 
                                                                                       
 
41 Though Schloendorff does not use the construction ‘self-determination’, it is easily inferred from the language 
of the statement, as the American Supreme Court does in the landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence 464 F.2d 
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) which articulated a new standard of ‘informed consent’ designed for the communication 
needs of the patient.  
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the context of treatment refusals, freedom of choice is ‘absolute’ provided mental 
capacity is present. If it is, then that refusal can be for “any reason rational or 
irrational, or for no reason at all, even where that decision may lead to his or her own 
death” (Re T (1993) (p. 102E, 113D, 115G).  
 
Self-determination and personal autonomy are ‘fundamental’ to the interpretation of 
Article 8 of the ECHR and can be seen to incorporate both bodily and existential 
interpretations of it. Self-determination can be seen to be a ‘bridging concept’ 
connecting physical, intellectual and identity dimensions of the person.  
 
6.3.3 Expansive uses of autonomy as the person (capability)  
There is evidence under common law, the influence of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, of a developing understanding of 
agency. At common law, there is evidence of increasing judicial awareness that 
people need to be able to exercise their choices, rather than merely having the formal 
right to do so. In Re T (1993), Re MB (1997) and Re B (2002), the courts focus on 
potential ‘internal’ obstacles to freedom of choice. This develops the common law’s 
previous preoccupation with external hindrance, e.g. third party coercion (cf. Re T 
(1993)). Under the MCA, the statutorily-established incapacity criteria are 
supplemented by a requirement that practical steps be taken to ensure that those with 
limited decision-making abilities are supported. Autonomy is a function, not simply 
of choice and capacity, but also of ‘capability’, presupposing supporting and 
enabling conditions of choice-making.  
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Under the ECHR, the concept of autonomy is further expanded. In Pretty (2002), the 
House of Lords affirms that Article 8 (the right to ‘private life’) “protects the 
physical, moral, and psychological integrity of the individual” (p.818C). This is 
supported by decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights where these elements are used conjunctively with the concepts of 
autonomy and dignity (pp. 819G, 821G). In Burke (2005), this is extended to include 
a person’s ‘physical and social identity’, including a right to personal development 
and to establish personal relationships, following the seminal decision of the ECtHR 
in Pretty. The case of Pretty v. UK 
42
 described autonomy as an ‘important principle’ 
inherent in Article 8 of the ECHR. Subsequent cases (Burke (2005), Burke (2006), 
Purdy (2009), Purdy (2010), and Re M (2011) have taken the Pretty decision into 
account in their interpretations of autonomy, including the ECtHR jurisprudence 
which underlies it. 
 
This section reveals the developing of a holistic concept of the autonomy of the 
person, embracing not only bodily and intellectual dimensions of the self, but also 
psychological, relational and the moral. The function of Article 8 is to guarantee as 
an aspect of ‘private life’ a person’s right to express personal identity. The concept 
of autonomy inherent in this Article cannot be restricted to ‘physical essentialism’, 
the right to be ‘let alone’, or to ‘liberal individualism’, the right to choose and to 
effect that choice. Instead, the English courts, under the influence of the ECHR are 
incorporating a ‘psychosomatic’ and ‘psychosocial’ understanding of autonomy into 
the jurisprudence that reaffirms its bodily and intellectual dimensions, but extends it 
                                                                                       
 
42 (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1 at [61] 
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to include a dimension of ‘relational consciousness’. There is awareness in the 
developing jurisprudence of the interdependent nature of persons and their 
connections with the wider world.  
 
In addition, it is proposed that there an inferential relationship between autonomy as 
a concept fundamental to the interpretation of ‘private life’ respected by Article 8, 
and the concept of ‘dignity’.  According to the ECtHR in Pretty ‘human dignity’ is, 
with ‘human freedom’ “the very essence of the Convention”. With the exception of 
Bland (1993), the notion of dignity is used sparingly before the advent of the ECHR 
and, although used more frequently subsequently, is nowhere defined. It is, like 
autonomy, a foundational concept. Deciding what is best for your body is part of 
one’s ‘persona’ and human dignity. Dignity is a ‘core value’ commanding a broad 
international consensus and inextricably bound up with respect for human life 
(Pretty (2002) (p. 842D).  
 
It is used in repeated conjunction with physical and intellectual concepts of 
autonomy (cf. Pretty (2002) (p. 819G)
43
; Burke (2005 (p.453G)). The fullest analysis 
of dignity in the jurisprudence appears in Burke (2005)
44
. It is identified as a core 
value predating the Convention (p. 444G; cf. Bland (1993) (p. 826G)). Although 
dignity appears to be used as a distinct concept to autonomy, the right to it is 
designed, amongst other things, to protect ‘mental stability’. Mental stability, 
however, is part of the complex concept of autonomy which is foundational to the 
                                                                                       
 
43 The court relies heavily on the Canadian Rodriguez (1994) case 
44  The term appears 75 times 
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guarantee of rights to private life under Article 8 as established in the ECtHR in 
Pretty. At both common law and under European law, the protection of dignity 
entails the avoidance of experiences of debasement and humiliation that threaten to 
undermine the persona and identity of the individual (Burke (2005) (p. 474C).  
 
6.4 THE INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL 
ORDER ON JUDGES’ DECISIONS 
 
The second operational measure for the testing of traditions which was advanced in 
chapter 4 is based on the hypothesis that there are different layers of interpretation at 
work in the use of autonomy and that more elemental meanings are connected to and 
subsumed by moral and political traditions of interpreting liberty and freedom 
(freedom- from and freedom to). Brandom (1994) argues that it is possible to 
identify strong relations of inference between layers of meaning.  Reading from the 
background data suggested the need to examine whether and the extent to which 
concepts of rights and freedom introduced under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 have influenced judges’ patterns of 
interpreting and using autonomy, and whether any such influence has created 
tensions between traditions of law.    
 
6.4.1 Inferential relations between concepts of autonomy and moral orders of 
freedom 
Chapter 4 set out for enquiry whether inferential relations existed between layers of 
the concept autonomy: particular expressions, underlying concepts and theoretical 
categories. At the level of conceptual analysis, particular conceptions of autonomy 
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are inferentially related to concepts of body, mind and identity and to categories of 
liberty, self-determination and capability. Many of these particulars can be related to 
their associated concepts fairly straightforwardly. For example, bodily inviolability 
and bodily integrity clearly relate to the body. Without much further extension, the 
notions of spatial privacy and freedom from unwanted interference are easily 
construed in bodily terms, especially when interpreted in their factual contexts (e.g. 
enforced caesarean cases such as Re MB (1997) and St. George’s (1999). Sometimes 
support for positing  particular inferential relationships can be found in the literature, 
e.g. self-ownership (cf. Archard, 2008).  
 
6.4.2 The tradition of liberty: autonomy as negative freedom 
The research has shown that there are number of conceptions of autonomy associated 
with a tradition of legal rationality based on precedent and a tradition of autonomy in 
interpreting the legal person which focusses on the body. The tradition of legal 
rationality based on the past is connected to the ‘non-interventionist’ character of 
English law. The notion of ‘civil liberties’ as opposed to ‘human rights’ is an 
outgrowth of the idea that citizens are free to do as they please without infringement 
unless authorised by law (cases or statute).  
 
The conceptions of bodily integrity, privacy, and freedom from interference are 
clearly resonant with the negative concept of freedom: ‘freedom-from’. The cases 
involving cognitively-impaired patients expounded earlier in this thesis are deeply 
concerned with protecting the bodily integrity or autonomy of the persons concerned. 
The cases of Bland (1993) and Re A (2001) each advance on the basis of their own 
facts the remarkable proposition that taking action (removing tubes or separation 
239 
 
surgery) which would hasten death would simultaneously restore to them the bodily 
autonomy that the continuance of the status quo (medical treatment or lack of 
surgery) denied them. The bodily construction of negative freedom expresses such a 
powerful cultural ideal that bodily autonomy is something that can survive the loss 
of mental capacity and legal competence. The citizen can be autonomous by mere 
fact of his bodily ‘let-aloneness’ even if he lack cognitive awareness (intellectual 
autonomy) or the wherewithal to express a sense of self. The concept of ‘freedom-
from’ expresses the tradition of liberty which in particular underlies the common law 
tradition. 
 
The concept of self-determination is a ‘bridging concept’ straddling the concepts of 
‘freedom-from’ (non-interference with the body) and ‘freedom-to’ (enabling 
development of the person), and the traditions of liberty and freedom. Self-
determination has a bodily sense – bodily self-determination – has deep roots in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence based on common law (cf. Schloendorff (1914)). The 
function of consent (which is an expression of freedom of choice based on mental 
capacity) is an intellectual concept which is designed to authorise interventions 
which would otherwise infringe the negative liberty to which citizens are 
presumptively entitled. Cases involving heavily pregnant women are powerfully 
illustrative. The legal proposition that treatment refusals by heavily pregnant women 
which threaten their own lives and those of their unborn children cannot be 
overridden if they are competent, however idiosyncratic their reasons, is a powerful 
rhetorical expression of the tradition of liberty exemplified by the common law 
tradition of legal rationality (cf. Re T (1993); Re MB (1997); St. George’s (1999)). 
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The common law – the body – the tradition of liberty appears in a clear inferential 
relationship. 
 
 6.4.3 The developing tradition of autonomy as positive freedom  
In the developing tradition, the conception of self-determination can be seen to 
encompass the various elemental meanings of ‘intellectual autonomy’ identified in 
the case law: freedom of choice and mental capacity. In addition to the ‘negative’ 
construction of self-determination as ‘consent’, self-determination can support a 
number of ‘positive’ constructions which suggest a concept of ‘freedom-to’, or 
‘freedom’ (in the sense used by Arendt (1973)). The idea of determining what 
happens to one’s body presupposes some measure of ‘self-control’ and personal 
efficacy which allows the citizen to live a life of his own choosing. Self-
determination is also used in a ‘liberal individualist’ sense of being able to choose 
and realise one’s choice. In Re T (1993), the Court of Appeal explicitly defines self-
determination as a person’s right to live as he chooses and to decide their own fate 
(p. 112E-H). This, the court makes clear, presupposes the capacity to do so, and it is 
on the basis of this capacity, that the individual has an ‘absolute’ right to choose, 
both deliberatively or non-deliberatively.  
 
The developing tradition of autonomy as positive freedom has also been influenced 
by the rationality of the public sphere (the Mental Capacity Act 2005). Two research 
cases decided under the MCA (Re A (2011) and D Borough Council (2011)) reveal 
the practical repercussions of its underlying philosophy to optimise the decision-
making powers of persons who in isolation lack decision-making competence. The 
idea that a person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all 
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practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success represents a 
major change of policy from the common law. The effects of this have been seen 
recently seen (noting that there have not yet been many cases decided in the Court of 
Protection raising questions of capacity) in the two research cases where judges have 
issued interim orders pending final determination in order to leave time for 
autonomy-enhancing interventions by the State.
45
  
 
The development of a tradition of autonomy as positive freedom has been radically 
affected by the introduction of the European Convention on Human Rights into 
English law. The Convention represents a tradition of legal rationality as ‘value’. It 
has introduced a ‘higher law’ in the form of ethical principles, from which the 
English judiciary are invited to deduce propositions of law. Through a process of 
deduction, the courts have identified and instantiated autonomy as a ‘human right’ 
inherent in Article 8 of the European Convention (cf. Burke (2005), Purdy (2009), 
Purdy (2010), and Re M (2011). Autonomy is now a positive entitlement guaranteed 
by the State, subject only to the ‘derogations’ contained in Article 8(2). It is also a 
much more complex concept than exists at common law or under the Mental 
Capacity Act, embracing bodily, intellectual and identity dimensions of the person.  
 
There is a strong sense in these cases that the human right of autonomy is not 
exercised in isolation, but in relationship with other people and the world. The 
                                                                                       
 
45 It should be noted, however, that these cases leave open the question of what standard of competence these 
autonomy-enhancing interventions are aiming for. In D Borough Council (2011), there could be something rather 
paradoxical about a philosophy which seeks to supply enabling conditions for a low threshold of capacity which 
would lead to potentially deleterious welfare consequences for the patient.  
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spheres of private and public life are not mutually exclusive but porous. Capabilities 
for autonomy are evolved and realised in relations with others and through the social 
(and by extension the economic and political) conditions that make this possible. The 
concept of ‘capability’ which is inherent in the relational model of autonomy which 
the courts are developing under the Convention and its jurisprudence can plausibly 
be related inferentially to concept of still underdeveloped concept of ‘dignity’ which 
is foundational to the Convention. The incipient understanding of autonomy-as-
dignity (or capability) in these new cases adumbrates a holistic approach to 
autonomy that recognises that autonomy is not simply about the values and purposes 
of autonomy but also about enabling conditions (cf. Chapter 2).  
 
6.4.4 Tensions between traditions? 
The analysis of reports in the previous section suggests that there is evidence of 
judges interpreting and using the concept of autonomy so as to tie its meaning to the 
larger moral and political ideas of positive or negative freedom. The argument that 
there is an influence of such traditions on judicial decision making in complex 
medical cases can be further developed by analysing the influence of the ECHR. The 
incorporation of the ECHR has introduced a new tradition of legal rationality directly 
into English law which has until now been based on the prudential rationality of 
common law and the instrumental rationality of statute. Three cases (NHS Trust v A 
(2001); Burke (2005); and Burke (2006)) may disclose evidence of a ‘tension’ 
between traditions which has resulted from the confluence of legal traditions. This 
tension, it is suggested, can be discerned within the text of the judgement in the first 
case, and between the judgements of the two levels of court hierarchy in the second 
cases. Though the influence of traditions can be discerned in these cases, the chapter 
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will, nevertheless, proceed to conclude that analysis of the set of cases over time 
reveals judges developing a much more sophisticated practice of interpretation and 
decision-making about autonomy rather than expressing a simple affiliation to this or 
that legal or moral and political tradition.  
 
 6.4.4.1 The Case of NHS Trust A (2001) 
The case of NHS Trust A (2001) concerned the lawfulness of withdrawing ANH 
from two patients who had been in PVS for four years. Because the ECHR had 
recently been passed, a declaration as to lawfulness was required even though the 
facts were closely analogous to those of Bland (1993). The passing of the Human 
Rights Act (1998) meant that the case was governed by the general ethical principles 
enshrined in Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR, not by common law. Cases decided 
under the latter now have at best ‘persuasive’ authority. The alleged tension between 
traditions in the case concerns the interpretation of Article 2 (right-to-life) and the 
impact of Article 8 (right to ‘private life’) on that interpretation.  
 
The legal issue was whether the withdrawal of ANH would amount to ‘intentional 
deprivation of life’ and thus infringe the human right to life protected by Article 2. 
The court had a chance to explore the scope and applicability of Article 2 without 
reference to common law and thus to engage in the kind of ‘big thinking’ associated 
with ‘constitutional’ adjudication. Instead the court chose to focus on whether the 
common law distinction between ‘acts’ and ‘omissions’ explored in Bland was 
relevant and whether an ‘omission’ which would have been lawful at common law 
fell outside the scope of the Article. It concluded that a lawful omission would not 
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amount to an intentional deprivation of life, i.e. that it satisfied the medical norms 
concerning ‘best interests’ established at common law.  
 
The tension between traditions is perhaps best evidenced in the judge’s ancillary 
comment that it might be relevant to scrutinise the reasons for the decision to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment ‘in the light of the positive obligation to safeguard 
life’ (p. 358D). Otherwise, the court could see not difference between failures on 
grounds of ‘best interests’ to initiate treatment or to withdraw it. In both cases, the 
theoretic view that it would be the patient’s condition that would take its course to 
death applied in accordance with common law analysis. The High Court held that if 
continued treatment were not in the patients’ best interests then it would violate their 
personal autonomy which was retained despite the loss of legal capacity (p.358G; cf. 
Re M (2011)).This was construed as ‘bodily integrity’ intrusion into which would 
need justification under Article 8 (2). This appears to underscore the common law’s 
traditional common law commitment to the unencumbered body, in keeping with 
English political traditions of non-interference.  
 
6.4.4.2 The case of Burke (2005) and (2006) 
In Burke, the alleged tension between traditions potentially lies between the 
judgements of the High Court and Court of Appeal. The case concerned a 44-year-
old man with cerebellar ataxia, a terminal neuro-degenerative disease. The claimant 
sought judicial review of the legal content of some provisions of the GMC guidance 
on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, fearful that a reasonable 
interpretation might leave doctors with discretion to determine the withdrawal of 
such treatment against his wishes once he became incommunicado or mentally 
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incapacitous. The High Court judge determined that questions of personal autonomy 
were central to the case, principally the nature and scope of patient choice, and to the 
larger issues of medical law and ethics (p. 430E-F).  
 
The distinctive feature of the High Court judgement is its appeal to the ethical value 
of autonomy enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention. The scope of 
personal autonomy, the court argues, extends to the preservation of one’s physical 
and psychological integrity, and mental stability, which includes freedom to 
determine the means and timing of one’s death. Unless this prima facie right was 
overridden by the qualifications in Article 8(2), then it extends even to a subjective 
interpretation of one’s ‘best interests’ which under common law and the MCA are 
matters to be determined by the medical profession. This would lift the restriction of 
patient autonomy to treatment refusals and represent a significant recalibration of the 
power balance between doctor and patient. The patient would have an autonomy 
right to sub-optimal medical treatment, at least in the factual circumstance which 
obtained.  
 
The Court of Appeal reacted with rare vitriol to the High Court’s panoptic approach 
to the case and stringently reiterated a number of common law themes (p. 292H-
293B). It acknowledged with faint praise his self-evident “erudition and industry” 
which it deemed “misplaced” (p. 296C-D) and found his ‘intense jurisprudential 
analysis’ unhelpful. In particular, it restated basic principles of common law 
methodology: the interdependence of factual context and the enunciation of legal 
principle and the implications of judicial decisions for practice, especially where 
issues of ethical controversy are involved (p. 293E). The wide-ranging approach of 
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the High Court judge was all the more inappropriate for its being hypothetical – what 
the claimant feared had not yet transpired. The Court of Appeal devoted little space 
to judicial reflection on the concepts of autonomy and dignity which formed a 
significant portion of the High Court judgement and which constitute the fundaments 
of the Convention.  
 
Discussion of these two cases – of NHS Trust and of Burke – shows that there is the 
potential for different traditions of jurisprudence to clash when judges have to form 
decision about autonomy in complex medical cases. Yet the discussion of cases in 
the last three chapters shows a clear trend over time for judges to develop a 
sophisticated conceptual framework of autonomy that accommodates the separate 
emphases – of body, mind and identity – in different traditions of legal and moral 
interpretation.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The initial engagement with the data base – in initial reading of the more public 
cases in complex medical law as well as background reading about the potential 
influence of a new body of European jurisprudence in English common law – 
generated the hypothesis that judicial decision-making in ethically contentious 
medical cases would face a tension between legal traditions which were at the same 
time traditions of moral and political order.  
 
This chapter has drawn attention to the operations of distinct traditions, informed by 
traditions of autonomy in interpreting the legal person and the influence of traditions 
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of moral and political order on judges’ decisions. MacIntyre has, as was seen earlier 
in the thesis, provided a stipulative definition of ‘tradition’ as:  
 
A tradition (of enquiry) is an argument extended 
through time in which certain fundamental agreements 
are defined and refined in terms of two kinds of 
conflict, those with critics and enemies external to the 
tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those 
fundamental agreements, and those internal, 
interpretative debates through which the meaning and 
rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be 
expressed and by whose progress a tradition is 
constituted. 
 
 It can plausibly argued that the research cases reflect an internal debate within 
medical jurisprudence constituted by traditions of enquiry: the tradition of non-
intervention represented by the common law, the judicial focus on the body, and the 
moral and political imperative of non-regulation; and the tradition of personal 
efficacy, enablement and support represented by the judicial focus on the whole 
person and the moral and political imperatives of providing options and means of 
enablement.  
 
Nevertheless, the last three chapters have demonstrated that the judiciary have been 
developing an increasingly sophisticated ethical language in response to the new 
kinds of contentious medical laws case which are arising for adjudication. This 
development has been both ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’. In terms of temporal 
progression, there is evidence of a clear development of judicial language concerning 
questions of autonomy over time. This temporal progression can be explicated in 
terms of the increase in the number and type of cases which have arisen for 
judgement. The language of autonomy has become more sophisticated over time and 
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there is evidence that the judiciary have begun to synthesise the various elemental 
meanings they have assigned to autonomy in individual cases. This is in keeping 
with the common law methodology of addressing the issues raised by tailoring the 
law and the concepts on which it is based to the facts of particular cases. 
 
This understanding of temporal development is reinforced by synchronic (cross 
sectional) analysis of distinct periods during the past thirty years. It was proposed 
that before the 1980s, ethical language was not being used in legal cases arising 
within the healthcare context. This language becomes current at the moment when 
medical cases with inherently ethical content begin to arise for adjudication (1980s). 
The first use of autonomy in a legal case in 1990 represented a major linguistic shift 
and signalled that the judiciary were beginning to develop a more sophisticated 
language and incorporating it into judicial practice. Throughout the 1990s there is a 
clear temporal progression in the use of autonomy. With the coming into force of the 
ECHR into English law and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 a richer concept of 
autonomy begins to be incorporated into judicial practice importing a more 
expansive use of autonomy as the person-as- capability over against the restricted 
use associated with the common law’s physical essentialism (the body) and liberal 
individualism  (the mind). 
  
The discovery of these diachronic and synchronic dimensions of analysis thus 
reveals that the judiciary have been developing over time a more sophisticated 
intellectual and conceptual framework in order to ensure that their legal practice is 
responding adequately to the increasingly complex ethically contentious cases which 
are arising for judgement. Medical jurisprudence must be understood therefore, as an 
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impressive community of practice that is constantly developing medical law, 
integrating legal and conceptual resources from different traditions to meet the needs 
of their complex cases.  MacIntyre himself describes law as a practice and ‘public 
law’ has also be so described (Loughlin, 2003). The notion of practice has already 
been elaborated in terms articulated by MacIntyre who has defined it as ( MacIntyre, 
1981: 187):  
 
…any coherent and complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity through which 
goods internet to that activity are realised in the course 
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, 
that form of activity.  
 
The practice of medical jurisprudence is clearly neither fixed nor finished. It has 
been, as has been seen, modified by both incidental (the accidents of litigation) and 
major (new sources of law) developments. The judiciary as practitioners of the law 
may be likened to performers who operate within the framework of customs, rules, 
canons and conventions that comprise the practice. Medical jurisprudence as a 
complex practice is, as Oakeshott has observed of ‘practice’ generally, ‘an 
instrument to be played upon, not a tune to be played’(Oakeshott, 1975: 56).  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: A CONFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE AND 
TRADITION FOR JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter outlines the core findings of the research, reflects on the causes of 
changes to autonomy as a concept,  and considers the likely trajectory of future 
changes for policy and practice. It concludes with consideration of the implications 
of the study for future research.   
 
7.2 THE CORE FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH  
 
This research has investigated how and why judges use and interpret autonomy in 
ethically contentious medical law cases. The initial research question taken up by the 
study asked whether judges use the concept of autonomy and how they use it. The 
investigation led to two kinds of empirical finding: descriptions of judges’ use of 
autonomy, and explanations of the connections and associations that begin to explain 
why judges have developed their interpretations of autonomy. 
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7.2.1 Describing judges’ use of autonomy 
The research discovered three basic findings about judges’ use of autonomy: that 
judges express a variety of uses of autonomy; they have developed a concept of 
autonomy; and their concept of autonomy has developed over time. These findings 
are presented in turn: 
 
7.2.1.1 Judges express a variety of uses of autonomy 
This study has demonstrated that judges express a variety of uses of autonomy in the 
medical law reports. Nineteen distinct elemental uses of autonomy were identified 
which exhibit its multifaceted nature. Although, academic commentators have 
observed that judges use autonomy in different ways, this is based on knowledge 
acquired ‘in passing’ rather than via systematic analysis. The investigation of the law 
reports undertaken in this thesis is the first attempt of its kind at an empirical 
investigation of the concept of autonomy in the medical law reports. The discovery 
of a sizeable variety of elemental uses in the legal judgements invites further 
reflection on the nature of autonomy – its meanings and whether these fit together 
into a coherent concept.  
 
7.2.1.2   Judges have developed a concept of autonomy 
Further analysis of the law reports have progressed from elemental uses of autonomy 
to articulate a more coherent concept of autonomy as expressing aspects of the 
person: the body (self-ownership), the mind (self-determination), and identity (self-
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realisation). This developing understanding of autonomy as the self in three 
dimensions has allowed a more sophisticated concept of autonomy to take shape. 
The concept of autonomy as bodily integrity or physical sovereignty has strong roots 
in common law. The physical dimension of autonomy has negative and positive 
senses. In the negative sense, bodily integrity refers to personal liberty or freedom 
from unwanted outside physical interference. In its positive sense, it concerns a 
person’s freedom to move her body through space and time as desired. In the law 
reports, there is a strong association between the autonomy of the self and the 
concept of mind as self-determination: the property of choosing freely and rationally, 
as opposed to being free of coercion or deception. A third aspect of the autonomy of 
the person is expressed in the association of autonomy with personal identity, the 
capacity to relate to oneself practically, namely in self-respect, of self-trust 
(openness and trust towards ones feelings) and self-esteem, as a proper sense of self-
worth. This understanding of autonomy as personal identity comes to be associated 
in medical jurisprudence as self-creation of being free to express and realise the 
person one chooses to become. The meaning and interpretation judges give to their 
usage of autonomy has elaborated a concept of autonomy as self-determination of 
body, mind and identity. The development of this  more ‘holistic’ approach to 
autonomy has been encouraged by the enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
and the domestic jurisprudence decided under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Such events encouraged a third core finding. 
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7.2.1.3 Judges’ concept of autonomy has developed over time 
When the medical law reports were contextualised by placing them in historical 
order of publication the investigation also revealed an emerging use of autonomy 
over time. There is evidence of an unfolding in stages of judges’ use of ethical 
language, informing the difficult practice of decision-making in ethically-contentious 
medical cases. Three ‘watershed’ moments in the development of the English 
medical jurisprudence have been identified. Firstly, there is the introduction of the 
term ‘autonomy’ for the first time in 1990 (Re F (1990) at p. 78E). Secondly, there is 
a ‘moment’, represented by the case of St. George’s (1999), when autonomy exhibits 
itself as part of the judicial lingua franca; autonomy appears explicitly as a section 
heading in the judgement drawing together previously-decided cases under it and is 
referred to for the first time as a ‘principle’. Thirdly, the incorporation in 2000 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights through the medium of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 represents a third pivotal moment in the jurisprudence of autonomy. The 
European Court of Human Rights identifies autonomy as a ‘human right’ under 
Article 8, leading the English courts to draw upon European jurisprudence providing 
more ‘holistic’ constructions of autonomy, autonomy as ‘body’, ‘mind’ and 
‘identity’.  
 
The growing consciousness of an unfolding language of autonomy after 1990 led to 
the discovery that the judiciary was using a range of elemental uses of autonomy 
prior to the first judicial use of the term itself in 1990. The investigation discovered 
that the rise of ethical language, e.g. ‘bodily inviolability’, ‘self-determination’, 
‘mental capacity; in medical cases broadly corresponds with the emergence of 
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medical law as a distinct legal topic (i.e. early to mid-1980s). There is some evidence 
that English jurisprudence in related areas of law (e.g. criminal law) and non-English 
common law jurisprudence (e.g. American, Canadian) are sources of influence.  
 
The emergence of the judicial concept of autonomy can thus be periodised in four 
stages constituting: (i) the period prior to the 1980’s when there was no ethical 
language to speak of in medical cases; (ii) the emergence of cases containing ethical 
language, but not the term autonomy; (iii) the use of autonomy in a restricted sense 
prior to 2000; and (iv) the emergence after 2000 of a more elaborate concept of 
autonomy. This finding constitutes a significant contribution to the related literature 
demonstrating as it does that judicial thought and practice is developing as it 
continues to address the ethically-contentious medical cases that arise for 
adjudication.  
 
This section has described basic findings of what has been discovered about judges’ 
use of autonomy in ethically contentious medical cases. Descriptions invite analysis 
of why these developments in the use of autonomy have taken place. Change needs 
to be explained. Empirical investigation has also discovered connections and 
associations between judges’ use of autonomy and aspects of the legal context of 
decision-making. Such empirical connections begin to suggest ways of interpreting 
and explaining judges’ use of autonomy.   
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7.2.2 Explaining the development in judges use of autonomy  
As the empirical investigation unfolded it began to deepen its understanding and 
explanation of associations that might explain why judges used autonomy as they did 
and why their uses developed over time.  The study considered some evidence that 
judges interpretations of autonomy might be influenced by the level of court 
hierarchy at which they are decided suggesting that higher courts were prepared to 
give greater weight to ethical principles over case precedents in view of their greater 
law-making powers. But there is not sufficient evidence to point to a trend of the 
influence of judicial structure on uses of autonomy. Three more significant 
influences on judicial decision-making are the focus of discussion here: the influence 
of the Academy, of public policy and legislation, and the influence of traditions of 
judicial practice. 
 
7.2.2.1   The influence on judges of academic thought   
The research has disclosed that the variety of uses of autonomy in the medical law 
reports has a basis in academic thought. The research has confirmed the early 
suspicion of regularities of usage between the jurisprudence and the medical law and 
philosophical literature through a systematic semantic analysis of the latter. The 
variation evident in judicial usage of the autonomy concept has also been found to be 
present in the academic literature.  In addition, the elemental uses of the concept of 
autonomy in both contexts have been shown to be fluid, if not interchangeable. 
These regularities of usage support the proposition that there is a degree of judicial 
reliance on academic thought reflected in the medical jurisprudence. This 
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proposition is supported by the observations of academics of a special relationship 
between medical law and ethics and that in its infancy medical law relied on non-
legal sources (e.g. bioethics, philosophy, sociology and theology) to supply its 
foundational materials.  
 
The investigation has also demonstrated that there is evidence in the law reports, and 
sources outside the cases, of a relationship between judicial usage and academic 
thought.  The reports suggest that the judiciary is drawing upon academic materials 
for a variety of purposes, including as sources of legal authority and guidance. There 
is also  a broader trend within the common law to accept citations from a range of 
academic sources, including living authors, although there has as yet been no 
systematic analysis of judicial citation practices in medical law. This thesis suggests 
that in the research sample that judges are referring to the academic literature in 
order to provide their decisions with ethical and legal justification, or as sources of 
ethical and legal guidance, or in order to highlight the plurality of ethical opinion 
which exists on medical law issues. This appeal to academic literature has, in one or 
two cases (e.g. Re B (2002)), has directly concerned the question of the meaning of 
autonomy.  
 
It is proposed that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the judiciary is aware of 
broader academic developments and that these have a measure of influence on 
judicial thinking.  
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7.2.2.2 The influence of public policy, legislation and law 
Although the thesis began by looking at the connections between judges’ use of 
autonomy and the academic literature in medical law, it was clear from early 
background reading that the creation of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(2000) and the Mental Capacity Act (2005) would constitute bodies of law with 
significant consequences for English Common Law. The discovery from the law 
reports that judges use of autonomy changed over time is also empirically associated 
with these fundamental changes to public policy and law in England and across 
Europe. Public policy accelerated change in use and interpretation of autonomy.  
 
The more expansive interpretation of autonomy defined by the European Convention 
has transformed the legal context and influenced judges’ decision-making in more 
recent cases (e.g. Pretty (2002); Burke (2005); Purdy (2009)). The Human Rights 
Act 1998 has enshrined the exact words of the Convention into English statute and 
made them the subject of direct interpretation by judges. The enactment of the 
Convention into English law has had the effect of giving judges new interpretative 
possibilities beyond the scope of existing precedents. The Human Rights Act has 
also made it a statutory requirement for English judges to ‘take into account’ the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and thus the more developed 
European case law on autonomy. The Convention has introduced a new ethos into 
the law based on ethical values and deductive logic, in addition to the common law 
tradition on particular cases and inductive reasoning.  
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The interpretation of the Mental Capacity Act and the European Convention on 
Human Rights has started to suggest a view of the self in which autonomy is not 
exercised in isolation, but intersubjectively, interdependently and in relationship with 
others. This complex interpretation of autonomy incorporates personal identity and 
relationships rather than being restricted to body and intellect alone. The Mental 
Capacity Act’s emphasis on optimising conditions for competent decision-making 
and a person’s autonomous right to   form relationships with others derived from 
European jurisprudence represents the basis of a new political obligation to promote 
freedom rather than mere liberty. On this construction the state has a positive 
obligation to ensure that supporting and enabling conditions are in place to enjoy 
autonomy. Though few cases have yet been decided under the Mental Capacity Act 
(D Borough Council (2010); Re A (2011); Re M (2011)) the legislative construction 
of the common law has introduced an important new emphasis on the provision of 
the supporting and enabling conditions vulnerable persons often need to exercise 
autonomous choice.  
 
Public policy and legislation has acted as a proximate influence on judges’ 
developing use of the concept of autonomy in complex cases. Yet while this is a 
necessary component of explanation it is not sufficient. It fails to identify the 
underlying structure of influence, the traditions of judicial practice which the study 
proposed historically were determining decision-making on autonomy.  
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7.2.2.3   The influence of traditions of judicial practice     
The idea of a tradition in ordinary language, as an established custom handed down, 
is commonplace. In its more technical (MacIntyrean) sense, ‘a living tradition is an 
historically extended, socially embodied argument about the goods which constitute 
the rationality of the tradition’ (1981, 207). The notion of bodies of law as tradition-
constituted ‘practice’ evincing tradition-dependent rationalities is only recently the 
subject of academic reflection. But the basis for such a characterisation is present in 
such. MacIntyre (1981) himself designates law as a complex practice and Loughlin 
(2003) has characterised the act of governing “a highly complex practice, replete 
with ambiguities and tensions” in the context of which “the idea of public law” can 
be grasped.  Medical law is a good example of a complex practice which has  
constituted traditions and these can be seen to resource an internal argument within 
medical law about what concept of autonomy is worth pursuing. The three bodies of 
law considered in the study each express different structures of legal rationality: the 
common law deciding cases on the basis of precedent, European law enjoining 
judges to derive decisions from ethical principles, while the instrumental rationality 
of statute law reflects the ends of democratic reconstruction.  
 
The study has shown not only that these bodies of law disclose traditions of legal 
rationality but that the concept of autonomy itself is shaped by living traditions of 
historically extended and socially embodied argument.  Thus the  concept of 
autonomy in its guises as bodily integrity, privacy and freedom from unwanted 
interference can be seen to be inferentially related to the notion of ‘freedom-from’ 
(liberty). The older notion of ‘civil liberties’ as opposed to ‘human rights’ is 
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associated with the traditional ‘negative’ interpretation of the English constitutional 
tradition. The concept of autonomy in its more positive guises as self-determination 
and self-realisation, supplements the concept of liberty with stronger notions of 
personal agency or freedom-for. On this interpretation, autonomy is understood not 
simply in terms of non-interference but broader notions of empowerment and 
achievement and the material accommodations and supports that these imply and 
necessitate.  
 
Thus legal traditions which have influenced judicial uses and interpretations of 
autonomy in ethically contentious medical law cases have themselves been 
influenced by traditions of moral and political order of (negative) liberty and 
(positive) freedom. These two traditions of freedom have  through inferential 
analysis been seen to be implicit within the elemental uses and meanings in use in 
examination of the law reports. For example, it is proposed that there are substantial 
material inferential relations between the judicial uses of autonomy as ‘bodily 
inviolability’ or ‘bodily integrity’ (Bland (1993), p. 883E), the concept of ‘bodily 
autonomy’ (Yearworth (2010) at p. 13G) and the category of liberty or negative 
freedom. By the same token, similar inferential analysis of the elemental uses of 
freedom of choice, mental capacity, and self-determination in its elemental sense, 
can be abstracted to the more fundamental concept of self-determination, or liberal 
individualism, which, in turn, can be seen to relate to a concept of agency, and, 
perhaps, (positive) freedom. 
 
261 
 
The discovery that medical law is a tradition-constituted practice that influences the 
decision-making of judges about autonomy in ethically contentious cases  generated 
a question for the investigation of law reports concerning whether judges would be 
drawn into a clash of traditions. The study anticipated, in particular, that there was 
the potential for rivalry between the traditions of English common law and the 
European Convention. The common law tradition of non-interference has deep roots 
in the English moral and political tradition which can be glimpsed occasionally in 
the submissions of counsel (where included in the law reports), or the judgment of 
the court. Thus, five cases refer to the ‘libertarian; principle of self-determination (Re 
F (1990; Bland (1993); Re A (2001); Burke (2005) and Purdy (2009). In the 
submissions of counsel in one case (Re T (1993) p. 98G), libertarian self-
determination is explicitly connected with the philosophy of Mill. One case did 
suggest that a judge remained committed to the common law tradition against the 
growing influence of the European Convention. The more conservative approach of 
Lady Justice Butler-Sloss in NHS Trust A in which she appeals to the persuasive 
authority of common law precedent to justify her restricted interpretation of the 
European Convention, i.e. the obligation of continuing to give life-sustaining 
treatment to a patient in PVS. The patient’s bodily autonomy (bodily integrity) 
which remains in spite of the loss of intellectual autonomy is capable of being 
breached by non-beneficent treatment.  
 
The approach of Justice Butler-Sloss, however, has not been typical. The courts 
began to address directly the issue of whether there is a ‘human right’ to autonomy 
in the cases of Pretty (2002), Burke (2005) and Purdy (2010). Under the influence 
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the decision of European Court of Human Rights in the case of Pretty v UK, the 
English courts have in these cases deduced the existence of a prima facie right to 
autonomy from the broad wording contained in Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention. This autonomy right has been interpreted to extend in principle to a 
person’s deciding the manner and timing of her death, subject only to the 
qualifications contained in Article 8(2). The definition of the autonomy read out of 
the Convention has been influenced by the exiting tradition of earlier European case 
law which developed a notion of freedom as more than mere non-interference and 
implying greater state responsibility to assist in the realisation of the self.  
 
The overall investigation of the cases, however, has demonstrated that the judiciary 
has not been fractured into opposing groups who are compelled to support one or 
other of incommensurable traditions. Rather, the judiciary has been called upon, by 
broader legal and political developments for judgements of autonomy which draw 
appropriately upon different traditions to meet the needs of each specific case. For 
example, in the case of Purdy (2010), the scope of a person’s autonomy right under 
Article 8 of the Convention is directly addressed. The court affirmed that the 
claimant had a human right to autonomy which could in principle extend to a right to 
an assisted suicide. The court also confirmed that the English suicide legislation was 
clear and amounted to a ‘blanket ban ‘on assisted suicide, which was permissible 
under the terms of the qualifying Article 8(2), provided it accorded with European 
standards of clarity, foreseeability and proportionality. The court, as it is required to 
do, does not favour the common law tradition, or statute or European human rights 
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law over against each other. Rather, it draws upon each in order to provide a robust 
legal and ethical justification for the decision it has made.  
 
The core empirical findings of the investigation demonstrate a progressive 
development of judges’ use of autonomy from a partial view of autonomy as body 
and mind towards an emerging holistic concept of the person as the identity and 
capability of the person.  In light of this disclosure, the law reports can also be seen 
to reveal a development in the concept of autonomy from its traditional concern in 
criminal and civil law with the protection of bodily inviolability to the development 
of intellectual criteria for determining legal competence towards an 
‘anthropologically’ fuller concept of autonomy emerging in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the English jurisprudence influenced by it. 
This is a more complex finding than the research anticipated at the outset when it 
hypothesised the possibility of rivalry between European and English traditions of 
law. These developments have generated reflections on the ‘grounded theory’ that 
emerges from the empirical investigations.   
 
7.3 REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF CHANGE TO THE USAGE OF 
AUTONOMY AS A CONCEPT: AN EMERGING GROUNDED THEORY 
 
The cycles of enquiry have generated an emergent grounded theory of medical 
jurisprudence as tradition mediated practice.  Judges have developed their practice 
over time and have elaborated a sophisticated ethical language of autonomy in order 
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to mediate the distinct legal traditions of common law, statute and European human 
rights law in response to medical, moral, social and political changes in society. And 
in so doing, it suggests the emergence of a new practice of medical jurisprudence. 
This theory has arisen as a result of the interaction with the data and exemplifies the 
power the processual methodology of grounded theory has to gain real knowledge of 
the structures of the social world which might not otherwise be unearthed. The 
emergent theory of a tradition-mediating judiciary was not anticipated or envisaged 
at the outset of the research process.  
 
The judiciary, it is being hypothesised, is called upon, by broader legal and political 
developments, to evolve as members of an integrated community of practice. The 
traditions of the law can better be interpreted as resources upon which the judiciary 
can draw in order to address the ethical dilemmas inherent in the new legal cases 
which arise for adjudication in legally and socially acceptable ways. This has 
inevitably involved in the cases a process of implicit ‘inter-mural’ reflection as the 
judiciary work out the implications of the changing legal ecology, particularly 
following the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
thesis has highlighted the manner in which judges in their development of medical 
jurisprudence have been the point of convergence of distinctive bodies of law (the 
common law, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights). Judges have not, on the whole, revealed themselves to be the 
sponsors of any one particular tradition over another, giving rise to a ‘clash of 
traditions’ between the advocates of liberty and freedom.  They have displayed a 
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professional responsibility to engage with other traditions to ensure their 
interpretations and decisions are appropriate to the needs of each case. 
 
Each legal tradition is both a decision-making constraint and resource. At common 
law, the judiciary is constrained to advert to past decisions, not simply because of 
legal doctrine but because a peculiarly English form of democracy is at work. In the 
common law tradition, the franchise of past decisions is extended through time on 
the premise that if they have stood the test of time then there is probably something 
in them of prudential value worth applying in the present. Statute law epitomises the 
rationality of the public sphere and constrains the judiciary give expression, through 
a rational reconstruction of parliamentary intent, to the franchise of the present.  The 
European human rights tradition exemplifies a rationality of values, constraining the 
judiciary to give positive legal expression to ethical values of general applicability 
through the use of deductive logic.  
 
Tradition, according to Brennan (2009) is: ‘the crucible of creativity in which the 
current generation can add a layer of intelligence to what has been handed down, 
thus meeting the challenge of a world that has never before existed (2009: 451).  
“Judgement”, as Hauerwas (1986) has observed, “is not a mechanical procedure” 
because “it often has to go beyond existing precedents and current generalisations if 
it is to work out the anomalies in the tradition or meet the demands of a new day” 
(1986: 43).  
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The discipline of medical law, as was observed in Chapter 1, arose in response to 
broader social pressures, the rise of the assertive citizen in particular, seeking a 
recalibration of the power relationship between the medical profession and the 
citizen which has traditionally been weighted firmly in favour of the former. In the 
current, era, perhaps, the citizenry of Europe are looking for more than rights to be 
‘let alone’, or to have one’s rational decisions respected. Rather, they are seeking the 
right to express a sense of self in the context of an increasingly reflective 
appreciation that human beings are not isolated entities, but rather ‘persons-in-
relationship’. There is increasing recognition that people, in their moments of 
vulnerability, a little bit of goodwill from others, to make their way through life 
towards some form of self-realisation.  
 
The richer view of the capabilities of the human person, emanating from the law 
courts and the literature, means that the traditions of freedom, freedom-from and 
freedom-for, are not so conceptually incommensurable as to be rivals. It is more 
widely-appreciated that freedom presupposes liberty, and also requires the material 
resources of society and the state to flourish. The ‘negative’ and ‘positive’  traditions 
of freedom which have characterised the English constitutional settlement of 
common law are now in confluence with a different, more communitarian tradition 
of law and polity emanating from continental Europe and incorporated into the 
English constitutional settlement by statute. The complex construction of autonomy 
which is beginning to be read out of the European Convention and adopted into 
English medical jurisprudence is perhaps the imprimatur of a more integrated 
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‘recognitive’ tradition of autonomy to complement the other aspects of its 
philosophical heritage.  
 
7.4 THE LIKELY TRAJECTORY OF FUTURE CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE STUDY FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
The emergent grounded theory of the investigation suggests a likely trajectory of 
future change for judges in their judicial decision-making about autonomy. The 
judiciary can now be seen to be the carriers of an interpretive debate within the 
complex practice of medical law concerning questions of autonomy. MacIntyre’s 
concept of tradition as a historically-extended argument about goods internal to 
(judicial) practice is a helpful way of conceptualising the manner in which judges 
now need to engage with different traditions of freedom as they address the new 
medical law cases which are arising for adjudication. This study of law reports 
therefore has implications for future policy and practice in key areas for: The 
healthcare professions; the role of ‘intermediate’ influences on the law-making 
process and judicial decision-making; and the contribution of medical jurisprudence 
to ethical and political debate about developments in medicine and the biosciences. 
These will be considered in turn.  
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7.4.1 The healthcare professions 
This thesis began with the proposition that the concept of autonomy was a legal, 
ethical and cultural value of paramount importance. The investigation of the law 
reports was prompted by the suspicion that there was considerable variation of usage 
of autonomy in the law reports and the literature. The finding that such variation 
actually exists is significant for medical policy and practice because of the great 
importance attached in the medical profession to autonomy as a key principle of 
biomedical ethics. If autonomy is advanced as a value to be protected, upheld and 
promoted, then it is important that healthcare students and practitioners more fully 
understand its complex nature. There is, it is contended, a tendency for healthcare 
practitioners to reduce autonomy to the restricted dimension of ‘intellectual 
autonomy’, i.e. the requirements of a legally-valid consent.  
 
This is understandable in view of medical concerns to avoid litigation for non-
consensual interventions. This thesis, however, has drawn attention to two 
dimensions of autonomy of which the healthcare professions might become more 
fully aware. Firstly, the thesis has drawn attention to a ‘physical essentialist’ 
conception of autonomy which proposes that a person’s autonomy can, in a sense, 
subsist beyond the loss of intellectual autonomy and that autonomy understood in 
this sense is closely associated with notions of ‘dignity’ (the idea that the person’s 
body should continue to be respected even when the patient’s capacity has been lost) 
and ‘privacy’ (the notion that that all persons have, in some sense, a presumptive 
right to be ‘let alone’). Secondly, this thesis has also drawn attention to an 
understanding of autonomy which attempts to encapsulate the patient as a ‘whole 
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person’. On this view, the patient should not be reduced to her physical or 
intellectual dimensions, but as an integrated totality of dimensions which the 
healthcare professions are called at some level to address. It is proposed that the 
implication for policy and practice of this multi-faceted use of autonomy is to induct 
the healthcare professions through education and training into a richer concept of 
‘the person’. There is already evidence of policy moves to promote ‘equality of 
autonomy’ in respect of the treatment and care vulnerable adults (cf. Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2009; Bach and Kerzner, 2010). This ‘equality’ view of 
autonomy has enjoined a shift away from a view of autonomy based on liberty and 
rationality alone to one grounded in notions of ‘identity’ and ‘dignity’.  
 
The findings of this thesis could be disseminated in medical, legal and ethical 
journals, especially those likely to be read by members of the healthcare professions, 
e.g. the Journal of Observational Pain (whose editorial board I have recently 
joined), the Journal of Medical Ethics (for which I have already written), and the 
Medical Law Journal (for which I would like to write). The implications of my study 
could also be disseminated through teaching (e.g. Warwick Medical School), the 
organisation of inter-disciplinary seminars and the publication of research papers 
drawing from the content of the thesis.  
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7.4.2 The role of ‘intermediate’ influences on the law-making process and judicial 
decision-making 
The role of ‘intermediate’ authorities, such as the legal and bioethical literature, 
professional guidance (GMC, HFEA) and the impact of interveners and their legal 
submissions on judicial decision-making have implications for descriptions of the 
law making process and the normative principles underlying judicial lawmaking. 
This elucidation of this role promises to contribute to a fuller account of how judges 
choose to take narrow or expansive approaches to the cases before them.  
 
There are important questions to be asked about the extent to which judges rely on 
academic literature for sources of law and guidance in ethically-contentious medical 
law cases. Firstly, the traditionally close relationship between medical law and 
medical ethics in the academic context, and the inherently ethical content of medical 
jurisprudence, suggests that academic thought will continue to impinge on judicial 
thinking at some level. It is contended that the influence of European law on English 
common law will gradually make the English judiciary more aware of the interplay 
between juristic thought and jurisprudence on the European continent. The structure 
of English law reports are already beginning to reflect the distinction between ‘fact’ 
and ‘law’ which is less clear-cut in earlier English medical jurisprudence.  
 
Secondly, the transformation of professional norm into legal norm has been show to 
occur frequently in the context of medical practice. Greater awareness of the 
influence of professional guidance on judicial lawmaking in the medico-legal context 
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will likely prompt further reflection on the influence of professional norms on legal 
norms (cf. Miola, 2007; Foster, 2009; 2011). This will encourage greater reflection 
on how the practices and policies that guide professional conduct in the clinical 
context ultimately acquire authority as norms recognised and enforced by judges in 
the medico-legal sphere.  It will also lead to greater acknowledgement of these extra-
judicial documents as sources of principles of medical ethics and corresponding 
reflection on the relationship between medical ethical principles and legal precedents 
as the bases of legal decisions.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis has drawn attention to those who intervene in legal cases (‘public 
interveners’) in order to influence the outcome. Investigation the impact of these 
interveners and of their submissions on judicial thought offers a potentially revealing 
line of enquiry. There are important questions to be asked about the status, role and 
legitimacy of the various interventions by individuals and public bodies in ethically-
contentious medical cases and the extent to which their submissions are relied on by 
the judiciary.  
 
The significance of the influence of these various forms of ‘soft law’ on judicial 
thinking  calls for a development in the ‘community of practice’ between the 
judiciary and legal and non-legal academics. This can perhaps be promoted by 
providing contexts within which the judiciary and academics (medical lawyers and 
political philosophers) can engage in collective reflection – through seminars, 
colloquia, retreats, joint writing of papers, the creation of specialist journals - on the 
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influence on jurisprudence on academic thought and vice-versa. There is also a case 
for contributing to an increasingly profession system of inducting the judiciary into 
judicial practice and continuing professional education. It is difficult – and 
undesirable – to be too prescriptive about how judicial practice should develop, but it 
is important in an ethically-controversial and politically-contentions area such as 
medical law, to encourage the judiciary to be more transparent about the influences 
which are brought to bear on legal judgements which can significantly influence 
public policy.  
 
7.4.3 The contribution of the law to ethical and political debate 
The judiciary has a vital function in contributing to ethical and political debate. 
Legal cases, such as Bland (1993), Re A (2001), and very recently Nicklinson (2012), 
demonstrate how medical court cases can become the focus of wider public 
participation in moral debate. Judges cannot avoid making moral decisions however 
much they may protest that they are simply applying the law. Yet it is essential that 
judges develop a clear normative framework for decision-making in ethically-
contentious medical cases. If the judiciary is to undertake this task seriously, then 
there will need to be greater discussion by the courts of the moral conflicts inherent 
in the medical cases that arise for adjudication. The value conflicts which the courts 
tend current to obscure (‘the court is a court of law, not an arbiter of morals’) could 
be made more explicit and the court made a place where matters affecting the 
community can be discussed and deliberated upon. This would of course raise 
questions about the proper limits of judicial discretion in formulating social policy. 
Cases such as Bland and very recently in Nicklinson have prompted enquiries about 
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the competence and the constitutionality of the courts in this area, e.g. voluntary 
euthanasia, assisted suicide and withdrawal of treatment. But as this thesis has 
shown, the law is not autonomous, but informed by dimensions of moral and 
political order. Medical jurisprudence has, and is, tackling some of the most 
fundamental moral issues of the day touching on matters of personal liberty and 
human freedom in the most sensitive and intimate aspects of human life. The 
decisions and deliberations of judges in these cases may be one place where wisdom 
might be found. 
 
7.5 THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF THE RESEARCH  
 
The distinctive feature of this thesis is its systematic investigation of a unique 
database of law reports, conducted in three layered cycles of enquiry, into judicial 
uses, meanings and formations of autonomy in ethically-controversial medical law 
cases. Its strengths are revealed in the result and the way the distinctive process of 
study enabled the result. The result is constituted in the empirical finding of the 
development of a conceptual language of autonomy over time; a temporal 
progression in conceptual language shaped by distinct traditions of legal rationality, 
informed by traditions of moral and political order; and a theory which proposes that 
judicial decision-making about autonomy in contentious medical cases is not to be 
understood as a rivalry of contested traditions, but as shaped by judges mediating of 
these traditions to meet the presenting cases. The results of the thesis on judicial 
decision-making were only possible because of the process of layered enquiry. The 
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distinctive methodology is constituted in the distinctive the interactive relationship 
with the data of law reports which required me to deepen the questions and method 
of enquiry if I was to answer the questions with which I began. When the limitations 
of each mode of enquiry were reached the investigation had to reach beyond the 
mode of investigation to a deeper mode of enquiry which extended the objects and 
form of analysis. This iterative methodology I came to understand as grounded 
theory which led to deepening layers of conceptual analysis, especially on the 
principal concept of the thesis autonomy. 
 
Some of the weaknesses of the thesis are the result of limitations of the study that are 
there by design. The study would have been improved had it been feasible to 
investigate all domestic medical law cases in which the ethical language of 
autonomy was used, which would have included cases which were not of particular 
note legally, or publicly. Study of the more expansive database would have reduced 
the risks of selection bias caused by the restriction of the study to cases of public 
importance according to the criteria set out in Appendix 4. There is a good case for 
expanding the database of law reports for study in future research to include both 
domestic cases and cases decided in other jurisdictions, e.g. the European Court of 
Human Rights and the United States. The limitations of the data base may reflect 
some of the disadvantages of the application of grounded theory which normally 
demands large volumes of data and the tensions between the evolving and inductive 
style of a flexible enquiry and the systematic methods of gathering, conceptualising 
and categorising data systematically. Some other weaknesses of the thesis are 
functions of the research process and have been discerned more clearly with the 
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benefit of hindsight. For example, it was at a relatively late stage in the research 
process that the significance of cases decided before the earliest point on the timeline 
became apparent. It was recognised rather that the use of ethical language in medical 
cases before ‘autonomy’ was first used in 1990 formed an important aspect of the 
periodisation of elemental uses of autonomy in English medical jurisprudence.  
 
7. 6 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
A number of these dimensions of enquiry not developed in the thesis provide 
potential avenues for future research.  These include detailed investigation of the 
influence of arguments of counsel on judicial determinations; the academic sources 
upon which the judiciary are relying in the medical law context; potential changes in 
the nature of judicial deliberation and judgement introduced by subtle changes in the 
structure and provenance of legal judgement; the history of medical law; and 
specifically in connection with autonomy, the disjunction between judicial rhetoric 
of autonomy and the reality of judicial decision-making. 
  
Firstly, systematic scrutiny of the skeleton arguments of, and/or interviews with, 
barristers, who have appeared in the research, or other, cases, could provide a 
potentially fruitful line of enquiry by illuminating the extent to which judicial uses of 
autonomy, and judicial appeal to academic literature, is influenced by legal argument 
presented in court. To what extent do barristers’ arguments in court serve as a source 
of philosophical ideas as well as legal and/or a register of broader social and 
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intellectual currents? To what extent is there evidence of a temporal progression of 
intellectual influence, explicit judicial acknowledgement of counsel’s contribution?46  
Secondly, examination of skeleton arguments and the law reports for evidence of 
academic influence on judicial deliberation could be taken further. It is 
acknowledged in the literature that there may be a growing trend of judicial reliance 
on academic literature for sources of law and guidance (Duxbury, 2008; Braun, 
2010). It is also accepted that there has been little systematic analysis of judicial 
citation practices within medical jurisprudence (James, 2008). Thirdly, analysis of 
bioethical input through expert-witnesses, interveners (amicus curiae briefs) in the 
resolution of legal disputes provides a third element of further investigation.  
 
This research would be important in order to determine whether and to what extent, 
the medical philosophic literature has had anything of merit to contribute to the 
analysis and resolution of cases with ethical dimensions or implications. It would 
also address a related concern (alluded to at the beginning of Chapter 2) relating to 
the ways in which the law might dictate, influence or shape the way in which 
bioethical issues are considered and resolved. Rich (2001) has considered the need to 
undertake an analysis of the amicus briefs in a number of landmark American cases 
with bioethical content in order to see whether and to what extent less dominant 
ethical approaches might have been aired in court, e.g. virtue ethics, narrative ethics, 
                                                                                       
 
46 In a private conversation with Adrian Hopkins QC, he indicated that leading medico-legal barristers 
such as Robert Francis QC and Adrian Whitfield QC were regularly using skeleton arguments in the 
late 1980s and early 1990’s. Mr Hopkins himself was a junior barrister at the time and involved in 
two cases included in the research sample Re F (1990) and Re C (1994) in which the barristers 
mentioned above appeared.  
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care ethics etc. His contention is premised on the view that questions of political 
morality lie at the heart of debates over the relationship between ethical theory and 
medical jurisprudence and that the ethical principle that is most consistently cited in 
medical jurisprudence is respect for patient autonomy.  
 
Fourthly, the evolving character of legal judgements was alluded to. The 
introduction of a neutral citation system, numbered paragraphs and the increasing 
incidence of composite judgements may be exerting a loosening influence on the 
relationship between the factual and legal aspects of cases. These developments, in 
combination with the influence on European styles of adjudication, may be having 
an effect on traditional styles of adjudication within the English common law system 
(cf. Zander, 2004).  
 
Fifthly, perhaps the most important area for future research suggested by this thesis 
is in the history of medical law. This research has made a modest contribution to the 
as yet underdeveloped historical jurisprudence in the medico-legal context (Laurie, 
2006a). The relatively late usage of the term ‘autonomy’ in the English medical 
jurisprudence was a surprise and unexpectedly led to a ‘periodisation’ of the judicial 
use of ethical language which perhaps would not otherwise occurred. Brazier has 
written that the “history of medical law has been little explored, at least by legal 
scholars” (2008: 464). Little has been written about the social and historical 
processes that have contributed to the development of medical law taking into 
account the interaction between medicine, law, ethics and society (Price, 2010). A 
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more rigorous periodising of the discipline of medical law is needed, of how the 
development of the judicial use and understanding of autonomy fits into the general 
history of medical law and ethics. It has become apparent during the course of this 
research that judicial reliance on foreign case law was crucial to judicial use, 
understanding and development of autonomy. The jurisprudential roots of autonomy 
need to be more fully explored.  
Finally, attention was drawn in Chapter 2 to Veitch’s (2007) exploration of the 
disjunction between the explicit and implicit reasons that influence judicial 
determinations in medical law cases. Veitch argues that the respect shown by judges 
to the opinions of medical professionals is contributing the existence of a concept of 
‘principled autonomy’ in the jurisprudence, in contrast with the rhetorical presence 
of ‘individualistic autonomy’.  Veitch’s work has been supplemented by that of 
Maclean (2009) and McLean (2010), who have considered the presence of a concept 
of ‘relational autonomy’ in the jurisprudence. There is scope for a wider study 
investigating whether, and to what extent, contributions to concepts of autonomy 
other than individualistic autonomy are being made in other cases not considered by 
Veitch (especially principled and relational autonomy). This thesis has alluded to 
growing awareness within the literature that there are alternative models of 
autonomy to the dominant individualistic one (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; O’Neill, 
2002; Veitch, 2007; Foster, 2009; Maclean 2009; McLean, 2010).  
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Afterword 
 
 
 
In the month in which this thesis was completed the High Court considered whether 
an ethically-contentious medico-legal case should receive a full-hearing.
47
 Mr Justice 
Charles sitting in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court was required to 
consider the preliminary question whether the claimant’s arguments had a realistic 
prospect of success at a full hearing and whether there was any other compelling 
reason why the case should be tried. The case concerns a 58-year-old man who 
suffered a stroke in 2005 which left him paralysed below the neck and unable to 
speak. He can communicate with an Eye Blink computer and limited head 
movements. He states that he has “no privacy or dignity” left and does not wish to 
spend the next 20 years of his life in such condition. He states that he is “asking for 
my right to choose when and how to die to be respected” (para. 3).   
 
The High Court judge remarks that the underlying issues in the case ‘have great 
social, ethical and religious significance’ (para. 1) echoing the sentiments of Lord 
Bingham in the House of Lords case in Pretty (2002). These ‘are questions on which 
widely differing beliefs and views are held, often strongly.’  The court 
acknowledges, by implication, that its determination will represent a particular 
response to these issues in a culture of moral pluralism. Whether it likes it or not, the 
court will be dictating a moral position to individuals (to Mr and Mrs Nicklinson) in 
                                                                                       
 
47 Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice & Ors [2012] EWHC 304 (QB). 
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a liberal democracy, thus more raising once the issue of medical law’s ‘legitimacy’ 
(Montgomery, 2006a). The court considered whether to ‘strike out’ the proceedings 
or to allow judicial review, concluding that the claimant’s arguments had a realistic 
prospect of success and was therefore justiciable. Amongst the legal orders sought 
were declarations that the doctrine of ‘necessity’ (which had been extensively 
explored in Re A (2001)) could be extended to allow the termination or assisted 
termination of Mr Nicklinson’s life, and that the current UK law on voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide was contrary to his rights under Article 8 of the 
European Convention. 
 
The court’s decision, albeit at a preliminary legal stage, is surprising in view of 
intense Parliamentary scrutiny to which these legal issues have recently been 
subjected, e.g. Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL], two unsuccessful 
assisted suicide amendments to the Coroners and Justice Bill (now the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009) . As late as March 2012, the House of Commons’ Backbench 
Business Committee affirmed its support of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ 
(DPP) official prosecution guidelines on assisted dying, while refusing to enshrine 
those guidelines in statute. Richard Ottaway MP opined that “Parliament and not the 
courts should have the last word on prosecuting policy and the criminal law.”48 Yet, 
were the claimant to succeed in their claim at a full trial of the issues, the courts will 
have effected one of the most significant and controversial changes in medical law in 
                                                                                       
 
48 Hansard HC Deb vol 542 col 1363 (27 March, 2012) [Electronic version]. 
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recent years. It will have done so either through the inductive  common law strategy 
of incrementally extending a common law principle (‘necessity’) to cover a new 
situation (assisted suicide/voluntary euthanasia), or the deductive European human 
rights strategy of identifying a full (i.e. non-rebutted prima facie) autonomy right to 
decide the manner and timing of one’s death. These common law and civil law 
strategies would obviate the current lack of democratic will (through the elected 
representative) expressed through the instrumental rationality of statute.  
 
Mrs Nicklinson, the claimant’s wife and an interested party to the litigation, 
succinctly express the reason for the appeal to the courts:  
 
I'm delighted that the issues surrounding assisted dying 
are to be aired in court. Politicians and others can 
hardly complain with the courts providing the forum 
for debate if the politicians continue to ignore one of 
the most important topics facing our society today. 
"It's no longer acceptable for 21st Century medicine to 
be governed by 20th Century attitudes to death”. 49 
 
This claimant clearly has not felt “listened to”, even though there has been copious 
Parliamentary debate and scrutiny of the issues surrounding the assisted termination 
of life. Perhaps this is because Parliamentarians are required to think about these in 
general, rather than particular, terms.  The fact-based nature of the common law 
process promises detailed and focussed engagement with the predicament of a 
particular individual, or individuals, and a clear resolution of the case. The processes 
of “tough law” seem to offer litigants the possibility of a catharsis which generalised 
                                                                                       
 
49  http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/mar/12/locked-in-syndrome-sufferer-court-hearing 
[accessed  15th March, 2012] 
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legislative scrutiny cannot hope to achieve. Even though the court will take the final 
decision about what happens to Mr Nicklinson out of his hands, there will perhaps be 
the consolation, of knowing that he and his wife could have done nothing more to 
influence the outcome.  
 
The courts continue to play an important role in the modern English polity. They 
look like the only forum currently willing and equipped to resolve cases of ethical 
complexity. While philosophy and ethics has many, and perhaps increasing, 
opportunities to make a contribution in the legal arena, the courts alone seem capable 
of achieving some form of closure when ethical controversy seems otherwise 
intractable: making decisions, imposing sanctions and establishing priorities. The 
complex practice of medical law, and the ethical discourse which is inherent, will 
continue to develop and become more sophisticated in response to the demands of 
the assertive citizen in a morally plural culture as this most recent case demonstrates. 
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Appendix 1 
Case Summaries: facts, determination and legal significance 
 
Re F (1990) – Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
A cognitively-impaired 36-year-old woman developed a sexually-active relationship 
with another patient in the hospital where she was a voluntary in-patient. The 
patient’s mother and hospital authorities considered that it would be in her ‘best 
interests’ to seek compulsory sterilisation because it would be impractical to apply 
contraceptive measures, or to restrict her movements. The Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords held that compulsory sterilisation would be lawful if the procedure 
was required as a matter of ‘necessity’ or as a result of an assessment of the patient’s 
‘best interests’. Although the court could not authorise the procedure itself under its 
inherent jurisdiction at common law, it did have the authority to make a declaration 
as to whether sterilisation surgery would be in the ‘best interests’ of a patient who 
was unable to give consent by virtue of mental incapacity. In the circumstances, the 
court held that it would be lawful to sterilise the women concerned.  
 
Re W (1992) – Court of Appeal 
A 16-year-old girl with a tragic family history developed symptoms of anorexia 
nervosa and was admitted to a residential unit for treatment. When her condition 
worsened it was proposed that she be transferred to a new unit specialising in eating 
disorders. The girl made it clear that she would refuse consent to this prompting the 
local authority to apply for leave to transfer her to it. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
High Court decision that it had authority to authorise medical treatment in spite of 
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her competent refusal. It held that although 16 or 17-year-old children had a statutory 
right to be treated as if they were adults for the purposes of consenting to diagnosis 
and treatment, it did not include a comparable right to refuse such. Refusal could be 
overridden by lawful parental authority or the court in the exercise of its inherent 
jurisdiction, especially in cases in which treatment was necessary to prevent death or 
serious harm to the patient.  
 
Re T (1993) – Court of Appeal 
A young pregnant woman, injured in a car accident, refused a potentially life-
sustaining blood transfusion, allegedly under the influence of her mother, an 
observant Jehovah’s Witness. The Court of Appeal unanimously determined that she 
lacked legal competence and that a blood transfusion could be administered without 
her agreement. Their reasons for doing so varied: one judge held that the patient 
lacked mental capacity; another that she had not made her decision voluntarily; the 
third judge seemed to hold that the reasons for the patient’s refusal were not 
applicable in the circumstances. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal unanimously and 
explicitly recognised a right to refuse medical treatment even if the decision is 
irrational and life-threatening, including the right to make an anticipatory refusal.  
This statement of law was, strictly speaking, ancillary (i.e. obiter) because while the 
patient’s right to refuse was recognised, it was not actually applied because of the 
patient’s lack of competence.  
 
Bland (1993) – Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
A 17-year-old football supporter was crushed and asphyxiated at the Hillsborough 
football disaster, suffered hypoxic brain damage and was eventually diagnosed as 
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being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Although he had a functioning brain 
stem, he had lost all higher brain function and it was agreed by his treating clinicians 
and family that there was no realistic prospect of recovery. The hospital authorities, 
with the agreement of the family, sought declarations authorising the discontinuance 
of existing, and withholding of all future, life-sustaining measures, including 
ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial means, except treatment that would 
enable him to die peacefully, with dignity, and without pain or distress. The Court of 
Appeal and House of Lords upheld the declarations sought. They held that: the 
sanctity of life principle was not absolute; artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) 
constituted medical treatment rather than basic care; withdrawing medical treatment 
included ANH, was an ‘omission’ rather than an ‘act’; prolonging the patient’s life 
had ceased to be in his ‘best interests’; and, accordingly, his medical practitioners 
were no longer under a duty to continue life-prolonging treatment and might be 
under a duty to cease it.  
 
Re C (1994) – High Court  
A 68-year-old detainee in Broadmoor Hospital with diagnosed paranoid 
schizophrenia refused a potentially life-sustaining below-the-knee leg amputation. 
The High Court held that his refusal was legally competent because, in spite of his 
mental disorder, he was capable of understanding the ‘nature, purpose and effects’ of 
the treatment. In upholding this treatment refusal, the court rejected ‘status’ and 
‘outcome’ tests of competence for the mentally disordered, fin favour of a functional 
one.  The court formulated a three-stage incapacity test, which the court held the 
patient satisfied. This involved the ability to understand information, to use it and 
weigh it up. Because the patient was competent, the court, in contrast to Re T, the 
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court was able to apply legal rights (the right to refuse treatment, including advance 
refusals), rather than merely recognising them.  
 
Re MB (1997) – Court of Appeal  
A heavily-pregnant 23-year-old woman was admitted to hospital with a footling 
breech which posed mortal danger to her foetus and required an emergency 
caesarean section. The Court of Appeal declared her legally incompetent because her 
irrational fear of needles led her to refuse the operation, although she hoped for a 
successful delivery. The court, with minor modifications, reaffirmed the three-stage 
incapacity test laid down in Re C (1994) and established that it had no jurisdiction to 
authorise medical intervention regarding a competent pregnant woman who decides 
to forego treatment even though it might result in the death or serious harm to the 
foetus.  In so doing, it rejected the proposition, intimated in Re T (1993) that the 
presence of a viable foetus qualified a competent adult’s right to refuse medical 
treatment which threatened harm. The case also established that the assessment of 
‘best interests’ included emotional and welfare factors in addition to medical.  
 
St George’s (1999) – Court of Appeal 
A heavily pregnant 28-year-old woman with pre-eclampsia, fully aware of the risks 
to her and her foetus, refused admission to hospital because she wanted a natural 
birth. She was detained under the mental health legislation and a court declaration 
obtained, dispensing with her consent. This was overturned on appeal on grounds 
that the legislation had been improperly applied and that the hospital authorities had 
acted unlawfully in treating her against her wishes. The court reaffirmed that a 
competent person’s treatment refusal could not lawfully be overridden in the context 
287 
 
of advanced pregnancy and that the interests of the foetus could not outweigh those 
of the pregnant woman. It also established that the mental health legislation could 
not be employed simply because a person’s thought processes were idiosyncratic and 
to treat a condition unrelated to the treatment of her mental disorder.  
 
NHS Trust A (2001) - High Court  
Hospital authorities, with the support of their families and hospital staff, sought legal 
declarations under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) that it would be lawful to 
withdraw ANH from two adult patients who had been in PVS for nearly four years, 
and would not suffer pain and discomfort in the process. Granting the declarations, 
the court held that though such withdrawal was calculated to bring the patients’ lives 
to an end, they were not tantamount to ‘intentional deprivation of life’ in 
contravention of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Where medical professionals responsibly judge the continuance of life-sustaining 
medical treatment to be futile, its withdrawal is to be construed as a lawful 
‘omission’, rather than an ‘act’ falling outside the ambit of the ECHR. The court also 
held that continuance of intervention against the ‘best interests’ of the patient would 
represent a violation of the patients’ autonomy, and thus Article 8 of the Convention 
even though they were permanently insensate. Moreover, because the patients’ 
would be unable to experience continued treatment as ‘inhuman and degrading’, 
such treatment would not constitute breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
Pretty (2002) – House of Lords  
A 40-year-old woman in the advanced stages of motor neurone disease (MND) 
sought an undertaking from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that he would 
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not, in the exercise of statutory discretion under the Suicide Act 1961, prosecute her 
husband should he help her to commit suicide. The DPP declined to do so on 
grounds that he lacked legal authority to grant the proleptic immunity sought. The 
claimant argued by way of judicial review that the DPP’s refusal infringed her  
Convention rights incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The court 
held (a decision subsequently upheld by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)) that while legalised assisted suicide was compatible with the HRA, this 
did not confer a right to it. It found that there had been no prima facie violations of 
any of the claimant’s rights, and that even if Article 8 (the right to ‘private life’) 
were engaged the UK’s ‘blanket ban’ on assisted suicide could be justified under 
Article 8(2).  
 
Re B (2002) – High Court  
A 42-year-old woman suffered a haemorrhage of the blood vessels in the spinal 
column of her neck which left her tetraplegic and ventilator dependent. Though not 
terminally-ill, the negligible prospect of recovery and a normal life led her to request 
the discontinuance of the ventilation which was keeping her alive. Her treating 
clinicians refused to accede to her wish on grounds that it would amount to killing 
and was incompatible with the integrity of the medical profession. After much 
equivocation, they changed their minds and concluded that she had regained 
capacity, but were still unwilling to switch off the ventilator. The patient refused 
various options for rehabilitation including transfer to a spinal rehabilitation unit and 
‘one-way weaning’. The High Court declared that the patient had had from the date 
of an independent psychiatric assessment mental capacity to make her own decisions 
and that the continuance of life-supporting against her wishes constituted an assault 
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for which the hospital authorities and clinicians would be liable in damages.  She 
was therefore entitled to have her ventilation removed notwithstanding that it would 
lead to her death. The court preferred the autonomy of the severely disabled patient 
over the qualms expressed by the medical professionals.  
 
Chester (2005) – House of Lords  
A woman with a degenerative spinal condition (cauda equina syndrome) underwent 
surgery to remove three discs in order to relieve long-standing lower back pain. She 
suffered nerve damage resulting in increased incapacity and pain. There had been a 
small risk of significant harm (1-2%) which materialised and of which she claimed 
she had not been informed by her consultant neuro-surgeon. She agreed that had she 
been so informed she would not have undergone the operation when she did but 
might have done so eventually.  The majority of the House of Lords (3: 2) held that 
even though she was not entitled to succeed according to traditional causation 
principles (the so-called ‘but for’ test), she could nevertheless recover in damages. 
The majority justified this by modifying the traditional legal position arguing that the 
duty to inform was based on the principle of autonomy (which failure to respect was 
regarded as a form of ‘damage’) rather than just compensating a successful claimant 
for physical damage consequent upon failure to inform.  
 
Re Z (2005) – High Court 
A 65-year-old woman suffered from the fatal progression of a neuro-degenerative 
disease (cerebellar ataxia). Having lost the physical ability to commit suicide herself, 
she wished with the help of her husband to travel to Switzerland for an assisted 
suicide there. The local authority, holding that she was a vulnerable adult, invoked 
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the inherent jurisdiction of the court which granted a temporary injunction 
restraining the woman’s husband from removing her from the jurisdiction on 
grounds that he would be committing an offence under section 2(1) of the Suicide 
Act 1961. The case raised the narrow issue whether the local authority had a 
statutory duty to prevent a person from assisting somebody fro travelling abroad for 
an assisted suicide.  
 
Burke (2005) and (2006) – High Court and Court of Appeal  
A 44-year-old man with cerebellar ataxia sought judicial review to determine 
whether certain provisions of the General Medical Council’s (GMC) guidelines on 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, accurately reflected the law, in particular 
the relevant Articles (3 and 8) of the European Convention. He was fearful that a 
reasonable interpretation of those provisions might allow his treating clinicians 
lawfully to withdraw treatment once he was unable to express his true wishes, either 
through the loss of mental capacity, or because he had become incommunicado. The 
High Court judge held that the guidelines did not accurately summarise the law as it 
stood as they gave insufficient weight to patient autonomy. The Court of Appeal 
overturned the High Court decision holding that the GMC guidelines in the 
hypothetical scenario the claimant envisaged adequately addressed his concerns and 
therefore did not impinge upon his human rights.  
 
Purdy (2009) and (2010) – Court of Appeal and House of Lords  
A 45-year-old woman with progressive multiple sclerosis (MS), leaving her 
wheelchair dependent and with swallowing problems, feared the consequences of 
progressive weakness and decreasing mobility and deteriorating cognitive ability. 
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She wanted the option of pre-empting these consequences of her condition by 
seeking an assisted suicide abroad with the help of her husband. She sought judicial 
review of the Director of Public Prosecution’s (DPP) refusal to produce a crime-
specific prosecution policy for assisted suicide and clarify the factors that would 
weight into the exercise of his discretion under section 2(4) of the Suicide Act 1961. 
The Court of Appeal rejected her application reaffirming that human rights under 
Articles 8 did not incorporate the right to be assisted by others to die. It also held that 
even if her rights were engaged under Article 8, the UK’s “blanket ban” on assisted 
suicide was justified under Article 8 (2) of the Act. The House of Lords upheld her 
appeal from the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords, following the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Pretty, as opposed to its own decision 
in the same case, held that the claimant’s rights under Article 8 were engaged and 
extended to the protection of personal autonomy in end-of-life decision-making. The 
DPP could not rely on the clear legal basis for the limiting autonomy in the suicide 
legislation because the discretion it afforded him, and the manner in which he 
exercised it, was insufficiently clear and accessible to allow foreseeability. 
Accordingly, the court directed the DPP to produce offence-specific guidelines 
guaranteeing legal certainty.  
 
Yearworth (2010) – Court of Appeal 
Six male claimants consented to undergo chemotherapy treatment after being 
diagnosed with cancer and were invited by the hospital authorities to provide 
samples of their semen for frozen storage in their licensed unit. The samples were 
frozen immediately and stored, but, in spite of the authorities’ undertaking that the 
samples would be looked after “with all possible care”, they were later irretrievably 
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damaged when the liquid nitrogen in which they were stored fell below the requisite 
temperature. The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s decision that the loss of 
the sperm was not bodily injury recoverable in damages, and that there was there 
evidence of psychological harm which would if present at most attract nominal 
damages. However, the Court of Appeal held, overturning the High Court’s decision 
on this point, that the destruction of the sperm amounted to “damage to property” 
and that the claimants’ could have property interests in parts or the products of the 
human body. The Court declared that for the purposes of their claim in negligence 
the men had ownership of the sperm which their bodies had produced.  
 
Re A  (2011) – High Court 
A 29-year-old woman with a low IQ (53) was married to a man with a similarly low 
level of cognitive functioning. Before her marriage, she had had two children 
removed from her at birth, made subject to care orders and later adopted. She had 
also been  made subject to guardianship order under the Mental Health Act 1983 and 
provided with local authority accommodation and support including a monthly depot 
injection of contraception. After her marriage, her contact with social services was 
severely reduced and concerns arose for her welfare, including allegations of 
domestic violence and discontinuance of contraceptive treatment. It was agreed that 
the extent of her cognitive impairment amounted to mental impairment for the 
purposes of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) but there was dispute as to 
whether she had capacity as to the use of contraception. The High Court held that she 
lack capacity to refuse it because she was unable to understand, retain, and weigh the 
“information relevant to the decision”. The court held that test of understanding was 
restricted to the ‘proximate medical issues’ rather than the “wider social 
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consequences” of childbirth and childrearing, because the application of the wider 
test would blur the boundary between capacity and “best interests”. But the woman 
failed even the restricted test, not through lack of understanding, but because of the 
coercive pressure of her husband rendered incapable of weighing up the relevant 
information adequately. The court in the exercise of its broad inherent jurisdiction, 
decided not to enforce continued contraceptive treatment in the woman’s “best 
interests” but a regime of enablement and support designed to empower her, free of 
coercion, to weigh up the relevant information relating to contraceptive treatment.  
 
D Borough Council (2011) – High Court 
A 41-year-old man with an IQ assessed at 48 developed a sexual relationship with 
another man and began expressing sexually-inappropriate behaviour in public. The 
local authority sought a court order stating that he lacked mental capacity to consent  
to sexual relations and restricting contact with his sexual partner. Analogous 
precedents concerning tests of capacity to consent to marriage and contraception set 
a low threshold of understanding. The court held that the test for capacity to engage 
in sexual relations was directed towards the nature of the act (act-specific), rather 
than the identity of the sexual partner (person-specific). The court held that the 
coming into force of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) had not changed this. An 
act-specific test of capacity to consent to sex required understanding and awareness 
of (1) the mechanics of the act; (2) the health risks involved; and (3) the possibility 
of a woman becoming pregnant through sex. The court held that the man did not 
even satisfy the narrower ‘act-specific’ test. However, the court held that it was a 
fundamental principle of recent mental health legislation (especially the MCA) that a 
person should not definitively be treated as mentally incapacitous unless all 
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practicable steps had been taken to help him. The court was aware that the 
curtailment of sexual autonomy raised profound questions of civil liberties and 
personal autonomy. The court issued an interim order directing the local authority to 
provide the man with sex education in the hope that he would gain capacity and a 
review order with a view to making a final determination 9 months hence.  
 
Re M (2011) – High Court 
A 43-year-old woman suffered viral encephalitis, fell into a coma, and was 
eventually diagnosed as being in a minimally-conscious state (MCS), with minimal 
prospect of substantial recovery. Although the woman was clinically stable, the 
applicant sought a court order for the withdrawal of medical treatment under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) on the basis that it would be in her ‘best 
interests’. The High Court held that it needed to employ an objective test in order to 
determine the patient’s best interests and that any decisions relating to the 
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment from patients in permanent 
vegetative state (PVS) or MCS required a court hearing. The court found that the 
patient had not executed a valid and applicable advance refusal of treatment of life-
sustaining treatment. The principle of the sanctity of life (SOL), although not 
determinative, weighed heavily in this case and was not offset by the patient’s 
previous generally-expressed wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment. The 
determination of best interests with reference to established (common law) legal 
principles and/or the ‘balance sheet’ approach, or the assessment of best interests,  
did not constitute breach of the patient’s rights under Articles 2 (right-to-life) and 8 
(right-to-private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
court further held that the balance sheet approach, comparing the advantages and 
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disadvantages of continuing treatment, should be applied in every case apart from 
PVS, where continued treatment was futile. This was the first case addressing the 
legality of withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) from a patient in a 
MCS.  
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Appendix 2 – Autonomy: the concept and its conceptions 
 
1. Autonomy 
 
Cases Direct references Domestic 
cases 
Overseas cases Counsel’s 
arguments 
References  
in 
headnotes  
Re F (1990) p. 78F   p. 45E-F  
Re W (1992) pp.81E-F, 87G, 
87H, 88A, 88E 
    
Re T (1993)   p.117A   
Bland 
(1993) 
pp.826F, 827E, 
827F, p 893A 
    
Re C (1994) p. 292G (x3)      
Croydon 
(1995) 
    p.134F 
Re MB 
(1997) 
p. 436     
St. George’s 
(1999) 
pp.35C, 43F-G 
(heading), 43G, 
46H, 47B, 50H, 52A, 
60B, 62B 
   p.27A 
Re A (2001) pp.153E-F 
(heading), 176G-H 
(heading), 177G, 
219B, 230H (x2), 
249G, 255E, 258H 
(x2) 
  pp.350C, 350F  
NHS Trust A 
(2001) 
pp.358D, 358H, 
361F 
    
Re AK 
(2001) 
p. 134     
Pretty 
(2002) 
pp. 821A, 821C, 
830D, 831B, 835H,  
 pp.819G, 
819H, 820G 
 p.801C 
Re B (2002) paras. 15-16 
(heading), 22, 27, 
68, 70 (x2), 72, 80, 
81, 82 (x3), 83 (x2), 
94 (x2), 100(x),  
para.19 para.19   
Wilkinson 
(2002)  
 p.427B    
Re AK 
(2004) 
p. 134     
Burke 
(2005) 
pp. 443B, 443D, 
443E (heading), 
444B, 445F 
heading, 445F, 
445G-H, 447B, 
447C, 451E, 
451H (x2), 452C, 
pp. 430E-
F (x2), 
444A 
(x2),467E 
pp. 444A 
(x2), 447B, 
447C 
  
297 
 
453C (x2), 453G 
(x2),453H, 465B, 
465C, 465D, 
467F, 467GQ, 
468F, 468G, 
469A (x2), 469C, 
469D (x2), 
475GQ, 479D, 
479E, 481D (x2), 
481H, 482A (x2), 
494E (x2), 495B 
(x2), 495C (x2) 
Re Z 
(2005) 
pp. 965C, 966G pp.963C, 
965F, 
965G 
   
W 
Healthcare 
Trust 
(2005) 
pp.838D     
Burke 
(2006) 
pp.280ESA (x2), 
283BSA, 
283DSA, 
284DSA (x2), 
286ASA, 
286BSA,286CSA, 
287CSA, 295G, 
296E, 296F (x2), 
297F   
    
Purdy 
(2009) 
paras .9, 33 34, 
35, 36, 47 (x2), 
52, 55,  
paras. 35, 
36, 57 
(x2), 58, 
59, 60,  
para. 
42[61,][66] 
(x2), 44[74],  
  
Purdy 
(2010) 
pp. 353CSA, 
354CSA, 387F, 
389A, 397BQ, 
397C, 398D, 
398H, 399A (x3), 
400A, 400F, 404A 
  pp. 
354D,364E, 
364F(x3), 
364H, 366H, 
367D, 
 
D Borough 
Council 
(2011) 
pp.1259H, 
1267E(x2), 
1267F , 1268H 
    
Re A 
(2011) 
pp.64B, 81C    p.61G 
Re M 
(2011) 
paras. 94(x2), 95 
(x2), 225(x1), 226 
(x2) 
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3. Bodily Integrity  
 
Cases Direct references Domestic 
cases 
Overseas  
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments  
References 
in headnotes 
Re F 
(1990) – 
Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp.11G,  13B, 13F, 
13H - 14A  16F, 
17F,  29G, 70D, 
70E, 72E-G, 73B-D, 
76E 
pp. 11H- 
12A, 14E, 
16C, 27G, 
35B, 36A-B, 
36F-G,  
pp. 35E 
(USA), 35F 
(Canada) 
pp. 44B, 
44F, 45A 
 
Re W 
(1992) 
   p. 69E  
Re T 
(1993) 
  pp.116H-
117A 
(Canada) 
p. 101E  
Bland 
(1993) – 
Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp.821E, 822A, 
822G, 828E, 829E, 
859D, 880E, 883E, 
884B, 891D, 891F, 
892C,  
  pp. 838D , 
846H, 848C, 
848H, 849A, 
849B, 849C, 
849D, 850B, 
850C, 850D, 
850G,  
p.789H 
Re C 
(1994) 
     
Croydon 
(1995) 
     
Re MB 
(1997) 
pp. 443-4,   p.444 (USA)  p.426 
St. 
George’s 
(1999) 
pp. 26H, 27A, 44D, 
44E, 46H, 50G, 
50H,  
 p. 47E 
(USA), 49C 
(Canada) 
p.32B,   
Re A 
(2001) 
pp. 165D, 177E, 
184B-C, 189H, 
190B, 199F, 
215A,218B, 219A, 
240E, 249G,251H,  
255H, 257C 
pp. 176E-F, 
177D, 
p. 176H 
(USA) 
  
NHS Trust 
A (2001) 
p.361F (x 2)   p.351E-F  
Re AK 
(2001) 
     
Pretty 
(2002) 
p. 818C pp., 813G p.819G 
(Canada) 
 804H 
Re B 
(2002) 
 paras.17. 23, 
24 
   
Wilkinson 
(2002)  
pp.427D, 427H, 
428A, 433D 
pp. 427B    
Razgar 
(2004) 
p.382F     
Burke 
(2005) 
pp. 446F, 448E, 
466F, 469A, 472H, 
482A, 495C 
p.467G    
Re Z 
(2005) 
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W 
Healthcare 
Trust 
(2005) 
p.838D-E (x2)     
Burke 
(2006) 
     
Purdy 
(2009) 
Paras. 34, 35, 42, 47 
(x2), 55, 57, 58 
    
Purdy 
(2010) 
p.397C-D     
D Borough 
Council 
(2011) 
     
Re A 
(2011) 
    p.61G 
Re M 
(2011) 
Para.95 (x2)      
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4. Self-determination 
 
Cases Direct 
references 
Domestic 
cases 
Overseas  
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments  
Headnotes 
Re F 
(1990) – 
Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp.44H-45A, 
45E-F, 73C 
    
Re W 
(1992) 
   pp.69E, 70B-
C, 71D-E 
 
Re T 
(1993) 
pp.112E   pp. 116H-
117A 
  
Bland 
(1993) – 
Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp. 816F, 819C-
D, 820G, 821E, 
822E, 826F, 
826H, 827A, 
827B, 827D, 
827G, 827H, 
828C, 829F, 
829H-830A, 
838A-B, 839A, 
842A-B, 864C, 
848C-D, 849C-
D, 849F, 852A, 
864C-D, 864D-
E, 865B 
    
Re C 
(1994) 
pp. 290B , 290E, 
295D-E 
    
Croydon 
(1995) 
     
Re MB 
(1997) 
p.443     
St. 
George’s 
(1999) 
pp.35C, 35G 
(x2), 44A, 44B, 
46H, 47F, 52B 
    
Re A 
(2001) 
pp. 176H, 177C, 
177F, 248D-E, 
255E 
    
NHS Trust 
A (2001) 
pp.350A, 361F     
Re AK 
(2001) 
 pp.133-4 
(x3) 
   
Pretty 
(2002) 
pp. 810F, 811A-
B, 817E-F, 
817G-H, 842B,  
842G-H, 846E, 
  pp. 804H, 
805A, 805F, 
808E 
pp.800E,800G 
Re B 
(2002) 
paras. 47, 70, 95 paras. 19, 23, 
25, 
   
Wilkinson 
(2002)  
pp. 427D,      
Burke 
(2005) 
pp.443B-C, 
443E-F, 469A 
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Re Z 
(2005) 
pp.963C,. 965C, 
965 (x2) 
    
W 
Healthcare 
Trust 
(2005) 
 p.839G    
Burke 
(2006) 
pp.296F, 296G, 
298F 
    
Purdy 
(2009) 
     
Purdy 
(2010) 
pp. 400E-F, 
401F-G, 404A-B, 
405A 
pp. 389B-C    
D Borough 
Council 
(2011) 
     
Re A 
(2011) 
     
Re M 
(2011) 
para. 62     
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5.  Freedom of Choice  
 
Cases Direct 
references 
Domestic 
cases 
Overseas 
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments  
Headnotes 
Re F (1990) – 
Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
     
Re W (1992)      
Re T (1993) pp. 102C, 
102D-E, 
102E, 102F, 
102G, 102H, 
102H-103A, 
103B-D, 
111G, 112B-
C113D, 115F-
G, 116F-G, 
120H-121A, 
122C 
 pp. 116H-
117A 
(Canada) 
p.98F  
Bland (1993) – 
Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp. 817A, 
828F, 
829H,830A 
891G-H, 
830E, 830G, 
891H 
  p.842E p.790B 
Re C (1994) pp.293A, 
295C 
p. 294E    
Croydon 
(1995) 
     
Re MB (1997) pp.431, 432, 
436, , 444(x3) 
pp. 433, 435, 
440 
pp. 443-444 
(USA) 
  
St. George’s 
(1999) 
 pp. 44F, 
45E,  
p.49D 
(Canada) 
p.34C,  
Re A (2001)  pp.177A, 
177E-F 
   
NHS Trust A 
(2001) 
     
Re AK (2001)      
Pretty (2002) pp.810F, 
817F, 834G-
H, 835H 
 pp. 819B 
(Canada), 
819G 
(Canada) 
  
Re B (2002) paras., 68, 69, 
70 
paras. 18, 
19, 20, 22, 
23 
paras.21 
(USA) 
  
Wilkinson 
(2002)  
     
Burke (2005) pp. 430E-F, 
443B-CQ, 
443E-F, 
443H-444AQ, 
444A-BQ, 
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444B-
C,447B-C, 
453FQ, 465C, 
482D, 494D-
E 
Re Z (2005)      
W Healthcare 
Trust (2005) 
     
Burke (2006) pp.301C, 
301F 
    
Purdy (2009)      
Purdy (2010) pp. 388F, 
388F-389A, 
pp.389B-CQ, 
389F, 397B-
CQ,  397C-
DQ, 397G, 
398C-D, 
398H-399A, 
400E-F 
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6. Dignity 
 
Cases Direct references Domestic 
cases 
Overseas 
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments  
Headnotes 
Re F 
(1990) – 
Court of 
Appeal 
and House 
of Lords 
     
Re W 
(1992) 
     
Re T 
(1993) 
     
Bland 
(1993) – 
Court of 
Appeal 
and House 
of Lords 
pp. 802F, 805D, 808A, , 
826F-G, 827C, 829F, 
830C, 830D, 830F-G856H, 
861E-F, 869D-E, 877G-H, 
879-880A, 897B-C  
 821G-H 
(USA), 
822B-C 
(New 
Zealand) 
pp.838C-D, 
846G-H, 
848D-H, 
849A-D, 
850B-C, 
850F-G, 
851G, 852F, 
852H, 853A, 
pp.789C, 
794G-H, 
Re C 
(1994) 
p. 294C     
Croydon 
(1995) 
     
Re MB 
(1997) 
p.432     
St. 
George’s 
(1999) 
  p.955 
(Canada)  
  
Re A 
(2001) 
pp., 182D-E, 184B-C, 
186B, 188C, 196A, 197A-
B, 203C-D, 258D 
   pp. 148G-
H 
NHS Trust 
A (2001) 
   p. 350C, 
362F,  
 
Re AK 
(2001) 
p.137     
Pretty 
(2002) 
pp. 807E-F, 817F, 822H-
823A, 827G, 832E-G, 
842C-D, 848E-F 
 812G-H 
(ECtHR) , 
819G 
(Canada), 
820G 
(Canada) 
 pp. 804D 
Re B 
(2002) 
paras.45, 62     
Wilkinson 
(2002)  
 p.421C    
Razgar 
(2004) 
     
Burke 
(2005) 
pp.436E, , 443D, 444E-H, 
445C, 445E, 445F-H, 
pp. 443B-
C, 453E-
pp. 474E 
(ECtHR)  
  
305 
 
446H, 447D, 448C, 448F-
H, 449E-F, 450F-H, 451C-
D, 451E, 453C, , 453G, 
465B, 465E, 466E-F, 
467B-C, 468G-H, 469A, 
469C-E, 470C-D, 471F, 
473H-474A, , 474D, , 
479D-E, 481B-C, 481D, 
481E, 481F, 481F-482A, 
483A, 494D-E, 494E-F, 
494G, 494C, 494E, 497B-
E, 
F, 466B, 
474C 
Re Z 
(2005) 
p. 963C-D     
W 
Healthcare 
Trust 
(2005) 
p.840E     
Burke 
(2006) 
p.297F-G     
Purdy 
(2009) 
paras. 7, 33, 38, 42, 47, 56     
Purdy 
(2010) 
p.389D, 392G, 399E   pp.353C, 
354C, 
 
D Borough 
Council 
(2011) 
     
Re A 
(2011) 
p.85F     
Re M 
(2011) 
paras. 24, 35, 61, 95, 119, 
199, 217, 225, 239 
(heading)240, 241, 247 
p.ara. 64    
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7. Privacy 
 
Cases Direct references Domestic 
cases 
Overseas 
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments  
Headnotes 
Re F (1990) 
– Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp.21F, 45B , 61C     
Re W (1992) p.77H p. 86D 
(Latey 
Committ
ee 
Report) 
   
Re T (1993) p.102B     
Bland (1993) 
– Court of 
Appeal and 
House of 
Lords 
pp.821E, 828E, 
829E-F , 894E-F 
 pp. 821G 
(USA), 
822B 
(New 
Zealand),  
pp. 846H, 
848A-D, 
848E-G, 
848H, 
849A-D, 
850B, 
850F-G, 
851G, 
851G-H, 
852A, 
852E-F, 
853A-B 
 
Re C (1994)      
Croydon 
(1995) 
p.139H-140A     
Re MB 
(1997) 
p.442     
St. George’s 
(1999) 
  p.49C 
(Canada) 
  
Re A (2001) pp. 156B, 156C, 
194A 
    
NHS Trust A 
(2001) 
     
Re AK 
(2001) 
     
Pretty (2002) pp. 800E, 817D-E, 
817G, 818B, 821B-
C, 821D- F, 835E-G, 
836C-D, 846B-C, 
846E-F  
  p. 807G p. 800E 
Re B (2002)      
Wilkinson 
(2002)  
    pp. 419E, 
428A , 
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432G 
Burke (2005) pp.440B 445F-H, 
446B-D, 446E-F,  
pp. 445C, 
492E, 
491A-B 
pp. 446A-
B 
(ECtHR), 
448D-F 
(ECtHR), 
469C-F 
(ECtHR),  
  
Re Z (2005)      
W 
Healthcare 
Trust (2005) 
     
Burke (2006) p.306E-F     
Purdy (2009) para. 32[13] (x2), 
35[23],  
    
Purdy (2010) pp. 386C-H, 387G, 
388C-391G, 393C, 
397C, 397G, 399D, 
400F 
  pp.350C, 
351C, 
353A, 
364H, 
365A, 
366C,  
pp. 345F, 
345G 
D Borough 
Council 
(2011) 
 paras. 
32[27], 
33[42] 
   
Re A (2011) paras. 3, 77     
Re M (2011) para. 261 (x2)     
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8.  Physical Sovereignty  
 
Cases Direct references Domestic 
cases 
Overseas 
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments  
Headnotes  
Re A 
(2001) 
pp. 219A-B, 249C, 
255E, 258H 
    
 
 
9. Freedom from unwanted interference 
 
Cases Direct references Domestic 
cases 
Overseas 
cases 
Counsel’s 
arguments 
Headnotes 
Re F 
(1990A) 
 p.12C    
St 
George’s 
(1999) 
 pp.951, 953, 
954, 957-8 
   
Re A 
(2001) 
 p.176E-F    
Re B 
(2002) 
 para. 16    
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Appendix 3 – Academic literature in the medical law reports 
Cases/literature Classical legal  Contemporary legal 
textbooks, articles and 
reports 
Non-legal articles and 
documents 
Re F (1990) – 
Court of Appeal 
and House of 
Lords 
Blackstone (1830) 
(p.12A); Hawkins and 
Curwood (1824) 
(pp.15B, 36C);  
Keeton (1984) (p.74G)  
Re W (1992) – 
Court of Appeal 
 Bainham (1992) (p.75A-
D); Thornton (1992) 
(p.75A-D); Dyer (1992) 
(p.75A-D); Brazier 
(1992) (p.75A-D) 
Department of Health 
(1991)(p.75C); Latey 
(1967) (pp.77F, 86C) 
Re T (1993) – 
Court of Appeal  
  Mill (1859) (Counsel’s 
submission at p.98G) 
Bland (1993) – 
Court of Appeal 
and House of 
Lords 
Coke (1797) (p.853F 
(CS))  
Beynon (1982) (p.898B); 
Williams (1983a) 
(pp.866B, 882C, 895E); 
Kennedy (1988) (p.863G; 
868C, 895E); Skegg 
(1984) (p.882A-C, 895E-
F); Gunn & Smith (1985) 
(p.898B); Smith  (1988) 
(p.898B); Smith (1992) 
(p.853F (CS)); “Medical 
Technology (1990) 
(p.886H).  
Berlin (1969) (p.830D-
F); LRCC (1982) 
(pp.811F, 852A (CS); 
872F-H); BMA 
(1992)(pp.812C, 824C, 
870F-G, 875H, 885A); 
UKCCN (1992) 
(p.898F); Dworkin 
(1993) (p.826A) 
Re C (1994)    
Re MB (1997) – 
Court of Appeal 
 Kennedy and Grubb 
(1994) (p.437)  
Law Commission (1974) 
(p. 442; RCOG (1994) 
(p.438) 
St. George’s 
(1999) – Court of 
Appeal  
 Powers et al. 
(1994)(p.40G-H) 
 
Re A (2001) – 
Court of Appeal 
Bacon (1630)(p.221E-
G);  Hale (1736) (p. 
200H, 212G); Coke 
(1797) (p.210F-G, 
213B);  Hale (1800) 
(p.221A-D, 222C); 
Blackstone (1830) 
(p.178C); Blackstone 
(1857) (p. 200H, 212G, 
221D-E, 222C); 
Stephen (1883) (p. 
223E-G; 224D; 225C-
D) ; Stephen (1887) 
(p.225C-D); Bracton 
(1968) (p.220G); 
Archbold (2000) 
(p.210H, 211B, 212G) 
Royal Commission No.2 
(1836) (p. 222E-F); 
Royal Commission No.4 
(1839) (p.222G-H); 
Williams (1958) (p. 
213C); Fletcher (1973) 
(p. 236G); Law 
Commission  (1974) (p. 
226A); Law Commission 
(1977)  (p.226B); Cross 
(1978) (p. 226 D); 
Huxley (1978) (p.226 C-
D);Williams (1978)  
(p.226C-D); Beynon 
(1982) (p. 247G); 
Williams (1983b) 
(pp.226D-227F, 238C-D, 
240A);  Simpson (1984) 
(p. 224C); Gunn & Smith 
(1985) (p.247G); Law 
Commission (1985) 
(p.227F-G, 233C);Annas 
(1987) (p.197A-B, 209H, 
Hobbes (1650) (p.213A); 
Locke (1689) (p.213A); 
Cicero (1913) (p.229B); 
Hobbes (1968) (pp.221G-
221A); Hoyle & Thomas 
(1989) (p.206G); HoL 
(1994) (p.186E-F); Hsu 
et al (1995) (p.209E); 
Thomasma et al (1996) 
(p. 218F, 252E); Freeman 
et al (1997) (p. 208C-D); 
Atwell (1998) (p.206G-
H); Wilcox et al (1998) 
(p.208 H)  
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218F, 229G-230A, 
241D); Kennedy (1988) 
(p.189A-B);Smith & 
Hogan (1988) (p. 247G); 
Law Commission (1989) 
(p.228B); Smith (1989) 
(p.229B-D, 237H-238B, 
252E); Gardner (1991) 
(p. 230B); Finnis (1993) 
(p.184F-G); Law 
Commission (1992)  (p. 
228C, 239H);  Kennedy 
& Grubb (1993) (p.184F-
G); Kennedy & Grubb 
(1994) (p.184F-G; 217E); 
Keown (1997) (p.184F-
G, 186B, 187A, G-H; 
197A); Sheldon & 
Wilkinson (1997) 
(pp.207G, 241C); 
Ashworth (1999) (p. 
230E); Smith & Hogan 
(1999) (p. 230D);  
Pretty (2002) – 
House of Lords 
Blackstone (1769) (p. 
839C);  
Williams (1983b) 
(p.830D, 831D); CLRC 
(1980) (p. 822D, 823F); 
Marston (1993) (p. 
133F);  Otlowski (1997) 
(pp. 831E, 832C); 
Vickers (1997) (p. 832E); 
Clayton & Tomlinson  
(2000) (p. 811D); 
Boswell (1970); Dworkin 
(1993) (p. 831E); HoL 
(1994) (pp. 822G, 823G, 
829F-G, 838E, 842C-D, 
845A); Response (1994) 
(pp. 844C, 845A);  
Keown (1995) (pp. 831E, 
832E); Johnson & 
Symonides (1998) (p. 
833B); Council of 
Europe (1999) (pp.822H-
823A, 832E, 845E-H); 
Glendon (2001) (p. 
833B); UNHRC (2001) 
(p.832D); Warnock  
(2006) (p. 831E) 
Wilkinson (2002) 
– Court of 
Appeal 
 Law Commission (1995) 
(p.443D); DoH (1999) (p 
446H);Jones (1999) (p. 
435H-436A); LCD 
(1999) (p. 443D);  
Powers et al (Powers et 
al; 2000) (p. 437 F) 
Council of  Europe 
(1998) (p. 433A); Grisso 
& Applebaum (1998) (p. 
427A-B) 
Re B (2002)   Gardner et al (1985) 
(para. 63); Atkins (2000) 
(para. 81-83) 
Re Z (2005)     
Burke (2005)  Hale (2004) )(p. 451B-D; 
474H);  Kennedy & 
Grubb (2004) (p. 461A-
C; 484D, 484H);  
GMC (2002) (pp. 
430D,431E; 499G); 
BMA (2001) (p. 463E-
464A).  
Burke (2006)    GMC (2002) (p. 
287F;290H; 294C; 
294D; 294E) 
Purdy (2009)  Nil Nil Nil 
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Purdy (2010)  Williams (1965) (p. 
383F-G); Hall (1972) (p. 
383H); Law Commission 
(1998) (p. 392D; 360G); 
Smith & Hogan (2008) 
(p. 379D); Hirst (2009) 
(p. 382D-E; 384D)  
National Centre for 
Social Attitudes (2007) 
(p. 399C).  
Re A (2011) Nil Nil Nil 
D Borough 
Council (2011) 
Nil Nil Nil 
Re M (2011) Nil Nil Nil 
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Appendix 4 – criteria for selecting law reports 
 
Case name Year ‘Stigmata’ Significant 
Academic 
Commentary 
Significant  
Judicial 
Discussion  
Elemental 
Uses of 
autonomy 
Re M  2011         
A London Local 
Authority v JH 
     
Wright (A Child) v 
Cambridge Medical 
Group (A Partnership) 
      
D Borough Council 2010         
R (on the application 
of Purdy) v Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions* 
         
Re A           
D County Council v LS         
Yearworth v North 
Bristol NHS Trust 
         
L v Human 
Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority  
 
2008        
Trust A v H (An Adult 
Patient) 
2006       
R. (on the application 
of B) v S (Responsible 
Medical Officer, 
Broadmoor Hospital)* 
       
R. (on the application 
of Axon) v Secretary of 
State for Health 
        
An NHS Trust v D 2005     
R. (on the application 
of Burke) v General 
Medical Council* 
         
R. (on the application 
of B) v Haddock 
       
R. (on the application 
of B) v SS 
     
Chester v Afshar          
Re Z 2004     
Portsmouth NHS Trust 
v Wyatt* 
       
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Appendix 4 – continued  
 
Name of case Year ‘Stigmata’ Significant 
academic 
commentary  
Significant  
judicial 
Discussion 
Elemental 
Uses of 
autonomy 
W Healthcare NHS Trust 
v H 
2004       
Evans v Amicus 
Healthcare Ltd* 
        
X NHS Trust v T (Adult 
Patient: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment) 
     
Rees v Darlington 
Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust 
       
R. (on the application of 
PS) v G (Responsible 
Medical Officer) 
      
HE v A Hospital NHS 
Trust 
       
R. (on the application of 
Wooder) v Feggetter 
2002       
Re W (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment), 
      
B (Consent to 
Treatment: Capacity) 
         
R. (on the application of 
Pretty) v DPP 
2001         
R. (on the application of 
Wilkinson) v Broadmoor 
Hospital 
       
NHS Trust A v M; NHS 
Trust B v H 
 
         
Re A (Children) 
(Conjoined Twins: 
Medical Treatment)  
         
Re AK (Adult Patient) 
(Medical Treatment: 
Consent) 
         
McFarlane v Tayside 
Health Board 
1999       
St. George's Healthcare 
N.H.S. Trust v S. 
Regina v. Collins and 
Others, Ex parte S 
         
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Appendix 4 – continued 
 
Name of case Year ‘Stigmata’ Significant 
academic 
commentary 
Significant 
judicial 
discussion 
Elemental 
uses of 
autonomy 
R. v Bournewood 
Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust Ex p. 
L 
       
Re MB 1997         
C (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment), 
1994         
Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland* 
1993         
Re T (Adult: Refusal 
of Treatment) 
         
Re W (A Minor) 
(Medical Treatment: 
Court's Jurisdiction 
1992         
Re F (Adult)* 1990         
 
Note that 18 cases are highlighted. The cases of Re F, Bland, Burke and Purdy 
comprise 2 judgements each a different levels of the court hierarchy (cf. p. 74 of this 
thesis).  
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